



AD A 039316


A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS VIEW OF THE VIETNAM WAR 1965-1972

Editor: Thomas C. Thayer



Volume 9
POPULATION SECURITY

AD NO.
DDC FILE COPY



THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN DOWNGRADED
TO **UNCLASSIFIED** 9 MAY 1977

PER **QASD(PAE)RPASIA D**

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
None		(9) Final rept.
4. TITLE (and Subtitle)	5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED	
(6) A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS VIEW OF THE VIETNAM WAR 1965-1972, VOLUME 9. Population Security	Final Report 1965-1972	
7. AUTHOR(s)	6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER	
(10) Thomas C. Thayer	None	
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS	9. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)	
OASD(SA)RP Southeast Asia Intelligence Division Pentagon Washington, D.C. 20301	None	
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS	10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS	
OASD(PA&E)RP Asia Division Room 2C310, The Pentagon Washington, D.C. 20301	(11) 18 Feb 75 (12) 287p.	
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)	12. REPORT DATE	
Same as Above	February 18, 1975	
	13. NUMBER OF PAGES	
	2793	
	15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report)	
	Unclassified	
	15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE	
	N/A	
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)		
Distribution Unlimited. Suggest nomination to NTIS because material is of interest to scholars of the Vietnam War.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
This volume is part of a		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
Southeast Asia Analysis Report OASD(Systems Analysis) SEA Analysis Report VC/NVA Pacification		RVNAF Hamlet Evaluation System SE Asia Air Operations SE Asia Deployments SE Asia Logistics/Construction
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
This twelve volume set, which includes every article printed in the fifty issue series of the <u>Southeast Asia Analysis Report</u> . The SEA Analysis Report represented a month-by-month analysis of Vietnam War activity including forces and manpower, VC/NV operations, Allied ground, naval and air operations, RVNAF, casualties and losses, population security, war costs and inflation and construction and port operations in South Vietnam.		


DD FORM 1 JAN 73 1473A EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE

UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS VIEW OF THE VIETNAM WAR: 1965-1972

POPULATION SECURITY

VOLUME 9



Editor: Thomas C. Thayer

1-10 SECTION	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
1-11 SECTION	<input type="checkbox"/>
1-12 SECTION	<input type="checkbox"/>
BY	
DATE	
PA 23	

1072

A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS VIEW OF THE VIETNAM WAR: 1965-1972

Contents of the 12 Volumes

- Volume 1 - The Situation In Southeast Asia
- Volume 2 - Forces and Manpower
- Volume 3 - Viet Cong--North Vietnamese Operations
- Volume 4 - Allied Ground and Naval Operations
- Volume 5 - The Air War
- Volume 6 - Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF)
- Volume 7 - Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF)
- Volume 8 - Casualties and Losses
- Volume 9 - Population Security
- Volume 10 - Pacification and Civil Affairs
- Volume 11 - Economics: War Costs and Inflation
- Volume 12 - Construction and Port Operations in South Vietnam

A Systems Analysis View Of The Vietnam War: 1965-1972

Volume 9

POPULATION SECURITY

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Page</u>
Measuring Pacification Progress in SVN	Jan 67	1
Revolutionary Development Highlights	Apr 67	4
Hamlet Evaluation System	Jun 67	6
Hamlet Evaluation System	Jul 67	12
GVN Rural Population Control Progress	Aug 67	20
Population Control	Oct 67	32
HES Reporting As A Basis For Detailed Analysis	Nov 67	51
Statistical Trends From The Hamlet Evaluation System	Dec 67	53
RD Program: A 1967 Progress Report	Jan 68	62
Pacification Slowdown	Feb 68	66
Ambassador Komer Rebutts Our February Pacification Article	Mar 68	75
1967 Security Setback And Early Tet HES Results	Mar 68	79
Ambassador Komer Comments On March 1968 Articles	Apr 68	82
Post-Tet Pacification Regression	Apr 68	84
Status Of Pacification	Jul 68	89
First Half 1968 HES Reports	Aug 68	96
Rebuttal From Ambassador Komer	Sep 68	99
Pacification Trends	Sep 68	106
GVN Population Control And Enemy Activity	Dec 68	112
Pacification Assessment	Feb 69	119
Pacification Progress Report	May 69	128
Effects Of The 1968 Accelerated Pacification Campaign	Jun 69	113
Measurement Of Security In RVN	Jul 69	139
Pacification Status Report	Feb 70	145
Hamlet Evaluation System: 1970 Revision	Feb 70	151
HES/70 Data For January 1970	Mar 70	156
HES/70 Data For February 1970	Mar 70	159
HES/70 Data Through March 1970	Apr 70	164
HES/70 Data For April 1970	Apr/May 70	171
HES/70 Data For May 1970	Jun/Jul 70	177
HES/70 Data For June 1970	Jul 70	185
HES/70 Data For July 1970	Aug 70	190
HES Data For August 1970	Sep 70	200
HES Data For September 1970	Oct 70	204
Pacification Progress: September 1970	Sep/Oct 70	206
HES Data For October 1970	Nov 70	213
HES Data For November 1970	Nov/Dec 70	215
HES Data For December 1970	Jan/Feb 71	217
HES Ratings For January 1971	Jan/Feb 71	230
HES/71 Data For January-February 1971	Mar 71	238
HES Data For March 1971	Mar/Apr 71	240
HES Data For April 1971	May 71	246

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Page</u>
Pacification	Sep 71	249
HES Data For August 1971	Sep 71	250
Security Situation In Southern MR-1	Jun/Jul 71	253
Pacification Status -- September 1971	Aug/Oct 71	258
Pacification Trends In 1971	Nov 71/Jan 72	265
June HES/71 Results	Jul 72	271
Mid Year Pacification Assessment	Aug 72	273
December HES Results	Jan 73	274
January HES Results	Mar 73	276

INTRODUCTION

This volume, plus the other eleven volumes in the series, contains every article ever printed in the Southeast Asia Analysis Report (a few additional papers not printed in the report are occasionally included, too.).

Fifty issues of the Southeast Asia Analysis Report were published from January 1967 through January 1972 by the Southeast Asia office under the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis). The Report had two purposes. First, it served as a vehicle to distribute the analyses produced by Systems Analysis on Southeast Asia. It thus provided other agencies an opportunity to tell us if we were wrong and to help prevent research duplications. We solicited and received frequent rebuttals or comments on our analyses which sharpened our studies and stimulated better analysis by other agencies. Second, it was a useful management tool for getting more good work from our staff -- they knew they must regularly produce studies which would be read critically throughout the Executive Branch.

The first page of the Report stated that it "is not an official publication of the Department of Defense, and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Secretary of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), or comparable officials." The intent was solely to improve the quality of analysis on Southeast Asia problems -- and to stimulate further thought and discussion. The report was successful in doing precisely this.

We distributed about 350 copies of the Report each month to OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense), the Military Departments, CINCPAC, and Saigon, and to other interested agencies such as the Paris Delegation, AID, State Department, CIA and the White House Staff. Most copies circulated outside OSD were in response to specific requests from the individual person or agency. Our readership included many of the key commanders, staff officers, and analysts in Washington and in the field. Their comments were almost always generous and complimentary, even when they disagreed with our conclusions. Some excerpts appear below:

"I believe the 'SEA Analysis Report' serves a useful purpose, and I would like to see its present distribution continued." (Deputy Secretary of Defense, 31 May 1968)

"We used a highly interesting item in your May Analysis Report as the basis for a note to the Secretary, which I've attached." (State Department, 28 June 1967)

"We were all most impressed with your first monthly Southeast Asia Analysis Report. Not only do we wish to continue to receive it, but we would appreciate it if we could receive 4 (four) copies from now on." (White House, 9 February 1967)

"Ambassador _____ has asked me to tell you that he has much appreciated and benefited from the studies and analyses of this publication." (State Department/White House, 24 January 1969)

"Congratulations on your January issue. The 'Situation in South Vietnam' article was especially interesting and provoking." (State Department, 24 January 1969)

"I let Ambassador _____ take a swing at the paper. He made several comments which may be of interest to you. Many thanks for putting us back on distribution for your report. Also, despite the return volley, I hope you will continue sending your products." (MACV-CORDS, 17 June 1968)

"As an avid reader (and user) of the SEA Analysis Report, I see a need for more rounded analyses in the pacification field and fewer simplistic constructs." (MACV-DEPCORDS, 17 April 1968)

"The SEA Programs Division is to be commended for its perceptive analysis of topics that hold the continuing concern of this headquarters... The approach was thoughtfully objective throughout and it was particularly pleasing to note a more incisive recognition of factors that defy quantified expression." (Commander, US Army Vietnam-USARV, 29 November 1967)

"In general, I think it is becoming the best analytical periodical I've seen yet on Vietnam (though there's not much competition)." (MACV-DEPCORDS, 21 April 1967)

"Statistical extrapolations of this type serve an extremely useful purpose in many facets of our daily work." (CIA, 6 February 1967)

"One of the most useful Systems Analysis products we have seen is the monthly Southeast Asia Progress Report.... Indeed it strikes many of us as perhaps the most searching and stimulating periodic analysis put out on Vietnam." (President of The Rand Corporation, 22 October 1969)

In November 1968, 55 addressees answered a questionnaire about the Report: 52 said the report was useful, 2 said it was not, and 1 said, "The report does not meet an essential need of this headquarters;" nonetheless, it desired "to remain on distribution" for 7 copies. From 48 questionnaires with complete responses, we found that an average 4.8 people read each copy -- a projected readership of 500-950, depending on whether we assumed 1 or 2.4 readers of copies for which no questionnaire was returned.

Readers responding to the questionnaire reported using the Report for the following purposes:

Information	42%
Analysis	31%
Policy Making	11%
Briefings	7%
Other	9%
	<hr/> 100%

In addition, readers reported about equal interest in each of the seven subject areas normally covered in the Report.

VC/NVA	18%
Air Operations	20%
RVNAF	17%
Pacification	13%
Friendly Forces	12%
Deployments	12%
Logistics/Construction	8%
	<u>100%</u>

There was some negative reaction to the Report. Concern was expressed about "the distorted impressions" the Report left with the reader and its wide dissemination which "implies its acceptance by the Secretary of Defense, giving the document increased credibility."

Given the way in which the Southeast Asia Analysis Report was used, the important responsibilities of many of its readers, and the controversial aspects of the report, I decided to include in these twelve volumes every article ever published in a Southeast Asia Analysis Report. This will allow the users of these volumes to arrive at their own conclusions.

Thomas C. Thayer
February 18, 1975

CONFIDENTIAL

Jan 67

Review
done

MEASURING PACIFICATION PROGRESS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The shortcomings of the current means of reporting population and hamlet control as a measure of pacification in South Vietnam have become increasingly evident during the past year. To remedy these shortcomings, a new measurement system for assessing the security situation in rural South Vietnam was developed, tested, and adopted for implementation on January 1, 1967.

The new system is designed to yield comprehensive, quantifiable data on the security and development of every hamlet in South Vietnam under some degree of GVN control. Sub-sector advisors will evaluate each hamlet in their district on the basis of the grid structure shown on the following page. The grid structure includes six critical factors of pacification, each to be graded according to three indicators, thus minimizing the need for subjective judgement early in the measuring process.

Three of the factors relate to the security status of the hamlet: VC/NVA military activities, Viet Cong political and subversive activities, and Friendly capabilities. The three factors to measure revolutionary development are: administrative and political activities, economic development, and health, education and welfare. The numerically weighted letter grade assigned to each factor depends on the scores given each relevant indicator; the average of the six factor grades will determine the grade for the overall status of the hamlet.

The report will be a US Mission report, although American advisors will have to work with their Vietnamese counterparts in compiling it. The sub-sector reports will be collated at province headquarters and then sent into Saigon and fed into computer facilities at MACV. A summary report will be submitted monthly, in conjunction with the Mission's monthly report of revolutionary development progress. In addition, the basic data will be transmitted from the MACV computer to CINCPAC and Washington for use by agencies at those locations.

CONFIDENTIAL

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

HAMLET EVALUATION WORKSHEET

CONFIDENTIAL WHEN FILLED IN

B = Undergoing Clearing; D & C = Undergoing Rebuilding; D = Secure; A = Secure		D	C
1. VC Military Activities a. Village Guerrilla Unit	VC do not affect the area identified or identified; VC VII defense largely intact.	VC do not affect the area identified or identified; VC VII defense largely intact.	VC do not affect the area identified or identified; VC VII defense largely intact.
b. Internal Forces (IF) (Prov, Main Force, unit in district)	IF intact; may have been a one unit company-sized attack within 15 km of hamlet. Hamlet or VII has been fired on and/or assaulted during month.	IF intact; may have been a one unit company-sized attack within 15 km of hamlet. Hamlet or VII has been fired on and/or assaulted during month.	IF intact; may have been a one unit company-sized attack within 15 km of hamlet. Hamlet or VII has been fired on and/or assaulted during month.
c. Military Incidents Affecting Hamlet	Armed VC units at night in hamlet, sometimes in day. Little IFN activity at night. Routes to hamlet interrupted by day; may be ambush near hamlet.	VCN activity under observation. Frequent sniping on routes to hamlet; VC night activity in hamlet.	VCN activity under observation. Frequent sniping on routes to hamlet; VC night activity in hamlet.
2. VC Political & Administrative Activities a. Hamlet Infrastructure	Party cadre underground by day but intimidate population at night. No extensive party leaders uncovered.	Most members of VC hamlet organizations uncovered & neutralized but undercover agents still operative.	Most members of VC hamlet organizations uncovered & neutralized but undercover agents still operative.
b. Village Infrastructure	Despite some individual identification, VII apparatus intact, functioning.	Some VII cadre identified but apparatus fairly effective.	Some VII cadre identified but apparatus fairly effective.
c. Activities Affecting Hamlet	VC apparatus can undermine IFN in hamlet by incidents ranging from propaganda thru terrorism & sabotage, at least at night.	No overt propaganda but terrorism or sabotage during past month.	No overt propaganda but terrorism or sabotage during past month.
3. Security (Friendly Community) a. Hamlet Defense Plan & Organization	No night defense except external forces.	Day & night defense by external forces. Local recruiting & training underway.	Day & night defense by external forces. Local recruiting & training underway.
b. Friendly Internal Forces (FIF) Assistance	FIF available does not meet needs in city, air support, reaction ground forces, etc.	FIF available meets needs but only marginally effective. E.g., delayed response, no night response, not enough, etc.	FIF available meets needs but only marginally effective. E.g., delayed response, no night response, not enough, etc.
c. Internal Security Activities	No agents, no intelligence from public except occasional police informants.	No complete intelligence network a few trained or voluntary informants & some data from IFN sources.	No complete intelligence network a few trained or voluntary informants & some data from IFN sources.
4. Administration & Political Activities a. Civil Government Management	Temporary or external IFN officials; marginally effective, usually present only in daylight.	Some local participation in hamlet management; officials usually present only in daylight.	Some local participation in hamlet management; officials usually present only in daylight.
b. Citizen Grievance Program	No IFN cadre committed.	IFN cadre committed in hamlet; citizen grievance program started.	IFN cadre committed in hamlet; citizen grievance program started.
c. Information/IFN Assistance	Little or none.	Minimal activity; public indifference.	Minimal activity; public indifference.
5. Health, Education & Welfare a. Medical Services & Sanitation	Frequent visits by hamlet or cadre team.	Periodic, scheduled MEDIC or cadre team visits.	Periodic, scheduled MEDIC or cadre team visits.
b. Education	No IFN-sponsored educational facilities; may be instruction by VII cadre, monks, Catholic priest.	May be instruction by IFN cadre; no prominent educational facilities.	May be instruction by IFN cadre; no prominent educational facilities.
c. Welfare	Military civil action projects only.	Civil action; basic needs not determined.	Civil action; basic needs not determined.
6. Economic Development a. Self Help Activity	None.	People assist in selecting projects but outsiders do the work.	People assist in selecting projects but outsiders do the work.
b. Public Works (require outside expertise; offices at least village)	None planned or undertaken.	Some detailed planning for IFN plan projects.	Some detailed planning for IFN plan projects.
c. Economic Improvement Programs (Farming, Fishing, Land Reclamation, etc.)	None.	Some planning; a few basic programs started.	Some planning; a few basic programs started.

CONFIDENTIAL

April 67

REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT HIGHLIGHTS - FROM RD REPORTS

Objectives - Progress

1. The 1967 RD effort is being concentrated in 1100 hamlets containing 1.3 million people fairly evenly spread throughout the country. The 4401 already secured hamlets presently appear to be neglected by the GVN. The Office of Civil Operations (OCO) is encouraging GVN follow-up in the secured hamlets.

<u>End Year</u>	<u>Est. Population (Millions)</u>	<u>Secured Hamlets</u>	<u>Secured Population (Millions)</u>	<u>(%)</u>
1965	14.8	3957	7.7	(52.0)
1966	15.1	4401	8.7	(57.6)
1967 Goal	16.5	5500	10.8	(65.5)

1967 PLAN

1966	Secured Population	8,700,000
1967	Increase in Secured Hamlet Population	1,350,000
	Increase in Secured Population - Other ^{a/}	750,000
		<u>10,800,000</u>

^{a/} Includes natural population increase, refugees and Non-Revolutionary Development pacification.

	<u>New Hamlets Planned</u>	<u>Hamlet Population</u>	<u>Budget* (P. 000)</u>
I Corps	244	337,215	318,019
II Corps	393	419,293	410,381
III Corps	215	269,492	463,365
IV Corps	248	328,586	524,090
Total	<u>1,100</u>	<u>1,354,586</u>	<u>1,715,855</u>

*Figures do not include Kien Giang or Phong Dinh Provinces.

2. During 1966, 444 hamlets were reported upgraded to "secure" status. This was less than one-third of the goal. However, this figure does appear to reflect fairly accurate reporting of accomplishments.

3. The 1967 Revolutionary Development program lagged two months behind schedule, as of early March and the diversion of RD workers to administer already scheduled local and national elections may further disrupt the program.

CONFIDENTIAL

4. The first monthly Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) survey was completed for January 1967. A trial period will be necessary before the statistics can be considered to have some validity. (NMCS will have the HES data base in Washington).

5. A relationship between successful pacification operations and increasing ralliers is becoming more apparent as RD progresses, and the VC seem more aware of this. Intelligence reports indicate that VC intend to attack RD hamlets and RD teams. In Jan-Feb 1967, 93 attacks were initiated by the VC against RD teams. Data on attacks in 1966 are not available.

6. Approximately 100 ARVN lieutenants will be sent to the Vung Tau RD Training Center for a 2-3 week course. They are to replace weak leaders in RD programs, provide unity of command, increase security for RD teams, and assist in RD programs at district levels.

RD Problems

1. Attrition of RD workers is about 11%.

RD LOSSES FOR 1966

Killed	593
Captured	75
Discharged	86
Deserted	603
Resigned	696
	<u>2053</u>

2. On January 1, 1967, 18,735 RD workers were in the field; 1000 fewer than on July 1, 1966. This occurred in spite of in-province recruiting and a net output from Vung Tau during the period of 2900 cadre.

3. Large numbers of returnees have overcrowded six Chieu Hoi centers. The GVN administrative apparatus could become overburdened by the rising influx. An increasing percentage of the returnees are military, mostly from provinces where VC provincial and regional forces have been hard pressed and where the government has been able to follow up with RD activities.

4. Office of Civil Operations (OCO) ability to respond to critical problems has not greatly improved because OCO operates under regulations and procedures of parent agencies which are geared to a peacetime situation. This is less true for OSA (CIA) funded activities than USAID and JUSPAO funded activities.

June 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM

Due to shortcomings in previous reporting of population and hamlet control in South Vietnam, the Secretary of Defense (in October 1966) requested the development of an improved system to measure Revolutionary Development progress. The Hamlet Evaluation System was begun in January 1967 and MACV is still adjusting reporting procedures and data. Reliable data for trend analysis will probably not be available until midsummer. Data from the system to date should be used only with extreme caution.

The Hamlet Evaluation System is designed to yield comprehensive, quantifiable data on the security and development of every hamlet in South Vietnam under some degree of GVN control, and to identify hamlets which are under VC control. The system is being completely automated for computer processing; duplicates of the MACV computer files are being sent to Washington.

The basic evaluation of each hamlet's status comes from the sub-sector advisors who fill out the work sheets. An example work sheet is printed below. Each hamlet is evaluated on six critical factors of classification, with three indicators in each factor, each to be graded from A-best to E-bad; thus there are 18 grades per hamlet. Three of the factors relate to the security status of the hamlet: VC/NVA Military activities, Viet Cong Political and Subversive Activities, and Friendly Capabilities. The three factors which measure development progress are: Administrative and Political Activities, Economic Development, and Health, Education and Welfare. The numerically weighted letter grade assigned to each factor depends on the scores given each relevant indicator; the average of the six factor grades determines the single composite grade for the hamlet, rounded to the nearest whole number. The reporter also indicates the level of confidence he places on his evaluation.

In addition, information regarding ten problem areas in each hamlet is reported on the reverse of the hamlet evaluation work sheet. This data will also be available in Washington.

The system will be a US reporting system, although American advisors will have to work closely with their Vietnamese counterparts in implementing parts of it. The sub-sector reports will be reviewed and collated by the inter-agency province team before being sent to MACV for processing by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS). The results are displayed in several computer printouts. MACV has been publishing a summary report monthly; it should not be used yet.

In setting up the system, MACV has run into a number of problems, but rapid progress has been made. For example, a complete and accurate inventory of hamlets in South Vietnam was not available. In compiling a new inventory and checking the location and characteristics of each hamlet in the system, MACV found that many hamlets no longer existed, or were unpopulated. These have been dropped from the system.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

In addition to the ratings, basic elements of information reported in the hamlet evaluation system include the name of the hamlet, its UTM coordinate, village, district, province and CTZ, its population, and whether it is in a National Priority area. The system will also provide information regarding the control status of the population residing outside officially recognized hamlets, e.g. in province towns, etc. Thus, the system will yield information regarding the control of hamlets, control of population in rural hamlets, and control of the total population in South Vietnam.

This office is automating the Hamlet Evaluation System for Washington users. We have recently received the computer tapes of the hamlet evaluation data from January, February and March 1967. Data for April and May is expected within the next few weeks. Shortly we will have the capability to reproduce all of the MACV reports that have been designed for the use in the field. In addition, we are also developing the capability to generate special reports and displays of data, including computer map plots and statistical analyses in order to spot trends, project future growth, and evaluate the impact of RD efforts. We will be happy to provide service for all potential users upon request.

Concern has been expressed that the composite hamlet rating (security and development factors) may be interpreted as the security status of the hamlet. A survey of the February Hamlet Evaluation System data indicates only about 5% of the 12,000 hamlets have a development factor sufficiently higher than the security factor to change the composite rating.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

HAMLET EVALUATION WORKSHEET*

DIRECTIONS FOR COMPLETING HAMLET EVALUATION WORKSHEET: All hamlets are to be evaluated ~~monthly~~ those that are considered by the subsector evaluator to be under VC control. It is suggested that a separate Worksheet be used for each evaluated hamlet. During the month, update the evaluation and the problem responses as necessary. At the end of the month review the worksheets. It is recommended that the responses selected for each of the 15 indicators be entered in the right-hand column. Entries that differ from those made in the preceding month should be transferred to the Hamlet Evaluation Summary Form (HESF) for transmittal to MACV in Saigon. If worksheet entries are made in pencil, the same form can be used repeatedly.

1. Identify the hamlet by name and location at the top of the Worksheet. Type of hamlet refers to RD Plan hamlet types: Ap Dai Moi (ADM), Ap Tan Binh (ATB), Ap Cong Cu (ACC), or Ap Binh Dinh (ABD). Use a check mark to indicate whether or not the hamlet is in a National Priority Area (NPA). Enter the best available population figure and indicate by a check mark whether the figure is reliable or unreliable. A reliable figure would fall within 10% of an accurate head count in the opinion of the subsector evaluator. Use a check mark to record that the hamlet has been visited during the month by a US District Team member or other designated US personnel and/or by a member of the OVN District staff.

2. For each of the 15 indicators, select the response that best represents the hamlet conditions during the month. The brief responses given on the Worksheet are intended to ~~summarize~~ steps in progress from C to A. Refer to Joint MACV-OCO Director's 1-47, 2 Jan 67, Annex E, Guidelines for Evaluating HES for more complete discussion. It should be understood that within each indicator, signs of progress in one rating, "D" for example, are implied in a related "C" rating if not repeated in the description of the "C" rating. The responses refer to the hamlet itself unless otherwise stated.

3. Enter in the boxes at the far right the number that represents the confidence you have in the validity of the information upon which your ratings for each factor were based: (1) No confidence; (2) Low confidence; (3) Medium confidence; (4) High confidence; (5) Complete confidence.

4. Changes in the wording of indicators are printed in upper case.

HAMLET PROBLEMS DURING MONTH

Select the one best answer for each section of each question

1. Incidents of misbehavior by friendly elements adversely affecting friendly relations with the hamlet population:
 - a. US Military. ☐ 1. None; ☐ 2. Minor only; ☐ 3. Serious; ☐ 4. Inapplicable; ☐ 5. Unknown
 - b. Other JVNAP ☐ 1. None; ☐ 2. Minor only; ☐ 3. Serious; ☐ 4. Inapplicable; ☐ 5. Unknown
 - c. ARVN ☐ 1. None; ☐ 2. Minor only; ☐ 3. Serious; ☐ 4. Inapplicable; ☐ 5. Unknown
 - d. RV/PF ☐ 1. None; ☐ 2. Minor only; ☐ 3. Serious; ☐ 4. Inapplicable; ☐ 5. Unknown
 - e. RD Team ☐ 1. None; ☐ 2. Minor only; ☐ 3. Serious; ☐ 4. Inapplicable; ☐ 5. Unknown
2. Attacks by friendly elements during military operations adversely affecting relations with hamlet population (excluding but not limited to fire from any type of weapon, destructive passage within hamlet area, detentions)
 - ☐ 1. None;
 - ☐ 2. Minor only.
 - ☐ 3. Serious
 - ☐ 4. Unknown.
3. Continuation of rumors of hamlet or village officials:
 - ☐ 1. No indications
 - ☐ 2. Rumored.
 - ☐ 3. Suspected but no proof.
 - ☐ 4. Solid indication.
 - ☐ 5. Unknown.

30

Continued on page 2.

FOUO
CONFIDENTIAL WHEN FILLED IN

8

HAMLET EVALUATION WORKSHEET

INSTRUCT	VEILAGE	BOOKLET NAME	OWN BOOKLET NO.	TYPE
Student visited by SA	OWN			

CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE REPORT

[illegible]

4. Support of hamlet self-defense force other than PF by district and/or province officials:

- ☐ 1. Received adequate support as requested.
☐ 2. Some support received but inadequate.
☐ 3. Support promised but not received.
☐ 4. Support needed but none promised.
☐ 5. Has self-defense force but outside support not required.
☐ 6. Has no self-defense force.
☐ 7. Unknown.

5. Supplies from outside hamlet or village for self-help projects:

- | | |
|---|---|
| a. From GVN sources | b. From non-GVN sources |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. On time and adequate. | <input type="checkbox"/> 1. On time and adequate. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2. Delayed but adequate. | <input type="checkbox"/> 2. Delayed but adequate. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. Inadequate and delayed. | <input type="checkbox"/> 3. Inadequate and delayed. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4. Promised but none received. | <input type="checkbox"/> 4. Promised but none received. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. Promised for future delivery. | <input type="checkbox"/> 5. Promised for future delivery. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 6. None required. | <input type="checkbox"/> 6. None required. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7. Unknown. | <input type="checkbox"/> 7. Unknown. |

6. Access to drinking water:

- a. Local sources of drinking water are inadequate. ☐ 1. Yes ☐ 2. No ☐ 3. Unknown
- b. Plans and/or work underway to improve local drinking water supply ☐ 1. Yes ☐ 2. No ☐ 3. Unknown

7. Refugee problems:

- a. What percent of the hamlet population are temporary residents who are refugees?
- | | |
|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. None or very few | <input type="checkbox"/> 4. More than 20% |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2. 10-25 % | <input type="checkbox"/> 5. 100% (refugee camp only). |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. 26-99% | <input type="checkbox"/> 6. Unknown. |
- b. Is GVN assistance adequate to enable them to subsist?
- | | |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. None required. | <input type="checkbox"/> 4. Not applicable (refugee only). |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2. Required and adequate. | <input type="checkbox"/> 5. Unknown. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. Required but inadequate. | |

8. The collection of tax or in cash:

- a. By the Viet-Cong. ☐ 1. Yes ☐ 2. No ☐ 3. Unknown
- b. By the GVN ☐ 1. Yes ☐ 2. No ☐ 3. Unknown

9. US Airman's access to hamlet:

- a. By surface from district headquarters:
- | |
|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. Weapons not necessary. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2. No special security arrangements necessary but weapons must be carried. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. Special security arrangements necessary. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4. Not feasible except by accompanying an operation. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. Access unfeasible. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 6. Unknown. |
- b. From airstrip or helicopter pad nearest to hamlet:
- | |
|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. Weapons not necessary. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2. No special security arrangements necessary but weapons must be carried. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. Special security arrangements necessary. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4. Not feasible except by accompanying an operation. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. Access unfeasible. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 6. Unknown. |

10. Condition of main route from hamlet to village center:

- | |
|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. In good repair, adequate for current traffic. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2. Being repaired or improved (recessed, dredged, new bridge, etc.) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. Difficult or dangerous to travel because of poor repair. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4. Impracticable (flooded, bridge out, stream dried up, etc.) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. Unknown. |

FOUO
CONFIDENTIAL WHEN FILLED IN

1967

CONFIDENTIAL

HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM

The Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) still suffers from data turbulence, but shows exceptional promise. So far, the HES reports greater progress than the GVN reporting system. Most hamlets (59%) show identical security and development ratings, but 673 hamlets (5.5%) have development ratings higher than their security ratings, indicating development proceeding without equivalent security, or bad reporting.

Corrected computer data (MACV hard copy reports have not been corrected) from the first four months (Jan-Apr 1967) of the Hamlet Evaluation System shows that there has been a net increase of 560,200 people residing in A, B, and C category hamlets in SVN. Most of the increase represents an upgrading of D and E hamlets, which showed a net increase of 463,100 population (see Table 1). The rural population base covered by the HES jumped from 12.8 million in January to 13.3 million in April. Newly cataloged VC-controlled hamlets probably account for most of the rise.

TABLE 1

HES HAMLET POPULATION RATINGS
(Population in Thousands)

	<u>Jan 67</u>	<u>Apr 67</u>	<u>Change</u>
<u>HES Rating</u>			
Category A	385.0	316.4	-68.6
Category B	2526.5	2946.1	+419.6
Category C	4123.0	4332.2	+209.2
Category D	2293.0	2179.8	-113.2
Category E	817.6	467.7	-349.9
VC-Controlled	2666.5	3012.2	+345.7
	12811.6	13254.4	+442.8

The HES does not evaluate populations outside of rural hamlets, and consequently there is no US rating system for the 3.6 million people (out of a countrywide population of 16.9 million) living in the cities and towns. The rural areas are most important strategically, however, and the HES catalogs and rates 12,246 hamlets in which 13.3 million Vietnamese peasants reside.

Hamlet security is thought to be a necessary precondition for social, economic, and political development. We would expect hamlet security scores to be higher than development scores as a rule. Table 2 shows, however, that most hamlets (58.9%) fall within the same security and development ratings. A third (35.6%) show security leading development by one letter grade or more; 673 (5.5%) hamlets have development ratings higher than their security ratings.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 2

HAMLET SECURITY VS DEVELOPMENT SCORES

<u>Security vs Development</u>	<u>No. of Hamlets</u>	<u>%</u>
Security rated higher*	4356	35.6
Security rated same	7217	58.9
Security rated lower*	673	5.5
Total	12,246	100.0

*By one letter grade or more.

The computer-generated plots of hamlets by security class display some patterns not seen (see foldout section) on conventional maps. Even on this small scale the patterns of area control stand out. For example, VC-controlled hamlets pervade the area south of Danang on the coastal plain, as well as in the Mekong delta. Strong GVN-controlled hamlets (showing A and B security scores) seem to cluster around urban areas where VC hamlets are notably absent.

The HES evaluations can be compared to the counterpart GVN ratings used over the years (see Table 3). There is a remarkable correspondence between the population in the A, B, & C categories and population in the GVN Secured category. Both start in January with almost the same population (US-7,034,500 vs. GVN 7,042,700) and remain close to each other through April.

However, the two systems report different amounts of progress made during the January-April period. The HES shows a gain of 560,200 people in A, B, and C hamlets while the GVN shows only 255,600 shifting into their Secured category.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 3

HAMLET POPULATION CONTROL SUMMARY


	<u>Jan 67</u>		<u>Feb 67</u>	
	Pop (000)	%	Pop (000)	%
<u>GVN Rating System</u>				
Secure	7042.7	55.0	7069.6	54.7
Undergoing Securing	784.9	6.1	757.6	5.9
Contested	2679.8	20.9	2744.7	21.3
Uninhabitable	3.4	.0	2.7	.0
VC Controlled	2300.8	18.0	2343.7	18.1
Total	12811.6	100.0	12918.3	100.0
<u>HES Rating System</u>				
Category A	385.0	3.0	381.4	3.0
Category B	2526.5	19.7	2609.1	20.2
Category C	4123.0	32.2	4227.7	32.7
Subtotal A, B & C	7034.5	54.9	7218.2	55.9
Category D	2293.0	17.9	2262.7	17.5
Category E	817.6	6.4	483.9	3.7
VC Control	2666.5	20.8	2953.5	22.9
Total	12811.6	100.0	12918.3	100.0

CONFIDENTIAL			
Mar 67		Apr 67	
Pop (000)	%	Pop (000)	%
7144.7	54.5	7208.3	54.4
837.3	6.4	677.3	6.6
2771.3	21.2	2778.2	21.0
2.7	.0	2.7	.0
2351.9	17.9	2387.9	18.0
13107.9	100.0	13254.4	100.0
301.7	2.3	316.4	2.4
2869.5	21.9	2946.1	22.2
4241.2	32.3	4332.2	32.7
5.4	56.5	7594.7	57.3
2243.2	17.1	2179.8	16.5
480.6	3.7	467.7	3.5
2971.7	22.7	3012.2	22.7
13107.9	100.0	13254.4	100.0

OASD/SA/SEA Programs Div.
July 19, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL


CONFIDENTIAL

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SOUTH VIETNAM


APRIL STATUS

SECURITY CLASS C HAMLETS



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL




SOUTH VIETNAM

APRIL STATUS

SECURITY D & E HAMLETS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



August 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

GVN RURAL POPULATION CONTROL PROGRESS

GVN population control figures continue to show increasing government control of population residing outside of the six autonomous cities (see Table 1). Although the absolute control levels are subject to question the trend over time may be accurate: as of June, 8.1 million Vietnamese (57.5%) reportedly resided in secure areas (excluding the six autonomous cities), compared to 6.9 million (52.1%) in December 1966 and 6.3 million (47.9%) in June 1966. These figures suffer from several recognized deficiencies, including politically-motivated distortions by field reporters, frequent revisions of population bases, sensitivity to rural-urban population migration, and misleading category labels. But they are the only long-term time series available, and an analysis of the trends seems worthwhile.

To simplify presentation of the trend we have computed a single index measure of GVN province control as follows:

<u>GVN Rating Category</u>	<u>GVN Aligned Population as Percent of Category Total</u>
Secure	100%
Undergoing Securing	60%
Contested	30%
VC-Controlled	0%

The last line of Table 1 shows the total GVN-aligned population computed in this way. This statistic shows the same steady upward trend as the Secured population category; by June 1967, 9.4 million people or 67% of the SVN rural population could be considered aligned with the GVN.

The computer printed maps following Table 1 graphically depict rough geographical variances in the GVN-aligned population index: the darker the area, the higher the index. The favorable trend shown in Table 1 is clearly reflected. Some specific trends show fairly clearly:

(1) GVN control throughout I Corps and Northern II Corps (VC MR5) deteriorates from June 1964 to June 1965. The GVN gradually regains control from December 1965 to the present, with an overall jump of one whole step (of 5 steps each of which is 20% population control) for practically the whole region between December 1966 and June 1967. The exception is the DMZ where the alignment index drops to the 41-60% range in June 1967.

(2) Back in June 1964, the highest alignment index anywhere around the Saigon area was the 41-60% shown to the northeast of the city. VC control was very high (indicated by dot (.) and plus (+) symbols signifying alignment index ranges 0-20% and 21-40%, respectively) to the west and south. GVN control of 81-100% was established by June 1965 to the northeast, but the area west of the city never does attain over 60%.

(3) GVN alignment of 61-80% was gradually established along the Mekong River by December 1965, with 81-100% (blackest area) shown in the north in the Chau Doc - An Giang area thereafter. The southern Delta is a real low spot for GVN control, never reaching more than 60%. A regression is shown between December 1966 and June 1967 in this area to the 21-40% range.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(4) The area north and east of Vung Tau in Phuoc Tuy province reaches a high point in December 1966, but a significant regression appears in the June 1967 map to the 40-60% range.

(5) The Kontum area at the Laos - Cambodia - SVN border seems to change hands frequently. VC control is high in June 1964; GVN control is high from December 1964 to December 1965; GVN control drops in June 1966; GVN control is very high (81-100%) in June 1967.

These maps were produced by SYMAP, a computer technique developed at the Harvard University Computer Graphics Laboratory. Each density level represents a degree of GVN rural population alignment, running from darkest (over 80% GVN-aligned) to lightest (less than 20%). The maps can also be read as VC control maps with heaviest VC control reflected in the lightest areas and least VC control in the darkest areas. They are not area control maps. The density (blackness) of any given spot on the map is determined by the control indexes of all provinces whose geographical center points fall within a radius of a few inches. Thus War Zone C, about as unsecure an area as there is in SVN, is colored entirely black in June 1967. The reason for this misleading result is that the alignment index for Tay Ninh province is very high (93%) because the population is concentrated in the reportedly secure areas of the province. The points on the map which lie in the war zone are colored black since they are near the center of a province (Tay Ninh) with an index between 81 and 100%. If some other province center were closer, the points would have been colored to reflect that province's index, even though the war zone falls in Tay Ninh province geographically.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 1

RURAL POPULATION CONTROL BY CATEGORY
(End of Month (000) in Thousands)

	June 1964	Dec 1964	June 1965	Dec 1965
Secured	4226.0(32.7)	4268.8(33.3)	4953.0(38.3)	5916.1 (45
Undergoing Securing	2610.6(20.2)	1843.5(14.4)	986.9(7.6)	794.7(6.1
Contested ^{b/}	3424.8(26.5)	3601.3(28.1)	3521.7(27.2)	2880.4(22.
Uncontested ^{c/}	116.3(.9)	60.1(.5)	33.6(.3)	86.0(.7)
VC Controlled	2546.0(19.7)	3048.8(23.7)	3440.4(26.6)	3357.4(25.
Total Population	12923.7	12822.5	12935.6	13034.6
Total GVN-Aligned Population (Weighted) ^{d/}	6819.8(52.8)	6455.3(50.3)	6601.7(51.0)	7257.0(55.

^{a/} Excludes population of the 6 autonomous cities.

^{b/} Formerly Undergoing Clearing.

^{c/} Dropped as a category 1 Jan 67.

^{d/} Computed as 100% of Secured, plus 60% of Undergoing Securing plus 30% of Contested

CONFIDENTIAL

2


CONFIDENTIAL

June 1965	Dec 1965	June 1966	Dec 1966	June 1967
953.0(38.3)	5916.1 (45.4)	6272.1(47.9)	6869.1(52.2)	8078.5(57.5)
986.9(7.6)	794.7(6.1)	779.3(5.9)	693.1(5.3)	829.4(5.9)
21.7(47.2)	2680.4(22.1)	2716.6(20.7)	2795.8(21.2)	2768.5(19.7)
33.6(.3)	86.0(.7)	130.5(1.0)	163.2(1.2)	-----
440.4(26.6)	3357.4(25.7)	3207.5(24.5)	2649.8(20.1)	2365.2(16.8)
935.6	13034.6	13106.0	13171.0	14041.6
601.7(51.0)	7257.0(55.7)	7554.7(57.6)	8123.7(61.7)	9406.7(67.0)

plus 30% of Contested population..


CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL




LEGEND:

PERCENT GVN-ALIGNED
RURAL POPULATION



0- 21- 41- 61- 81-
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%




SOUTH VIETNAM


JUNE 1965


7657


CONFIDENTIAL




CONFIDENTIAL









CONFIDENTIAL

DET 511

CONFIDENTIAL

POPULATION SECURITY STATISTICS

Security for the SVN population from VC harassment and exploitation is an essential part of pacification in South Vietnam, but opinion about the meaning and implications of population security data differs. Observers have variously used the sweeping favorable trends in the joint GVN/US data to demonstrate increased: allegiance, recruiting base, military control, pacification program progress, personal safety for the population, and political/administrative control. This article attempts to clarify the purpose behind the statistics^{a/}, as well as to explain the trends which appear.

I. What the GVN/US population security statistics measure

The GVN/US population security reporting system inaugurated in 1964 was designed to show only military security, administrative control, and pacification progress. Heaviest emphasis was placed on military security, as the simplified table shows below. (The actual criteria used are listed in Appendix A of this article.)

<u>Category</u>	<u>Military Control Situation</u>
1. Secured	US and RVN regular forces and RF-PF are keeping VC/NVA forces and active guerrilla terrorists out of the area
2. Undergoing Securing	
3. Contested (or Undergoing Clearing)	VC/NVA main forces are kept out by US-GVN military presence, but guerrillas still free to operate
4. Uncontested	Area is of no interest to either side because of uninhabitable terrain
5. VC Controlled	Area is controlled by the presence of VC/NVA forces, either main, local, or irregular

Progress against pacification program goals reportedly determines the difference between the first two categories:

a/ Except for Section V, this article deals with the joint GVN/US population security statistics which began in May 1964 and continue through the present. The new Hamlet Evaluation System began in January 1967, and will be discussed separately in Section V.

CONFIDENTIAL

Category

Administrative Control/RD Program Progress

1. Secured

Most of RD hamlet programs are completed, and effective GVN administrative control has been established.

2. Undergoing Securing

RD hamlet programs have been programmed and/or started. Some measure of GVN administrative control exists.

II. The Reporting System

Population security reports are made at the district level by both the US subsector advisor and his GVN counterpart, and sent separately to their respective province and Saigon headquarters. Since January 1967, (when the Hamlet Evaluation System, HES, began) the US advisor has been instructed to obtain his figures directly from his counterpart; from 1964 to 1966, the advisor was supposed to make his own assessment independently although this was often impossible because of either incomplete knowledge of the history of his district, or the necessity to use GVN interpreters to obtain information in the hamlets. Thus, the system is probably best described as a joint GVN/US one.

A built-in optimistic bias probably exists in the 1964-1966 statistics. First, US advisors were essentially rating their own progress when they reported security figures during their tour. Thus, there is a temptation as time passes to view things more optimistically than a detached objective observer might. Second, reporting tends to concentrate on changes resulting from ongoing work. As a result, backsliding in areas worked previously might not be identified as readily as progress in active areas.

Table 1 shows both population and hamlet data as reported for the period December 1964 to August 1967. (Separate accounting for hamlets did not start until April 1965.) For the population data, a number of significant adjustments have been made at various times in who was counted and how:

(1) In July 1965 the six autonomous cities (1,675,400 people at that time) were added to the Secure population. No accurate estimates are available for the cities' population prior to that time.

(2) In December 1966 an additional 785,200 people were added to the Secure category to reflect estimates of the increase in Saigon population.

(3) In January 1967 another 310,000 were added to the Secure category to account for the 50% of RVNAF personnel reportedly not counted before.

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 1

GVN-US POPULATION AND HAMLET STATISTICS AS REPORTED

POPULATION (IN THOUSANDS)

	<u>1964</u> <u>Dec</u>	<u>1965</u> <u>June</u>	<u>July</u>		<u>1965</u> <u>Dec</u>	
Pacification Completed <u>b/</u>	4,269	4,954	6,265 <u>a/</u>	Secured <u>b/</u>	7,724	Secured <u>b/</u>
Undergoing Pacification	1,843	986	916	Undergoing Securing	782	Undergoing Securing
Cleared	3,605	3,522	3,164	Cleared	2,864	Undergoing Clearing
Neither	60	34	74	Neither	86	Uncontested
VC Control or Dominance <u>c/</u>	3,044	3,440	3,658	VC Control <u>c/</u>	3,358	VC Control <u>c/</u>
TOTAL	12,821	12,936	14,577		14,814	

HAMLETS

	<u>1965</u> <u>Apr</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>		<u>1965</u> <u>Dec</u>	
Secured	3,067	3,186	3,345	Secured	3,903	Secured
Undergoing Securing	990	837	781	Undergoing Securing	630	Undergoing Securing
Cleared Areas	3,689	3,322	3,030	Cleared	2,674	Undergoing Clearing
Residual	3,222	3,623	3,333	Residual	3,785	Residual
TOTAL PLANNED	10,968	10,968	10,989	TOTAL PLANNED	10,992	TOTAL PLANNED

a/ As of July 1965 and thereafter, the six autonomous cities (Saigon, Vung Tau, Danang, Hue, Da Nang, and Vinh) were included in the population base. In July 1965 this amounted to 1,675,400 people, all category.

b/ For this paper, population living in areas under allied military protection and subject to degree of continuing GVN administration.

c/ Population living in areas over which GVN exercises no effective control.

2

CONFIDENTIAL

<u>1965</u> <u>Dec</u>		<u>1966</u> <u>June</u>	<u>Dec</u>		<u>1967</u> <u>June</u>		<u>1967</u> <u>Aug</u>
7,724	Secured b/ Undergoing Secu- ring	8,133	9,521	Secure b/ Undergoing Secu- ring	10,756	Secure, Day & Night b/ Secure, Day Only	10,729
782	Undergoing Clearing	786	736	Contested	920	Contested	1,022
2,864	Uncontested	2,732	2,796		2,769		2,556
86		130	163				
3,358	VC Control c/	3,208	2,650	VC Control c/	2,365	VC Control c/	2,312
4,814		14,989	15,866		16,810		16,619

<u>1965</u> <u>Dec</u>		<u>1966</u> <u>June</u>	<u>Dec</u>		<u>1967</u> <u>June</u>		<u>1967</u> <u>Aug</u>
3,903	Secured Undergoing Secu- ring	4,054	4,401	Secure Undergoing Secu- ring	4,723	Secure, Day & Night Secure, Day Only	4,674
630	Undergoing Clearing	579	526	Contested	836	Contested	1,024
12,674	Residual	2,860	2,995	VC Controlled	3,248	VC Controlled	3,123
13,785		3,966	3,328		3,088		3,119
19,992	TOTAL PLANNED	11,459	11,250	TOTAL PLANNED	11,895	TOTAL PLANNED	11,940

... Vung Tau, Danang, Hue, Dalat, Cam Ranh)
... to 1,675,400 people, all in the Secure

... protection and subject to at least some

... control.

CONFIDENTIAL

October 18, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

(4) Other increases in excess of natural population growth show up in the total population base figure during the period. These and other adjustments have made the GVN/US population base unstable, particularly during the last year.

(5) Minor changes in category definition are constantly taking place. Recently, one category (Uncontested) was dropped, and the first two categories were renamed ("Secured" is now called "Secure - Day and Night," and "Undergoing Securing" is now "Secure - Day Only").

The corresponding hamlet data is subject to some of the same reporting bias problems as the population data. In addition, only those hamlets "planned for pacification" by the GVN are counted, thus ignoring many hamlets in SVN which did not enter into pacification planning, including many VC hamlets. While Table 1 shows 11,940 hamlets in August 1967, the new HES counts 12,642, and, for administrative purposes other than planning, the GVN counts some 13,000 plus.

III. Ambiguities in the reported data

There are problems in the data beyond the changes in definition and the inclusion of autonomous cities, etc. that were discussed above. Some of these can be illustrated by examining the data for late 1964 through mid-1965. Table 1 shows that population in secure areas increased by 685,000 people in the same period. Historically this was perhaps the darkest hour of the war, when the enemy was making substantial inroads into the densely populated coastal provinces of II Corps, and when the ARVN was suffering repeated tactical reverses. The decision to commit US troops in large numbers was based on this crisis, yet the population control figures do not show the extent of the deterioration.

Table 2 gives a corps-by-corps breakdown of population data, with Undergoing Securing and Cleared counted in the Contested category. II Corps shows a drop in Secured and Contested, with a large rise in VC Control. On the other hand, III and IV Corps show marked favorable trends. (This was the time of the highly touted Hop Tac campaign around Saigon.) Thus, some deterioration is shown in the I and II Corps areas, but is masked in country-wide totals by the alleged progress in the heavily populated III and IV Corps areas.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 2
POPULATION SECURITY BY CORPS AS REPORTED
September 1964 - June 1965
(Thousands)

	<u>Sept 1964</u>	<u>Dec 1964</u>	<u>Mar 1965</u>	<u>June 1965</u>
<u>I Corps</u>				
Total Secure	436	455	441	441
Contested	1665	1439	1272	1052
VC Control	215	449	593	788
Total	<u>2316</u>	<u>2343</u>	<u>2306</u>	<u>2281</u>
<u>II Corps</u>				
Total Secure	1087	835	907	922
Contested	1104	1324	1129	969
VC Control	358	436	574	725
Total	<u>2549</u>	<u>2595</u>	<u>2610</u>	<u>2616</u>
<u>III Corps</u>				
Total Secure	803	855	1115	1327
Contested	1218	1257	1025	849
VC Control	526	446	427	435
Total	<u>2547</u>	<u>2558</u>	<u>2567</u>	<u>2611</u>
<u>IV Corps</u>				
Total Secure	1839	2124	2068	2264
Contested	1831	1488	1757	1672
VC Control	1738	1713	1586	1492
Total	<u>5408</u>	<u>5325</u>	<u>5411</u>	<u>5428</u>
<u>Countrywide</u>				
Total Secure	4165	4269	4531	4954
Contested	5818	5508	5183	4542
VC Control	2837	3044	3180	3440
Total	<u>12820</u>	<u>12821</u>	<u>12894</u>	<u>12936</u>

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

IV. Retrospective data

The population figures in Table 1 exaggerate the rate at which population comes under GVN protection. For instance, they show 5.8 million people brought under GVN protection between June 1965 and June 1967. To present a clearer picture of the trends, the data can be adjusted retrospectively to compensate for the known changes in counting procedures which took place. The result is shown in Table 3, a retrospective view of the population (and hamlet) security data developed as follows:

- (1) To establish a single set of population categories (Secure, Contested, and VC Controlled), we considered as
 - a. "Secure" all of the "Secure" category.
 - b. "Contested" all of the "Undergoing Securing," "Cleared," "Undergoing Clearing," "Contested," "Neither," and "Uncontested" categories.
 - c. "VC Controlled," all of the "VC Controlled" category.
- (2) We included the autonomous cities in the figures back to December 1964, assuming their population was 1,575,400 for the period prior to July 1965, and as reported thereafter.
- (3) We assumed that half of the Regular Force, RF and PF personnel had not been counted prior to January 1967, and therefore added half of the RVNAF-RF-PF strength in each previous period to the Secured category.
- (4) MACV added 785,200 people to the GVN secured population in Saigon in December 1966. We assumed that the Saigon population growth actually began in January 1965 and had continued at a steady rate; we therefore added 196,300 to the Secured category each six months, starting with June 1965.
- (5) We assumed that the total SVN population of 17,165,300 for June 1967, as reported in the new HES system (see below) was the most accurate. Assuming a population growth rate of 2.5% per year, we developed the retrospective view of total population at each point on the table. Next we found the difference between these retrospective totals and the totals computed in steps (1) to (4). This difference was apportioned on a ratio basis to each of the three population categories.

We examined these assumptions by varying them. We erased the RVNAF increase, eliminated the refugees from the cities, assumed that the bulk of the recent population growth was due to better knowledge of the population

CONFIDENTIAL

of VC areas, etc. The absolute numbers changed in each case, but the basic trend lines did not. We feel that the adjustments in Table 3 give us a reasonable approximation of population security in SVN as defined in the GVN-US system.

The retrospective estimate shows a more modest increase of 3.3 million between June 1965 and June 1967. It also shows a decrease of 1.3 million people under VC control.

The retrospective hamlet data in Table 3 was developed from Table 1 as follows:

(1) We established the same set of three basic categories (Secure, Contested, VC Control) used in Table 3.

(2) We assumed that the total number of hamlets in SVN has not changed during the two year period shown. The June 1967 total of 11,895 was therefore extended back through June 1965. The difference was apportioned to the three categories on a ratio basis.

Table 3 demonstrates the most striking aspect of the entire population security situation: most of the increase in GVN secured population did not result from significant expansion of territory (hamlets) protected by friendly forces, but from movement of people from VC controlled and contested areas into areas protected by GVN and allied forces. There have been 1.2 million officially recorded refugees since December 1965, which probably account for 60% of the 2.0 million increase in secure population from December 1965 to June 1967. Natural population growth (2.5% per year) would account for another .3 million (15%) of the increase. Other factors could account for the remainder: extension of friendly protection; job seekers moving to the cities; "unofficial" refugees; and over-optimistic evaluation of programs. The hamlet data suggests that the extension of allied and GVN security accounts for the remainder: about 500,000 people were added by securing hamlets (499 additional Secure hamlets between December 1965 and June 1967 at about 1,000 people per hamlet, the countrywide average).

Intelligence reports and captured Viet Cong documents lend some credence to the trend in VC loss of control shown in Table 3, but they also suggest that the retrospective VC control figures may be too low. For example, a document prepared in early 1966 stated that 5 million people lived in "liberated" (VC) areas and 9 million resided in government held rural areas (5 million) and cities and towns (4 million). The retrospective estimate for December 1965 shows 9 million in the Secure category, but only 3.6 million in the VC Controlled category. The document laments the loss of a million people from the countryside into government controlled urban areas as a result of the presence of US troops.

CONFIDENTIAL

The adjusted data of Table 3 is consistent with results of the recent presidential election in South Vietnam. 5.9 million voters were registered for the September 1967 elections, over one-half the adjusted GVN Secure population. This was a gain of .6 million over the September 1966 election registration. Our retrospective view shows an increase in the Secure population of 1.5 million over the comparable period (June 1966 - June 1967), of whom approximately one-half would be eligible to vote. We do not have enough detailed election data to verify that both improvements occurred in the same group of population.

TABLE 3

RETROSPECTIVE VIEW OF SVN POPULATION AND HAMLET SECURITY (Population in Thousands)

Degree of Military Security	1964 Dec	1965 June	1965 Dec	1966 June	1966 Dec	1967 June
<u>POPULATION</u>						
Secure ^{a/}	6,783	7,684	8,971	9,514	10,305	10,983
Contested	6,021	4,925	3,935	3,849	3,873	3,767
VC Control ^{b/}	3,335	3,731	3,536	3,384	2,777	2,415
Total	16,139	16,340	16,542	16,747	16,955	17,165
<u>HAMLETS</u>						
Secure ^{a/}		3,455	4,224	4,208	4,653	4,723
Contested		4,511	3,575	3,570	3,723	4,084
VC Control ^{b/}		3,929	4,096	4,117	3,519	3,088
Total		11,895	11,895	11,895	11,895	11,895

^{a/} Population or hamlets in areas under allied military protection and subject to at least some degree of continuing GVN administration.

^{b/} Population or hamlets in areas over which GVN exercises no effective control.

CONFIDENTIAL

The retrospective estimate shows a loss of only 145,000 in VC control between June and December 1965; the contested category dropped 940,000 during the same period, and probably accounts for the rest of the "million" to which the document referred.

Another captured document, dated 30 October 1966, indicates that friendly operations and programs produced "some relatively significant results" in the form of 400 additional GVN hamlets "built" and 400,000 additional people under GVN control. Other documents refer to loss of VC influence and control over the rural population and describe the decreases in VC food production, tax revenues, and manpower as a result of shrinkage in their population base.

V. SVN Population Security and the Hamlet Evaluation System

In January 1967 US advisors began reporting their own evaluations of hamlet status through the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES). A new gazetteer of hamlets was compiled and new population base estimates were made whenever possible. For each hamlet in his district, the subsector advisor began giving monthly ratings on each of 18 status indicators, nine measuring security conditions, nine covering socio-economic development projects. The 18 indicator ratings are averaged together to yield an over-all hamlet classification of A through E. Country-wide results are shown in Table 4.

Because all 18 indicators enter into a hamlet's over-all rating (A through E) (see Appendix B), it is difficult to give a concise interpretation of what constitutes an "A" or a "B" hamlet. There is no clear relationship between the GVN/US categories and the HES classifications thus making it very difficult to link the two systems for time series analysis. For a broad general comparison, the sum of non-hamlet population and population in A, B, and C hamlets seems to be roughly equivalent to the GVN/US Secure category; D and E hamlet population seems equivalent to Contested; and VC equivalent to VC Controlled.

CONFIDENTIAL

The over-all HES scores are clearly weighted more toward social and economic development than the criteria for the 1964 - 1966 GVN/US reports and may give a better measure of permanent pacification progress, as opposed to increased military protection. The latter, of course, can be examined separately in the HES. For example, the August HES scores on the nine security indicators alone included 2% more of the SVN population in the A-B-C hamlet grouping than did the over-all HES scores (i.e., security ratings were slightly higher than development scores).

The HES will provide a powerful tool for analyzing many aspects of the war effort. The tool will be sharp enough to use after the January - July data is retrospectively adjusted based on a final tuning of the system in August. MACCORDS hopes to have completed its retrospective analysis by the end of November.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 4

COMPARISON OF GVN WITH PRELIMINARY HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM (HES) DATA (000)

GVN -- US	1967 JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUNE
Secure	9,887.0	10,091.9	10,165.3	10,203.6	10,427.3	10,756
Undergoing Securing	962.4	921.7	993.5	990.5	958.9	920
Contested	2,916.9	3,020.5	3,042.1	2,945.4	2,836.4	2,768
Uninhabitable	16.2	17.3	17.6	17.9	17.9	2,365
VC Control	2,466.2	2,540.2	2,535.8	2,497.0	2,312.9	16,810
Total	16,248.7	16,591.6	16,754.4	16,654.4	16,553.4	
HES -- Preliminary (Jan - July data being revised based on August knowledge)						
Non Hamlet Pop.	3,144.8	3,672.0	3,698.1	3,635.2	3,540.3	3,884
Hamlet Pop:						489
A	386.4	381.4	301.0	315.6	447.9	3,129
B	2,521.2	2,611.6	2,857.9	2,935.5	2,854.9	4,360
C	4,250.4	4,225.3	4,225.8	4,308.6	4,386.3	1,976
D	2,283.9	2,262.9	2,235.9	2,162.3	2,079.8	402
E	818.9	484.1	480.0	467.1	449.7	2,923
VC	2,843.1	2,954.0	2,955.7	2,987.1	3,015.7	17,165
Total	16,248.7	16,591.3	16,754.4	16,811.4	16,774.6	

a/ Includes 2,501,700 of the 2,792,100 population of the six autonomous cities; also includes 103,200 and 128,900 (August) people in non-evaluated hamlets.

31

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

APR	MAY	JUNE		JULY	AUGUST
10,203.6	10,427.3	10,756.3	Secure, Night & Day	10,445.7	10,729.2
990.5	958.9	920.3	Secure, Day Only	1,337.9	1,022.0
2,945.4	2,836.4	2,768.5	Contested	2,619.0	2,555.9
17.9	17.9	2,365.2	VC Control	2,332.6	2,311.6
2,497.0	2,312.9		Total	16,742.2	16,618.7
16,654.4	16,553.4	16,810.3			
3,635.2	3,540.3	3,884.8		3,616.7 $\frac{a}{b}$	3,658.5 $\frac{a}{b}$
315.6	447.9	489.3		581.6	600.2
2,935.5	2,854.9	3,129.1		3,435.8	3,489.1
4,308.6	4,386.3	4,360.6		4,170.0	3,991.1
2,162.3	2,079.8	1,976.1		2,035.4	2,116.3
467.1	449.7	422.2		370.9	360.6
2,987.1	3,015.7	2,923.2		2,903.9	2,821.4
16,811.4	16,774.6	17,165.3		17,114.3	17,037.2

cities; also includes 103,200

July)

October 18, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Criteria for Population Control Categories, May 1964 - June 1967

JANUARY - JUNE 1967

SECURED

For hamlets designated Ap Doi Moi (Real New Life Hamlet):

Hamlet is "secure" and RD cadre and other personnel are working to meet the 11 standards listed below, or the standards have been completed.

1. Eliminate the VC infrastructure.
2. Eliminate corrupt practices and discharge corrupt officials.
3. Develop a "new spirit."
4. Establish popular government and social organizations.
5. Organize the people for self-defense.
6. Improve literacy.
7. Eliminate disease and unsanitary conditions.
8. Implement land reform.
9. Develop agriculture and handicraft industries.
10. Improve lines of communication.
11. Reward deserving soldiers, public servants and citizens who have contributed to RD programs.

For hamlets designated Ap Tan Sinh or Ap Cung Co:

1. Census of residents has been completed; the VC infrastructure has been discovered, identified, and destroyed or neutralized; and an intelligence net has been established to deter its recurrence.
2. Adequate Popular Forces and/or paramilitary forces have been recruited, trained, armed, and are qualified and available for operations.
3. Hamlet security is effective with an integrated defensive system to include methods of requesting reinforcements.
4. Hamlet inhabitants have been questioned and have expressed their grievances and aspirations and some economic and social development projects have been initiated to satisfy people's desires.
5. Hamlet inhabitants have been organized for self-defense and development tasks.
6. A hamlet chief has been elected or appointed, trained, and is supported by the majority of the people of the hamlet.

For hamlets designated Ap Binh Dinh:

1. VC infrastructure eliminated.
2. Corrupt practices eliminated and corrupt officials discharged.

For other hamlets and area control:

1. Hamlets in the area have been secured.
2. Village councils have been elected.
3. Village administration committees appointed, trained, and have support.
4. VC forces are out and cannot return.

Autonomous cities:

All city areas are treated as Secure; hamlets within boundaries of autonomous cities are treated as above.

DCM

E.

IVALS

AMS

32

CONFIDENTIAL

45

Hamlet

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

For ot

Autono

2

1967

CONFIDENTIAL

MAY 1966 - DECEMBER 1966

SECURED

Hamlets planned for pacification:

1. The hamlet residents have been screened and existing VC infrastructure discovered and eliminated.
2. Popular forces have been selected, trained, and armed.
3. An obstacle system, as well as other fortifications, has been established for defense against VC guerrillas.
4. A system of communications and for requesting reinforcements has been set up.
5. Hamlet inhabitants have been organized into groups and assigned specific tasks for hamlet security and for New Life improvement activities.
6. A hamlet committee has been elected by secret ballot in accordance with a democratic spirit (may be waived by Montagnard hamlets if a committee is appointed instead).

For other hamlets and area control:

Criteria not clearly specified in available documents.

Autonomous cities:

All city areas are treated as Secure; hamlets within boundaries of autonomous cities are treated as above.

CONFIDENTIAL

October 18, 1967

Appendix A

46

45

CONFIDENTIAL

JANUARY - JUNE 1967

UNDERGOING SECURING

For hamlets designated Ap Doi Moi:

The hamlet is not secure, but RD cadre and other GVN officials are working to meet the 11 standards.

The area has been
action cadre to

For hamlets designated Ap Tan Sinh and Ap Cung Co:

The hamlet is not secure, but RD cadre are working to raise the hamlet back to a point where it again fulfills the 6-point criteria.

For hamlets designated Ap Binh Dinh:

RD cadre and other GVN personnel are working to meet the first two standards.

For other hamlets and area control:

1. Company size and over VC units eliminated.
2. RVNAF can prevent return of VC.
3. Regular Forces and Popular Forces operations provide security.
4. RD cadres working in hamlets to establish local government and eliminate VC infrastructure.

CONTESTED (or Undergoing Clearing)

RVNAF and/or FVNAF conducting operations to oust VC/NVA (company size and larger); can maintain or enhance security status achieved.

Area has been cleared
forces are not
of maintaining
not preclude the
nor existence of

UNCONTESTED

(Category not used after May 1967)

Area has not been
struggle by either
that the area is
importance to either
VC as a safe haven

VC CONTROL

No GVN political or military presence; VC can keep RF and PF out.

Area controlled
local, or irregular

DOVA	RECEIVED
BRANCH	DATE

33

47

CONFIDENTIAL

2

CONFIDENTIAL

MAY 1964 - DECEMBER 1966

UNDERGOING SECURING

The area has been cleared by GVN regular or paramilitary forces and mobile action cadre teams (or their equivalent) have started work in the area.

CONTESTED (or Undergoing Clearing)

Area has been cleared of significant VC military units -- VC main or local forces are not present or operating in the area and ARVN forces are capable of maintaining or enhancing present cleared status. This condition does not preclude the occurrence of minor VC acts of terrorism and other incidents, nor existence of guerrilla forces.

UNCONTESTED

Area has not been nor is it likely to become a contested point in the power struggle by either the GVN or VC. The geographical characteristics are such that the area is largely uninhabitable and has no tactical or strategic importance to either side. The area is unattractive and/or unnecessary to the VC as a safe haven.

VC CONTROL

Area controlled or dominated by the presence of VC forces, either main, local, or irregular.

CONFIDENTIAL

October 18, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) Scoring Criteria

Hamlets are rated 1 (worst) through 5 (best) on each of 18 multiple choice "indicators." Nine of the indicators relate to Security; the other 9 relate to socio-economic Development. The scores for the 18 indicators are summed (minimum score 18, maximum 90) and the hamlet is designated A, B, C, D, or E according to the following arbitrarily set ranges:

<u>Hamlet Total Score</u>	<u>Hamlet Alphabetical Index</u>
18-26	E
27-44	D
45-62	C
63-80	B
81-90	A

If the hamlet is controlled by the VC, it is not rated at all, but is simply tallied as a "VC" hamlet.

Sample responses from the 18 indicators are as follows:

1-point responses

Village guerrillas combat effective although some identified or eliminated. External forces intact, may have base, and can make company-size attacks within a few hours travel to hamlet...

Armed VC units in hamlet at night, sometimes in day; may have fired on or attacked or overrun hamlet. Little or no GVN authority at night...

Party cadre underground by day but free to intimidate populace at night...

VC apparatus can undermine GVN in hamlet by incidents ranging from propaganda through terrorism and sabotage, at least at night. All taxation by VC.

2-point responses

Village guerrillas reduced somewhat in men and defenses; can attack in platoon strength from within village or 1-2 hours' travel to hamlet.

GVN activity under harassment. May be mines and/or frequent sniping on routes to hamlet. VC night activity in hamlet.

Members and most leaders of VC hamlet organizations uncovered and neutralized but hamlet undercover agents still operative.

Some village cadre eliminated but apparatus fairly effective.

Day and night defense by external forces but local defense force recruiting and training may be underway.

Some local participation in hamlet management; GVN officials usually present but only in daytime.

Some welfare activity by GVN and/or foreign sources to aid needy families but basic need not determined.

3-point responses

Military control of village broken, most guerrillas identified, 50% losses, havens destroyed, activity below platoon level; can harass but

CONFIDENTIAL

not prevent GVN activities in hamlet.

Long range fire at night; VC activity in adjacent hamlets. May be occasional sniping and/or mines on routes to hamlet.

Most key members of village apparatus identified, up to half neutralized; effectiveness curtailed.

No overt VC incidents in hamlet; few signs of covert subversion but some continuing VC taxation or extortion suspected.

Some individual grievances being resolved. In hamlet or village census grievance survey completed.

Formal full-time public primary education in permanent classrooms in hamlet or village, but overcrowded or at least 25% of children not enrolled.

Basic (welfare) needs being determined, some being met..

4-point responses

Village guerrilla control reduced to 1-2 hamlets on village periphery or 2-3 hours' travel; could make desperation raid...

Bases in district or within 6 hours' travel to hamlet destroyed...

All normal party apparatus identified and dealt with...

Defense force organized but only partly effective; adequate plan and communications for its use. In urban areas, adequate police by day.

More GVN actions being taken to meet people's grievances and aspirations...

At least 90% of children receive primary education in readily accessible permanent classrooms; may be some adult classes.

Basic (welfare) needs being met; some special benefits being paid by GVN.

Priority projects underway; resources at hand. People aware of advantages projects will provide.

5-point responses

Village guerrilla remnants driven out. No threat of harassment or intimidation from guerrillas in adjacent villages.

No incidents including harassments in village or nearby hamlets...

Whole party apparatus appears to have been destroyed...

Adequate defense force and plan, following province RD plan where applicable. In urban areas adequate police protection day and night.

Effective elected hamlet governing body; elected village council; all officials in hamlet and village resident.

Substantial evidence of GVN efforts to meet aspirations; resident GVN official grievance representative in RD hamlet or village.

Adequate medical programs, hospital facilities, supplies, trained personnel readily available; general public participation.

Public works projects will along or completed; public is using new facilities, in some urban areas no such projects needed.

Revised 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

HES REPORTING AS A BASIS FOR DETAILED ANALYSIS

The large volume of detailed data included in the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) reports provides a useful source for analysis in greater depth of the progress of non-military programs. Some preliminary studies are discussed below:

Corruption and Pacification Progress

Table 1 attempts to measure the impact of alleged corruption among hamlet or village officials, using the assessment of US subsector advisors in the problem area section of the HES worksheet. The results indicate that in III Corps corruption does not seem to impact heavily, if at all, on the socio-economic development status of the hamlet. The "uncorrupt" hamlets have an average development rating of 2.69 compared to 2.55 in the reportedly corrupt hamlets. (A score of 2.5 to 3.5 equals a "C" grade.) Yet this is the area of activity which would seem to be most open to abuse by corrupt officials. In fact, in 4 provinces, development appears to be enhanced by the rumored, suspected, or proved condition of corrupt officials. That is, the average development score is higher in the reportedly corrupt hamlets. In the remaining III Corps provinces, the average HES development scores are lower where corruption is allegedly taking place.

TABLE 1
CORRUPTION VS PACIFICATION DEVELOPMENT
(As of August 31, 1967)

<u>Province</u>	<u>Hamlets with no Corruption Reported</u>			<u>Hamlets with Corruption Reported</u>		
	<u>No. of Hamlets</u>	<u>Aug HES Devl. Score</u>	<u>Avg. Pop</u>	<u>No. of Hamlets</u>	<u>Avg HES Devel Score</u>	<u>Avg Pop</u>
Binh Tuy	45	3.17	1071	7	1.97	1134
Long Khanh	81	3.59	1543	2	3.00	1335
Phuoc Long	9	2.78	445	44	2.87	592
Binh Long	83	2.14	718	7	3.15	1268
Binh Duong	51	2.98	1783	12	2.52	2346
Tay Ninh	49	3.11	1984	8	3.04	2229
Hau Nghia	63	2.68	1542	9	2.56	1424
Bien Hoa	130	2.55	1398	17	1.81	821
Phuoc Tuy	38	2.51	986	0	-	-
Long An	52	2.42	1171	25	2.57	1607
Gia Dinh	183	2.46	3232	16	2.10	1154
Vung Tau	25	2.69	2272	1	3.33	4243
III Corps Total						

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Pacification and Tax Collections

Table 2 shows the relationship between tax collection activities in hamlet (as reported by subsector advisors on the Hamlet Evaluation System Worksheet problem area section) and pacification progress, as measured by the total HES hamlet score. As one would expect, pacification progress seems to correlate closely with the ability of the GVN to tax hamlet residents. In 500 hamlets in III Corps where the VC are not collecting taxes (according to the subsector advisor), the average hamlet HES score was 3.22. In 475 hamlets where the VC have some taxation power, the average HES score was 2.85.

TABLE 2

VC TAX COLLECTION VERSUS PACIFICATION PROGRESS (As of August 31, 1967)

<u>Province</u>	<u>Hamlets with No VC Taxation</u>			<u>Hamlets with Some or All VC Taxation</u>		
	<u>No. of Hamlets</u>	<u>Avg HES Score</u>	<u>Avg Pop</u>	<u>No. of Hamlets</u>	<u>Avg HES Score</u>	<u>Avg Pop</u>
Binh Tuy	42	3.31	1119	8	1.73	982
Long Khanh	22	4.22	2268	39	3.53	1067
Phuoc Long	40	3.20	550	4	3.04	646
Binh Long	23	2.83	883	54	2.14	604
Binh Duong	32	3.20	2247	15	2.00	849
Tay Ninh	29	3.29	2381	6	2.75	2001
Hau Nghia	24	3.38	1449	40	2.38	1400
Bien Hoa	62	3.16	1777	63	2.24	1222
Phuoc Tay	19	2.64	848	45	2.45	887
Long An	9	2.78	1421	75	2.51	1171
Gia Dinh	173	3.14	4731	125	2.24	1303
Vung Tau	25	3.66	2396	4	3.78	1145
III Corps	500	3.22	2665	475	2.85	1125

It appears that data on taxation could provide a very useful indicator of pacification progress. The growth of tax receipts might be a meaningful indication of increased GVN control over the population. Likewise, apparent increases in GVN population control without a corresponding increase in tax receipts would bring into question the reality of the progress reporting. One of the virtues of using tax receipt data is that it is quantifiable and not subject to the biases that trouble much of the qualitative reporting.

CONFIDENTIAL

Revised 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

STATISTICAL TRENDS FROM THE HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM

While the overall trend of scores from the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) is useful, the analysis of the 18 individual indicators can provide a better understanding of what is happening in SVN. Table 1 shows two indicator-by-indicator comparisons of improvements and regressions in hamlets which US advisors rated in both March and August 1967. ^{a/} The first comparison is in terms of average scores, and the second in terms of what we considered to be the critical threshold or "benchmark" for each indicator. Finally, Table 2 shows the impact of total HES scores on the percentage of population residing in each rating category.

Average Score Trends

For each of the 18 HES indicators we computed an average score for all hamlets rated in both March and August using the standard 5-point scale: we gave hamlets 5 points for an A rating, down through 1 for an E rating and 0 if the hamlet was entirely VC controlled. In general, the nine HES security indicators (1A through 3C) were higher in both months than the nine development indicators (4A through 6B). However, the development indicators showed greater improvement between March and August: development scores increased an average of .11 points versus a .04 point gain in security scores. No security indicators showed a slippage, although there was no gain in clearing out provincial main force units. VC political and subversive activities (indicator 2c) showed the greatest improvement of the security indicators. All development indicators showed marked gains except for education (indicator 5B), which slipped .01 point.

Progress Against Fixed Benchmarks

For each indicator we also tallied the number of hamlets which met what we regarded as the most significant threshold or benchmark. For example, on VC village guerrillas (indicator 1A) (see Appendix B, Hamlet Evaluation Worksheet) we chose a C rating as a benchmark of security. To attain a C (or better) rating, a hamlet must be in a village where guerrilla control is broken. In March, 5378 hamlets (45.1% of all hamlets) were C-or-better. Between March and August, 365 hamlets were upgraded to A-B-C, while 360 hamlets regressed from the A-B-C level. Thus, there was a net countrywide gain of 5 hamlets where friendly forces reportedly have broken VC military control of the associated village. ^{b/}

Statistics on gains and losses of benchmark hamlets confirm the evidence from average scores that social and political development is outpacing security. All nine development indicators showed sizeable net

- ^{a/} Retrospective adjustments have been made by MACCORDS to make January and February data usable, but the revised data was not received in time for this article.
- ^{b/} MACV J-2 reports a sharp decline of 26,800 (24%) in the estimated guerrilla strength over the same period. See MACV Monthly Order of Battle Summary, 31 October 1967. Also see article: "Revised Estimates of VC/NVA Order of Battle" elsewhere in this issue.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

gains in hamlets that met the benchmark criteria, while four of the nine security indicators--hamlet and village infrastructure (2A and 2B), hamlet defense plan (3A), and VC main force units (1B)--showed net declines. As with average scores, the benchmark statistics show that VC subversive activities (indicator 2C) made the greatest progress among the security indicators, and education (5B) made the least progress among the development indicators.

The benchmark statistics also demonstrate substantial turnover in hamlet ratings. For instance, the data for indicator 1C shows that 543 incident-free hamlets in March incurred some VC military incidents during August. Compared to 566 hamlets in which military incidents occurred in March but not August: a net improvement of 23 hamlets but a gross shift of over 1100 or almost 10% of those hamlets rated both times.

Impact on Total HES Scores

Shifting now from the individual indicators to the aggregate scores, Table 2 shows countrywide changes in HES total scores (security plus development) and population bases between March and October 1967. Population residing in A, B, and C hamlets, plus non-hamlet population in secure areas, rose from 63.2% in March to 66.6% in October, a net increase of 3.4% of total population. This upward trend was due to many factors: improvements in development scores, additions and deletions of hamlets, population movements, and new census information.

For example, Table 2 shows that 783,700 more people lived in secure areas (A-B-C hamlets and non-hamlet secure areas) in October than in March. During the period, the following changes occurred:

1. Population migrations and/or new census information account for 238,500 of the increase: 310,200 more people live in what were March A-B-C hamlets, while 71,700 fewer people live in non-hamlet secure areas.
2. 149,500 resided in newly rated hamlets which may or may not have improved in the period: A-B-C hamlets having 323,800 inhabitants were "found" and added to the data base, while 174,300 in A-B-C hamlets listed erroneously were dropped.
3. 395,600 more people resided in hamlets which were upgraded to A-B-C than those which regressed: there were 1,934,400 people in upgraded hamlets, and 1,538,800 in hamlets which regressed.

Thus, only about one half of the increase in A-B-C/secure population between March and October were people living in hamlets whose HES ratings increased.

Statistical Checks of HES

Appendix A summarizes statistical validity checks of HES data made to date.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 1

CHANGES IN HES INDICATORS FOR CONTINUOUSLY RATED HAMLETS ^{a/} March - August 1967

HES Indicator	Average Score of Continuously Rated Hamlets ^{b/}			Comparison of	
	March	August	Net Change Mar-Aug	Benchmark ^{c/}	Benchmark Ratings
1A: VC Village Guerrilla Units	2.18	2.19	+ .01	C: Military control of village is broken	A-B-C
1B: VC Provincial Main Force Units in District	1.88	1.88	0	C: Not capable of company size operations	A-B-C
1C: VC Military Incidents Affecting Hamlet	2.28	2.30	+ .02	B: No incidents in hamlet during month	A-B
2A: VC Hamlet Infrastructure	1.98	2.01	+ .03	B: Party apparatus and agents eliminated	A-B
2B: VC Village Infrastructure	2.10	2.12	+ .02	B: Most village leaders eliminated	A-B
2C: VC Political and Subversive Activities	2.08	2.20	+ .12	B: No overt VC incidents or evidence of subversion	A-B
3A: Hamlet Defense Plan	1.90	1.92	+ .03	B: Defense force organized; may be partially effective	A-B
3B: Friendly External Force Assistance	2.05	2.10	+ .05	C: Availability and effectiveness generally meet needs	A-B-C
3C: Internal Security Activities	1.92	1.93	+ .06	B: Effective informant system	A-B
All Security Indicators	2.04	2.05	+ .04		
4A: GVN Governmental Management	2.00	2.16	+ .16	C: Managerial groups resident, usually present at night	A-B-C
4B: GVN Response to Popular Aspirations	1.64	1.51	+ .17	C: Initial census grievance survey taken	A-B-C
4C: Information/Psycop Activities	1.73	1.85	+ .12	C: Frequent activity; public impact evident	A-B-C
5A: Medical Services and Public Health	1.61	1.75	+ .14	C: Full time coverage by external teams	A-B-C
5B: Education	1.84	1.83	- .01	B: At least 90% of children receive primary education	A-B
5C: Welfare	1.68	1.75	+ .07	B: Basic needs being met	A-B
6A: Self Help/Civic Action	1.64	1.72	+ .08	B: All programmed projects underway	A-B
6B: Public Works	1.29	1.41	+ .12	C: Planned projects adequate; some work started	A-B-C
6C: Economic Improvement Program	1.32	1.44	+ .12	C: VN technical workers in part time	A-B-C
All Development Indicators	1.64	1.75	+ .11		

Source: Hamlet Evaluation System, NMCSHC HAMLA file.

^{a/} Hamlets classed as A, B, C, D, E or VC in both March and October.

^{b/} A = 5, B = 4, C = 3, D = 2, E = 1, VC = 0.

^{c/} Paraphrased from Hamlet Evaluation Worksheet.

^{d/} Percentages based on total number of continuously rated hamlets (11,392).

CONFIDENTIAL

Hamlets Meeting Critical Benchmark Ratings

Benchmark Hamlets

<u>March 1967</u> <u>No. (%) d/</u>	<u>Gains</u>	<u>Losses</u>	<u>August 1967</u> <u>No. (%) d/</u>	<u>Net Gains</u> <u>Mar-Aug</u> <u>No. (%) d/</u>
5378 (47.2)	365	360	5383 (47.3)	+ 5 (+.1)
4350 (38.2)	426	478	4298 (37.7)	- 52 (-.5)
4089 (35.9)	566	543	4112 (36.1)	+ 23 (+.2)
2635 (23.1)	316	411	2540 (22.3)	- 95 (-.8)
3308 (29.0)	335	392	3251 (28.5)	- 57 (-.5)
3255 (25.9)	578	365	3168 (27.8)	+213 (+1.9)
2222 (25.2)	399	461	2806 (24.6)	- 62 (-.6)
5171 (45.4)	537	376	5332 (46.8)	+161 (+1.4)
2396 (21.0)	400	315	2481 (21.8)	+ 85 (+.8)
5523 (48.5)	491	266	5748 (50.5)	+225 (+2.0)
3634 (31.9)	746	252	4128 (36.2)	+494 (+4.3)
4187 (36.8)	628	213	4602 (40.4)	+415 (+3.6)
3210 (28.2)	783	193	3800 (33.4)	+590 (+5.2)
1858 (16.3)	298	191	1965 (17.2)	+107 (+.9)
1421 (12.5)	318	158	1581 (13.9)	+160 (+1.4)
1790 (15.7)	491	274	2007 (17.6)	+217 (+1.9)
2141 (18.8)	739	240	2640 (23.2)	+499 (+4.4)
2228 (19.6)	752	251	2729 (24.0)	+501 (+4.4)

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 2

CHANGES IN HES TOTAL SCORES MARCH - OCTOBER 1967 (SVN Totals)

Population in Thousands ^{a/}

	March Population Data		
	March HES Ratings	March HES Ratings	Shifts From Ma Into Category
<u>Population in Hamlets</u>			
Category A	301.0	348.7	215.8
B	2,857.9	3,011.3	860.6
C	4,225.8	4,334.9	858.0
Sub Total	7,384.7 (44.1)	7,694.9 (45.5)	1,934.4
Category D	2,235.9 (13.3)	2,274.5 (13.5)	530.6
E	430.0 (2.9)	446.1 (2.6)	98.9
VC Controlled	2,955.7 (17.6)	2,795.6 (16.6)	84.7
Other (Non-Evaluated) b/	---	---	32.1
Total	13,055.3 (77.9)	13,211.1 (78.2)	2,680.7
<u>Non-Hamlet Population</u>			
Secure	3,210.2 (19.1)	3,210.2 (19.0)	
Contested	291.3 (1.8)	291.3 (1.7)	
VC	196.4 (1.2)	196.4 (1.1)	
Total	3,697.9 (22.1)	3,697.9 (21.8)	
<u>Total Population</u>			
Secure (A+B+C)	10,534.9 (63.2)	10,905.1 (64.5)	
Contested (D+E+Other)	3,007.2 (18.0)	3,011.9 (17.8)	
VC	3,152.1 (18.8)	2,992.0 (17.7)	
Total	16,754.2	16,909.0	

^{a/} Percentages of total countrywide population shown in parentheses.

^{b/} Category established in May. Includes abandoned and planned hamlets.

Source: Hamlet Evaluation System, IMCSCC HAMLA file.

CONFIDENTIAL

October Population Data

<u>ch Ratings</u>	<u>Data Base</u>	<u>Data Base</u>	<u>Net</u>	
<u>Out of Category</u>	<u>Additions</u>	<u>Deletions</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>October HES Ratings</u>
25.9	121.2	0	+ 311.1	659.8
468.1	104.9	45.9	+ 451.5	3,462.8
1,044.8	97.7	128.4	- 217.5	4,117.4
1,538.8	323.8	174.3	+ 545.1	8,240.0 (48.2)
714.7	38.3	25.4	- 171.2	2,103.3 (12.3)
221.3	9.5	2.1	- 115.0	331.1 (1.9)
205.9	172.2	42.4	+ 8.6	2,804.2 (16.4)
---	49.2	--	+ 81.3	81.3 (.5)
380.7	593.0	244.2	+ 348.8	13,559.9 (79.3)

- 71.7	3,138.5 (18.4)
- 38.2	253.1 (1.5)
- 61.6	134.8 (.8)
- 171.5	3,526.4 (20.7)

+ 473.5	11,378.5 (66.6)
- 243.1	2,768.8 (16.2)
- 53.0	2,939.0 (17.2)
+ 177.4	17,086.3

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX B

HAMLET EVALUATION WORKSHEET

MACHOS

DISTRICT _____ VILLAGE _____ HAMLET NAME _____ GVN HAMLET NO. _____ TYPE OF _____
 Hamlet visited by VN _____ GVN _____

C. Access to Hamlets under Some Degree of GVN Control			
FACTORS	A	B	C
1. VC Military Activities a. Village Security VN Unit	VC do control effective the same identified or adjacent; VC VS distance largely in air	VC do reduced somewhat in men & distance; can attack in full strength from within VS or 1-6 KMS TRAVEL TO HAMLET.	History control of VS broken, most do identified, 50% losses, losses decreased, activity below plot level, can force but not prevent GVN activities in hamlet.
b. External Forces (EF) (Open, Main Force unit in district)	EF forces may have base & can make comprehensive attacks WITHIN A FEW KMS TRAVEL TO HAMLET. Hamlet or VS may have been fired on and/or attacked during month.	EF in district reduced up to 25%, EF otherwise as in B.	EF in district reduced up to 50% in men & arms, or bases near hamlet destroyed. No VC operations during night or longer, no mortar or SA fire near hamlet during month.
c. Military Incidents Affecting Hamlet	Armed VC units in hamlet at night, sometimes in day; MAY HAVE FIRED ON OR ATTACKED OR OVERRAN HAMLET. Little or no GVN activity at night. Routes to hamlet may be interrupted by day; may have been ambushed near hamlet.	GVN activity under harassment. MAY BE MOVED and/or frequent waiting on routes to hamlet; VC night activity in hamlet.	Long range fire at night, VC activity in adjacent hamlets. May be occasional mortar attack OR MINES on routes to hamlet.
2. VC Political & Administrative Activities a. Hamlet Infrastructure	Party cadres underground by day but free to maintain positions at night. No observable party structure or leaders uncovered.	Most here and most leaders of VC hamlet organizations or covered & maintained the HAMLET underground system since 1975.	Best indicates most of Party apparatus identified; some agents under VS or just control GVN operations.
b. Village Infrastructure	Despite some individual identification, VS apparatus intact, functioning.	Some VS cadres eliminated but apparatus fairly effective.	Most key members of VS apparatus identified, up to half eliminated, effectiveness doubtful.
c. Activities Affecting Hamlet	VC apparatus can undermine GVN in hamlet by inducing refusal to sign, no acceptance of taxation & election, if least at night. ALL TAXATION BY VC.	No overt propaganda but terrorism or sabotage during past 6 mos. VC TAXATION PREDOMINANT.	No overt VC activities in hamlet, few signs of covert subversion but SOME CONTINUING VC TAXATION OR EXTORTION SUSPECTED.
3. Security (Village Committee) a. Hamlet Security Plan & Organization	No night defense except by external forces although required. PP PRESENT DURING DAY.	Day & night defense by external forces & PP BUT local DEFENSE FORCE remaining & training MAY BE underway.	Local warning & communication systems operative some area of local leaders but little reliance on PP AND/OR SO TEAM or external defense. IN CRISIS AREAS POLICE BURST IN BUT INADEQUATE.
b. Friendly External Forces (FEP) Assistance	FEP ARE INADEQUATE IN STRENGTH to meet needs for air, air support, reaction ground forces, etc.	FEP more needed but only effective marginally. A B. FEP's response, no night response, no aggressive, etc.	Availability and effectiveness of FEP generally most needed.
c. Internal Security Activities	No agents, no intelligence from public except possibly operate police information.	No machine intelligence system or no trained or no active informants, some data from passive grievances WHERE OPERATIVE.	Hamlet still gets word into from informants & some volunteers & from other grievances WHERE PRESENT.
4. Administrative & Political Activities a. GVN Governmental Management	APPOINTED NON-RESIDENT GVN officials, marginally effective, IRREGULARLY present, only in daytime.	Some local participation in hamlet management, GVN officials usually present but only in daytime.	Management group resident, mostly local, appointed or elected, usually present at night.
b. GVN Recruitment (Communist Grievance Program)	NO COOPERATION BY LOCAL OFFICIALS TO POPULAR ASPIRATIONS. No active activity or grievance program.	OCCASIONAL RESPONSE BY LOCAL OFFICIALS TO POPULAR ASPIRATIONS. Commence grievances program MAY HAVE BEEN started in hamlet.	Some individual grievances being resolved, IN HAMLET OR VS. Local issues grievances survey completed.
c. Information/PROPAGANDA Activities	Little or none.	OCCASIONAL PUBLIC INFO activity public information.	Request activity even if makeshift; public impact evident, GVN dissemination MAY BE STARTING.
5. Health, Education & Welfare a. Medical Services & Facilities	NO OR INFREQUENT VISITS TO HAMLET ON VS. BY MEDCAP OR SIMILAR TEAM.	Only periodic, scheduled visits TO HAMLET ON VS. BY MEDCAP OR SIMILAR TEAM.	Full-time coverage by external teams, MAY include medical, administrative, DIMENSIONS. MAY BE MEDIC & ADVISORY PRESENT IN VS. BUT POORLY TRAINED & EQUIPPED.
b. Education	No GVN-sponsored educational facilities, may be informal instruction by VS elders, monks, Cath. priest.	Some PARTTIME formal instruction ACCORDING TO VS. IN SOME CASES CLASSROOMS OR CLASSROOMS NOT FULLY CREW.	Formal, full-time public primary education program in permanent classrooms IN HAMLET OR VS. but overcrowded or at least 25% of children not enrolled.
c. Welfare	No social welfare activity.	Some welfare activity BY GVN AND/OR FOREIGN AGENCIES in a few hamlets, but needs food and shelter.	Little needs determined, some being met.
6. Economic Development a. Self Help Activity, Self Aid	None.	Projects in progress in some hamlets & in other areas do not exist.	Projects from SO OR OTHER PROVINCE PROGRAMS OR CIVIC ACTION groups with local content & some LOCAL participation in "volunteer" work.
b. Public Works (require outside assistance, effort at least village)	SOME TYPE OF PUBLIC WORKS MUCH NEEDED BUT none planned or underway.	Some limited planning AT DISTRICT for projects under VS. OR OTHER GVN programs.	Planned projects suitable & meet public needs, some work being done.
c. Economic Improvement Programs (Fishing, Poultry, Land Reclamation, New Urban Industries, etc.)	None.	Some planning at district, a few small programs in progress.	VS TECHNICAL WORKERS IN VS. PARTTIME; local programs underway, people interested.

FOUO

CONFIDENTIAL WHEN FILLED IN

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX A

Adequacy of HES Data

The reliability of information from the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) depends on the ability of the subsector advisors to report accurately. Several factors combine to make HES reporting difficult:

1. Only a few of the 18 indicators can be rated on the basis of direct observation of a clear-cut condition.
2. Much of the HES information can be obtained only from Vietnamese. Surveys to date indicate that advisors rely on their Vietnamese counterparts for at least half of the raw data they use in answering the HES questions.
3. Most advisors cannot visit all of their hamlets during one month. In III CTZ, advisors reported that US personnel visited about two-thirds of the accessible hamlets in their district in any given month, but managed to cover all but 6% over a four month interval.

Despite the obstacles, HES results correlate well with non-HES data, such as VC initiated incidents: anti-aircraft incidents tend to occur over VC controlled hamlets, and incidents around A or B hamlets tend to feature terror. Furthermore, HES results accord with common sense and observations of skilled personnel. The scores on the nine security indicators are generally higher than the scores on the nine development indicators, and there is a high correlation between the two sets of scores. Hamlets which have development scores higher than security scores seem to be located in trouble spots, such as the area just south of the DMZ. Finally, statistical analysis of the April 1967 HES reports indicates that the raters were not mechanically grading all of the indicators according to one single criterion. While the individual indicator scores do correlate with each other, the correlations are not so high as to allow good predictions of some indicator scores from knowledge of others. The wide variety of hamlet characteristics is reflected in the range of grades for each hamlet.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

January 68

RD PROGRAM: A 1967 PROGRESS REPORT

The Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) reports for 1967 indicate improvements in about 14% of the hamlets in Vietnam which were rated in both March and November; it also shows regressions in about 7%. Hamlets given priority treatment under the Revolutionary Development (RD) program show consistently better progress than non-RD hamlets, and account for about 60% of all hamlets that attained A-B-C rating status during the past 9 months.

HES Total Score Changes

Table 1 summarizes the changes in HES total scores (security plus development) for 11,248 hamlets rated in both March and November 1967. It excludes hamlets added after March, as well as those not rated in November. There was a net shift of 364 hamlets from D, E, and VC categories to the A, B, and C levels.

TABLE 1

CHANGES IN HES TOTAL SCORES
FOR CONTINUOUSLY RATED HAMLETS^{a/}

	1967		Net Change Mar-Nov
	March	November	
A	99	183	+ 84
B	1605	1768	+163
C	3050	3167	+117
Sub-total	4754	5118	+364
D	2253	2146	-107
E	537	415	-122
Sub-total	2790	2561	-229
VC	3704	3569	-135
Total	11248	11248	0

^{a/} Hamlets rated in both March and November. Hamlets added to the HES after March are excluded, as well as those not rated in November

Table 2 is a change matrix which shows that 2339 hamlets changed categories between March and November; the ratings of 1567 hamlets improved at least one "grade", and 771 declined. Thus, what may appear as a steady movement of hamlets into the GVN fold is actually a complex mix of increases and decreases in security/development status. The first matrix covers hamlets in the March RD plans; the second matrix covers non-RD hamlets.

The figures in the boxes show the hamlets that were unchanged during the 9 month period. The figures above show the hamlets whose ratings regressed; the numbers below reflect those that progressed. For instance,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

four RD hamlets were rated A at both points in time; eight RD hamlets rose from B to A; five RD hamlets went from C to A; and one RD hamlet fell from A to B. The total number of hamlets in each category are shown in the total column at right for March and the total row at the bottom for November. Thus, the number of A-rated RD hamlets rose from five in March to 17 in November. This net change of 12 hamlets resulted from rating changes in 14 hamlets.

TABLE 2

HES RATING CHANGE MATRIX (March - November 1967)

RD Hamlets

From \ To	A	B	C	D	E	VC	March Total
A	4	1					5
B	8	116	24	1			149
C	5	111	332	26			474
D		30	137	138	3	2	310
E		3	13	22	11	3	52
VC			20	27	5	26	78
Nov-Total	17	261	526	214	19	31	1068

Non-RD Hamlets

From \ To	A	B	C	D	E	VC	March Total
A	82	10	2				94
B	77	1138	219	21		1	1456
C	6	312	1954	283	3	18	2576
D		36	399	1398	58	52	1943
E		1	12	141	287	44	485
VC	1	10	55	89	48	3423	3626
Nov-Total	166	1507	2641	1932	396	3538	10180

CONFIDENTIAL

RD Program Trends

Turning now from continuously rated hamlets to all hamlets, the net effect of HES total score changes is shown in Table 3. At least 1218 hamlets were on the GVN priority list at least once during 1967. Incomplete GVN statistics indicate that RD cadre teams had completed their work in at least 282 of the 1218 hamlets as of November 30. By November, 910 (75%) of these hamlets were in the A-B-C category, a net gain of 268 since March. In comparison, only 189 non-RD hamlets were added to the A-B-C category during the period. Thus, RD hamlets accounted for only 10% of the rated hamlets but 60% of those attaining A-C status.

TABLE 3

HES TOTAL SCORES FOR RD AND NON-RD HAMLETS

	<u>NUMBER OF HAMLETS</u>				
	<u>1967</u> <u>March</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>November</u>	<u>Net Change</u> <u>Mar-Nov</u>
<u>RD Hamlets</u>					
A	5	17	18	18	+ 13
B	151	230	275	289	+ 138
C	486	554	561	603	+ 117
Sub-Total	642	801	854	910	+ 268
D	314	243	257	246	- 68
E	61	34	24	17	- 44
Sub-Total	375	277	281	263	- 112
VC	86	44	28	25	- 61
Other	--	32	21	20	+ 20
Total RD	1103	1154	1184	1218	+ 115
<u>Non-RD Hamlets</u>					
A	94	151	195	201	+ 107
B	1488	1546	1627	1556	+ 68
C	2652	2691	2576	2666	+ 14
Sub-Total	4234	4388	4398	4423	+ 189
D	2034	1913	1949	1987	- 47
E	538	494	459	429	- 109
Sub-Total	2572	2407	2408	2416	- 156
VC	4176	3934	3959	3908	- 268
Other	--	654	692	749	+ 749
Total Non-RD	10982	11383	11457	11496	+ 514

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

The RD program seems to have had a significant positive impact on the scores of the priority hamlets, both in causing a change to their scores and by increasing the possibility of score improvement. Table 2 (the matrix table) shows that 41.3% (441) of the RD hamlets changed their total score while only 18.6% (1898) of the non-RD hamlets changed.

Table 4, derived from Table 2, shows that C-or-lower hamlets included in the RD program showed more progress than those not receiving priority attention. For instance, 24.5% of the C-rated RD hamlets improved during the period, while only 12.3% of the C-rated non-RD hamlets improved; C-rated RD hamlets regressed less than half as often as non-RD hamlets. The greatest difference was in the VC controlled hamlets: 66.7% of those in the RD program improved, while only 5.6% of those not included improved.

TABLE 4

PERCENTAGE BREAKDOWN OF HES
SCORE CHANGES:
RD VS NON-RD HAMLETS

<u>March HES Rating</u>	<u>Percent of Hamlets Improving</u> <u>RD Hamlet</u>	<u>Percent of Hamlets Improving</u> <u>Non-RD Hamlet</u>	<u>Percent of Hamlets Regressing</u> <u>RD Hamlet</u>	<u>Percent of Hamlets Regressing</u> <u>Non-RD Hamlet</u>
A	-	-	20.0	12.8
B	5.4	5.3	16.8	16.6
C	24.5	12.3	5.5	11.8
D	53.9	22.4	1.6	5.7
E	73.1	31.8	5.8	9.1
VC	66.7	5.6	-	-
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
All Ratings	35.7	11.7	5.6	7.0

CONFIDENTIAL

Feb 68

PACIFICATION SLOWDOWN

Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) reports for CY 1967 indicate that pacification progressed slowly during the first half of 1967, and lost ground in the second half. Most (60%) of the 1967 gain results from accounting type changes to the HES system, not from pacification progress; hamlet additions and deletions, and revised population estimates accounted for half of the January-June increase and all of the June-December increase. In the area that really counts -- C-D-E hamlets rising to A-B-C ratings -- we actually suffered a net loss of 10,100 people between June and December 1967. The enemy's offensive appears to have killed the revolutionary development program, as currently conceived. Recent reports state that to a large extent, the VC now control the countryside.

Countrywide Population Control

There was a net gain of 1.3 million people in HES A-B-C categories during 1967, increasing the categories from 62.1% to 66.9% of the total SVN population. Table 1 shows the following:

(1) Most of the 1.3 million increase occurred in the first half of 1967; there was a net gain of 1,064,500 people in A-B-C areas between January and June, but a net gain of only 258,600 between June and December.

(2) Less than half of the 1.3 million increase resulted from D, E, or VC hamlets rising to A, B, or C. For the January-December period, about one-third of the gain resulted from changing population estimates; about one-fourth from addition and deletion of hamlets; and about 40% from 979,900 people in hamlets upgraded to A-B-C between January and December, minus the 434,000 in hamlets downgraded to D-E-VC.

The geographic distribution of A-B-C and VC hamlets as of November 30, 1967 is shown on the map plot.

The first two components of the increase in A-B-C population seem to represent accounting changes to the HES rather than real pacification progress:

Changing population estimates can occur because of (a) natural population growth, (b) population migrations, or (c) corrections of inaccuracies. Since only 39.3% of all hamlets have "head counts" accurate to within 10%, HES figures probably do not measure natural population growth or migrations accurately. However, migrations of civilians to A-B-C areas from contested or VC areas, if measured in the HES, might represent one form of pacification progress.

Addition and deletion of hamlets occurred as 1174 new hamlets were "found" (285 in the A-B-C category), 298 were dropped, and 622 hamlets (mainly VC) were rated in January but classified as abandoned, planned, or non-evaluated in December. This turnover of hamlets caused the A-B-C population to increase by 317,300 between January and December, but represented better information about the countryside, not expansion of pacified areas.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 1

1967 CHANGES IN HES A-B-C POPULATION ^{a/}
(SVN Totals - Population in Thousands)

	<u>January-June</u>	<u>June-December</u>	<u>January-December</u>
<u>'Start of Period:</u>			
A-B-C hamlets plus secure non-hamlet population	10191.7 (62.1%)	11256.2 (65.6%)	10191.7 (62.1%)
Total SVN population	16401.8	17165.3	16401.8
<u>Changes in A-B-C Population During Period Due To:</u>			
End-of-period revision of population estimates for hamlets rated A-B-C at start and for secure non-hamlet population	+ 461.2	+ 41.0	+ 499.9 ^{b/}
New A-B-C hamlets "found" minus A-B-C hamlets dropped or no longer rated ^{c/}	+ 79.1	+ 227.7	+ 317.3 ^{b/}
Hamlets upgraded to A-B-C minus hamlets dropped to D-E-VC ^{c/}	+ 524.2	- 10.1	+ 545.9 ^{b/}
Total changes	+ 1064.5	+ 258.6	+ 1323.1
<u>End Of Period:</u>			
A-B-C hamlets plus secure non-hamlet population	11256.2 (65.6%)	11514.8 (66.9%)	11514.8 (66.9%)
Total SVN population	17165.3	17208.3	17208.3

^{a/} Based on HES total scores (nine security plus nine development factors).

^{b/} Jan - June and June - Dec figures do not add to Jan - Dec totals due to use of end-of-period population estimates, and turnover of A-B-C hamlets.

^{c/} Based on population in hamlets at end of period.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Changes in hamlet ratings by subsector advisors account for the remaining component of the increase in A-B-C population. Table 2 shows that 6,954,700 people lived in hamlets which advisors rated A, B, or C in both January and December; 979,900 lived in hamlets upgraded to A-B-C during 1967; and 434,000 lived in hamlets downgraded to D-E-VC for a net gain of 545,900.

Pacification Reverses

Table 2 shows that in the last half of 1967 the number of people in hamlets downgraded to D-E-VC (327,400) exceeded those in hamlets upgraded to A-B-C (317,300) by 10,100. II and III CTZ, from which US units were withdrawn in order to meet the enemy threat in I CTZ, showed net losses of A-B-C population: 26,700 in II CTZ and 56,300 in III CTZ, for a total of 83,000 lost. All CTZs showed significantly fewer improvements, and all except IV CTZ showed more regressions during June-December than January-June. Other data from the HES indicates that a decline in the nine security indicators, not the nine development indicators, caused most of the reversals.

The enemy's offensive appears to have killed the Revolutionary Development program as currently conceived. Recent reports state that to a large extent, the VC now control the countryside. In many areas the VC/NVA reportedly have moved into the RD hamlets, purged the hamlet leaders, reorganized the villagers, picked up the GVN LV cards, recruited replacements for their forces, and have made it clear that they intend to stay. (Many of the RD cadre teams have retreated to the cities.) Even if the enemy were driven out of the hamlets in the coming months, the message to the villager clearly is, "We shall return. No one can protect you, not even in the cities."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 2

1967 CHANGES IN A-B-C HAMLET POPULATION (Population in Thousands)

	CTZ	January - June
<u>Hamlet population with A, B, or C</u>	I	1009.9
<u>rating start and end of period</u>	II	1568.6
Rating at start: A, B, or C	III	1762.3
Rating at end : A, B, or C	IV	2716.1
	SVN	7056.9
<u>Hamlet population with improved</u>	I	102.8
<u>rating at end of period</u>	II	192.8
Rating at start: D, E, or VC	III	199.1
Rating at end : A, B, or C	IV	252.5
	SVN	747.2
<u>Hamlet population with lower</u>	I	35.0
<u>rating at end of period</u>	II	55.7
Rating at start: A, B, or C	III	21.5
Rating at end : D, E, or VC	IV	110.8
	SVN	223.0
<u>Net increase/decrease in A-B-C</u>	I	+ 67.8
<u>categories for hamlets rated at</u>	II	+ 137.1
<u>start and end of period</u>	III	+ 177.6
	IV	+ 141.7
	SVN	+ 524.2 b/

a/ Based on HES total scores (nine security plus nine development factors).

b/ Jan - June and June - Dec figures do not add to Jan - Dec total because of turnover end-of-period hamlet population estimates.

CONFIDENTIAL

2

A-B-C HAMLET POPULATION a/
(in Thousands)

<u>January - June</u>	<u>June - December</u>	<u>January - December</u>
1009.9	1671.7	953.6
1568.6	1761.8	1534.4
1762.3	1979.1	1742.6
2716.1	2980.7	2724.1
<u>7056.9</u>	<u>7793.3</u>	<u>6954.7</u>
102.8	70.5	181.8
192.8	48.9	216.0
199.1	79.7	250.7
252.5	118.2	331.4
<u>747.2</u>	<u>317.3</u>	<u>979.9</u>
35.0	64.2	98.5
55.7	75.6	97.2
21.5	136.0	113.0
110.8	51.6	125.3
<u>223.0</u>	<u>327.4</u>	<u>434.0</u>
+ 67.8	+ 6.3	+ 83.3
+ 137.1	- 26.7	+ 118.8
+ 177.6	- 56.3	+ 137.7
+ 141.7	+ 66.6	+ 206.1
<u>+ 524.2 b/</u>	<u>- 10.1 b/</u>	<u>+ 545.9 b/</u>

at factors).
 total because of turnover of hamlets in the A-B-C category, and use of

CONFIDENTIAL


CONFIDENTIAL


**SOUTH VIETNAM
HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM**

NOVEMBER 30, 1967

71.

CTZ	NO. OF HAMLETS	
	A-B-C	VC
I	826	939
II	1576	541
III	965	468
IV	1966	1985
Total	5333	3933





4:

VR


x

2

22

50

73



LEGEND:

- HAMLETS WITH A, B, OR C HES TOTAL SCORE
- ▲ VC CONTROLLED HAMLETS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Mar 68

AMBASSADOR KOMER REBUTS OUR FEBRUARY PACIFICATION ARTICLE

We received the following rebuttal to our February pacification article from Ambassador Komer, Deputy for CORDS to COMUSMACV:

Am frankly floored by ex cathedra pronouncements in article entitled, "Pacification Slowdown" in February Southeast Asia Programs Report which just reached Saigon.

Neither facts on ground here nor even those presented in article support comments such as: "the enemy's offensive appears to have killed the Revolutionary Development program as currently conceived;" "recent reports state that to a large extent, the VC now control the countryside;" "the enemy's current offensive appears to have killed the (pacification) program once and for all." Is this systems analysis?

First, the above comments are larded into an analysis which isn't even based on post-Tet data, but rather on early press and other reports. Since Tet shock affected local advisors as well as people, early press and CAS reports frequently presented scary assessment based on quite incomplete and wholly unsystematic data. Could your analysts have been influenced more by these than by later rounded assessments based on the much greater data which we immediately began systematically surveying? What was their hurry?

Second, when your analysts talk about pacification they rarely seem to take into account the total program, or the resources we are gradually building into it. They consistently ignore the vital LOCs. They also forget about RF/PF, police, anti-infrastructure operations, or ARVN RD support battalions. Or what about local administration, hamlet schools, agriculture -- all essential to winning hearts and minds.

Now as to the only real analysis in the article -- that of 1967 HES data. Even this seems to me rather pale for following reasons:

1) We quite agree that most 1967 "population gains" result from increased population in already GVN-occupied areas rather than expansion into new hamlets. But a steady refinement of HES data gradually shows a lot more people in secure areas than previously estimated, why call this an "accounting change" instead of evidence we control more people than we realized? And even your analysts admit a net gain of 546,000 people in hamlets upgraded to ABC during 1967.

75

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2) Next, why confine your analysis to crude ABC VS. DE/VC comparisons? Our computers permit looking at upward trend vs. regression between each category. Pacification progress should not be assessed solely on basis of ABC vs. DE/VC, because the upgrading of VC hamlets to E or D category is also quite significant.

3) Above all I deplore population models designed by desk types in Washington which contend that only A/B hamlets can really be called secure because many C hamlets had D or E ratings on certain security factors. Why don't they also look at how many D or E hamlets have C or better security ratings? Since security ratings generally run higher than development ratings, it would be more valid.

4) As you know, we designed very stringent criteria for the HES (especially on the security side) to deflate previous overoptimistic reporting. It is perhaps oversensitive to minor changes. For example, one harassment of a hamlet one day in a month (even a few shots so long as they are reported) drags that security factor down to E.

5) *To bring home realities of life out here, I urge your analysts to come out and see for themselves. If they knew what kind of war this is, they would not "assume" that control "implies constant GVN protection for at least one year." It is silly to invent such absolute criteria as this.~

To return to the way the Tet offensive "killed the RD program," we now have the end-February HES run. It shows downgrading of 804 hamlets and 1.3 million people from ABC category. But only 201 of these hamlets and 279,000 people are rated as reverting to VC control. The rest are now "contested." A serious loss, but hardly tantamount to rigor mortis.

If I sound pained, it is because now more than ever I see an urgent need for cool and rational calculation instead of pushing the panic button. Should you wish to publish this message verbatim in next month's SEA report I'll waive all copyright. Warm regards.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SEAPRO Comment

The pacification program is clearly more alive and kicking than we thought based on MACV and other official military assessments prepared three to four weeks after Tet. Current reports indicate that RD resources came through the crisis more intact than first reports estimated. (We fear, however, that even revised reports are optimistic about the number of RD cadre actually working in hamlets, and RF/PF strength in rural outposts.) As Ambassador Komer pointed out in another message:

"By and large, the 'war' impact of the Tet offensive now appears to have been more psychological than physical.... Economic recovery has been sluggish as business confidence is only slowly returning. Insecurity and fear of further VC/NVA attacks remain key problems in many cities and even more so in the countryside. In pacification too the more serious damage seems psychological rather than physical. While rural pacification unquestionably received a substantial setback, especially in the IV Corps Delta area where over half our losses were suffered, the loss of hamlets and resources has proven much less than earlier feared."

We agree that the future of pacification depends on the efficacy of US/GVN resources and programs. Unfortunately we are hampered by an almost total absence of meaningful data. Systematic MATV LOC data is not available in Washington, and it has not been checked against incident and HES data as we did in the Route 4 article in our December report. Detailed data on RF/PF, police, and anti-infrastructure operations is not available in Washington. We do not know where the ARVN RD support battalions operate. We do not know which villages elected their own officials, or how many hamlet schools have adequate teachers, or whether GVN/US agriculture programs are meeting the people's needs. Much of the data Saigon has used to support statements of pacification progress in the provinces (e.g., percent of province RD programs on schedule, number of classrooms built, percent of infrastructure eliminated) has not been sent to Washington systematically or in sufficient detail for meaningful analysis.

We agree we should include the 1171 hamlets added during HES refinement, even though they "dilute" US/GVN control of the population: without the 1171 new hamlets, 67.4% (10,995,300) of the 16,323,900 SVN population lived in A-B-C hamlets or secure non-hamlet areas in December 1967; adding the 283 A-B-C hamlets (519,500 population) among the 1171 hamlets (884,400 population) gives the published December figure of 11,514,800 (66.9%) A-B-C out of 17,208,300 total population. We still maintain, however, that adding these hamlets represents an accounting improvement, not a 1967 pacification gain.

77

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

No one denies that the HES showed pacification progress in 1967: 545,900 more people lived in hamlets upgraded to A-B-C than regressed to D-E-VC. The point of our article was that all of the progress occurred prior to June 30, 1967; there was a slight net downgrading of A-B-C population in the second half of the year. Unfortunately we did not notice the danger signal until after Tet. Both MACV and Washington analysts now have the capability to pinpoint trouble areas in time to do something about them. HES was designed to be and can be used as a management tool.

We originally looked at all intercategory changes, but decided to concentrate on the flow in and out of the familiar A-B-C category. The first half-second half 1967 trends were the same, whether we looked at all rating changes, or just those in and out of the A-B-C range:

TABLE 1

1967 Summary of Changes in HES Ratings

	All changes of HES category		Changes in and out of A-B-C range	
	Jan-June	June-Dec	Jan-June	June-Dec
No. of Improved Hamlets	1374	791	690	329
No. of Regressed Hamlets	910	758	221	268
Net Improved	+464	+33	+469	+61

In paragraphs 3 and 5 Ambassador Komer is referring to a section we deleted before publication in which we calculated the "secure" population if we omitted C hamlets. We omitted this section because we realized it was impossible to use absolute criteria for security. Our approach in this month's article on the HES ("1967 Security Setback," p. 30) is to track the progress of the half of the population which is "most secure" without claiming it is the "only secure" population.

We appreciate the desirability of stringent indicators sensitive to both good and bad changes. Since the HES does not monitor popular attitudes, we must watch for the "minor" changes which precipitate wide swings in attitudes. One isolated terrorist assassination of a hamlet chief can set back months of patient RD work by activating the people's fears and doubts.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

March 68

1967 SECURITY SETBACK AND EARLY TET HES RESULTS

During 1967 the number of continuously evaluated hamlets rated A or B on the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) security indicators fell from 2565 in January to 2358 in December, a drop of 209. First analysis of the February HES data indicates the Tet offensive caused 804 A-B-C to become contested (803) or VC controlled (201).

Security Rating Patterns

Our February analysis (SEA Analysis Report, pp. 46-50) stated that the second half 1967 loss of A-B-C population was due to declines in the HES security indicators. To substantiate the claim we have analyzed security scores of the 10,796 hamlets rated every month of 1967. We excluded 1526 hamlets added or deleted during the year, 578 which were abandoned (mainly VC), and 173 listed as planned or non-evaluated one or more months. Table 1 shows the six main patterns for hamlets rated A or B in 1967: 1823 hamlets were "solidly" A-B for 12 months; 473 were "permanent" A-B gains; 149 were temporary gains; 681 were "permanent" losses; 61 were temporary losses; and 71 fluctuated in and out of the A-B range three or more times in 1967.

TABLE 1
1967 HES HAMLET SECURITY PATTERNS
FOR CONTINUOUSLY RATED HAMLETS

Pattern Type	Hamlet Security Ratings in 1967			No. Hamlets	Population in Thousands (December Estimate)
	Start of Year (Avg. No. of Months in Parentheses)	Mid Year	End of Year		
1. "Solid" A-B	A-B (12.0)			1823	3,524.0
2. "Permanent" Gain	C-D-E-VC (5.3)		A-B (6.7)	473	784.8
3. Temporary Loss	A-B (4.9)	C-D-E-VC (2.5)	A-B (4.6)	61	97.5
4. "Permanent" Loss	A-B (6.8)		C-D-E-VC (5.2)	681	942.6
5. Temporary Gain	C-D-E-VC (4.6)	A-B (3.5)	C-D-E-VC (3.9)	149	218.4
6. Other	Hamlets whose rating fluctuated 3 or more times. (Average 5.9 months as A-B)			71	75.3
Total Of Above	All hamlets rated A or B any time in 1967 (Average 9.6 months as A-B)			3258	5,642.6
	All hamlets in SVN rated throughout 1967			10796	12,739.0

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

A-B Hamlet Balance Sheet

Table 2 shows that the number of hamlets rated A or B on the HES security indicators fell from 2565 in January to 2356 in December, a drop of 209. 681 hamlets fell from A or B and stayed C-D-E-VC "permanently" through December, the drop occurring during July for the average hamlet; 473 hamlets rose "permanently" to A-B, the improvement coming in June for the average hamlet. "Temporary gains" and "temporary losses" are not counted since they were not A-B hamlets at the beginning or end of the year.

TABLE 2
A-B HAMLET BALANCE SHEET
FOR CONTINUOUSLY RATED HAMLETS

Description	Pattern Types Included	No. Hamlets	Population (Thousands)
A-B hamlets in January	1 + 3 + 4	2565	4564.1
"Permanent" A-B Gains	2	473	784.8
"Permanent" A-B Losses	4	681	942.6
Net "Permanent" Gain/Loss	2 minus 4	- 208	- 157.8
A-B hamlets in December	1 + 2 + 3	2356	4405.8

"Secure" Population Base Calculation

Table 3 shows our calculation that some 46.0% (7,368,200) of the continuously rated SVN population is in the "most secure" HES category: 4.3 million people in "solid A-B" and "permanent gain" hamlets, plus 3.1 million in the cities. We based the calculation on the hamlets we know most about -- the 10,796 continuously rated hamlets.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 3

CALCULATION OF "SECURE POPULATION BASE"
As of December 1967

Description	Pattern Types Included	No. Hamlets	Population (Thousands)
Secure non-hamlet (urban) population	Cities		3059.4
"Solid" A-B hamlets	1	1823	3524.0
"Permanent" A-B Gains	2	473	784.8
Total	Cities + 1 + 2	2296 (21.3%)	7368.2 (45.6%)
Total Continuously Rated		10796 (100.0%)	16174.6 (100.0%)

During the year some 1171 hamlets (884,400 population) were "found" and added to the HES. We do not know much about these hamlets statistically, but some could be as "secure" as our "solid A-B" or "permanent gains" hamlets. If we assume optimistically that the new hamlets never regressed in 1967 and add in the 187 A-B hamlets among the 1171, we increase the "most secure" population by 407,100 and total rated population by 858,000. The ratio of "most secure" to total rated population remains 45.6%.

Impact of the Tet Offensive

According to Ambassador Komer, preliminary analysis of the HES February data shows 804 hamlets (1.3 million population) falling from A-B-C, 603 hamlets (1.0 million population) to D or E ratings, and 201 hamlets (279,000 population) reverting to VC control. At the end of January 1968 there were 5331 A-B-C hamlets, of which a maximum of 4850 had been A-B-C since June 1967. The Tet offensive therefore eroded from 15% to 17% of the solid A-B-C hamlets, based on all 18 HES security and development indicators. Our next report will assess the impact of the Tet offensive on the 2295 "stable" A-B (security) hamlets.

81

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

April 68

AMBASSADOR KOMER COMMENTS ON MARCH ARTICLES

We received the following comments on several March Analysis Report articles from Ambassador Komer, Deputy to COMUSMACV for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support:

As an avid reader (and user) of the SEA Analysis Report, I see a need for more rounded analyses in the pacification field and fewer simplistic constructs.

For example, the March article on VC Assassinations and Abductions correctly defines the trend toward sharply increased kidnapping and killing of GVN officials and other civilians. What it does not show is the substantial increase in GVN officials as a result of the local elections in 1967. There are just more village and hamlet officials to assassinate or abduct.

The same goes for other GVN officials. National Police and RD Cadre killed or kidnapped also should be measured against the substantial increase in National Police and RDC during 1967.

The fact that the GVN is pushing officials, National Police and RD Cadre more into insecure areas is also relevant; this increases not only the risk but the return.

The attempt to estimate Enemy Guerrilla Forces in 67 seems thin indeed. It simply does not tie in with our experience on the ground to attempt to extrapolate actual guerrilla strength by applying standard planning factors to the HES hamlet categories. Our MACV advisors and GVN district officials make their estimates on the basis of the strength they actually encounter in the field, not on the basis of a presumed "nationwide" VC organization covering every village and hamlet in standard fashion. I have also asked several district advisors whether they think that all "D" villages have 80% of the "standard" enemy planned forces. They find this only slightly more credible than the assumption that all "C" villages would have 50% and all "B" villages 20% of the enemy planned level. Moreover, in interrogating prisoners captured during the Tet offensive we have not found one who had ever been part of a Self-Defense or Secret Self-Defense organization.

Lastly, we should do more analysis by deduction. If the enemy had 154,400 guerrillas at the end of 1967, they certainly weren't doing as much as so large a force could reasonably be expected to do. Look at the number of incidents and compare it to enemy strength. Even granting that by no means all incidents are reported, there is a marked discontinuity between such high estimates of enemy strength and reported enemy activity.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Thank you for printing my remarks on the over-hasty February SEAPROG article on pacification. I note, however, that you still allowed yourselves the last word. You really should study the stringent HES criteria more closely. We are very "hard markers," because we deliberately designed the system this way. Don't over-read it.

On the other hand, I find the article on "The Status of RVNAF (as of 29 February '68)" most useful, particularly with respect to the very poor RF/PF performance during Tet in III Corps. It is so notably poorer than in the other corps that I am inquiring as to the reasons.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

April 68

POST-TET PACIFICATION REGRESSION

The VC Tet offensive dropped 1.3 million people from the relatively secure A-B-C hamlets, - 959,000 to contested (D-E) and 283,000 to VC. The 1967 net gain in continuously rated A-B-C hamlets was 546,000 people. The proportion of relatively secure SVN population fell from a high of 67% on January 31 to 60% on February 28, recovering to 61% by March 31. However, MACV (CORDS) data shows that most GVN pacification forces have moved back into the countryside, and that a quick recovery of part of the Tet losses can be expected. Full recovery will take many months, in part because the VC seriously reduced the effectiveness of hamlet governments.

Rural Security Setback

The Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) indicates that there was at least a temporary security "vacuum" in the rural countryside immediately after Tet. Table 1 shows that the "relatively secure" A-B-C population dropped 1.3 million people in February, from 67.2% of the SVN population on January 31 to 59.8% on February 29. (Preliminary March HES reports show that 61.0% of the SVN population is now rated A-B-C, up 197,400 people from February.) Rural areas (villages of less than 20,000 people) accounted for 75% (989,400) of the 1.3 million February A-B-C loss, even though they represented only 48% (5.5 million) of the January A-B-C population.

Table 2 shows that the nine HES security indicators (1a through 3c) suffered the greatest setbacks, while the development indicators (4a through 6c) had more moderate losses. The VC military incidents indicator (1c) regressed the most (31% of hamlet population was downgraded) but may also recover the quickest as the VC relax their overt military pressure.

Impact on 1967 Progress

Table 3 shows that there were 2.7 million people in hamlets which regressed in February - including the 1.3 million in A-B-C hamlets which fell to D-E (1.0 million) or VC (.3 million). The 2.7 million is about twice as many as improved in all of 1967 (1.4 million). We have not received detailed February and March data yet, so we cannot tell how much the average hamlet regressed, nor how many regressions occurred in hamlets which improved in 1967.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 1
SVN POPULATION SECURITY URBAN VS RURAL
(Population in Thousands)

	Jan. 31, 1968	Feb. 29, 1968	Net Change Jan - Feb
<u>Rural a/</u>			
"Secure"	5527.6 (52.8%)	4538.4 (43.4%)	- 989.4
"Contested"	2247.1 (21.5%)	2933.2 (28.5%)	+ 736.1
"VC"	2686.9 (25.7%)	2929.8 (28.0%)	+ 242.9
Sub-Total	10461.8	10451.4	- 10.4
<u>Urban b/</u>			
"Secure"	6054.0 (89.4%)	5719.6 (85.4%)	- 334.4
"Contested"	570.4 (8.4%)	792.9 (11.8%)	+ 222.5
"VC"	147.2 (2.2%)	187.3 (2.8%)	+ 40.1
Sub-Total	6771.6	6699.8	- 71.8
<u>Total</u>			
"Secure"	11581.8 (67.2%)	10258.0 (59.8%)	-1323.8
"Contested"	2817.5 (16.4%)	3776.1 (22.0%)	+ 958.6
"VC"	2834.1 (16.4%)	3117.1 (18.2%)	+ 283.0
Total	17233.4	17151.2	- 82.2

a/ Hamlets in villages with 20,000 or less population.

b/ Non-hamlet areas, plus hamlets in villages with more than 20,000 population.

"Secure" - A+B+C hamlets, or secure non-hamlet areas.

"Contested" - D+E hamlets, or contested non-hamlet areas.

"VC" - VC hamlets, or VC controlled non-hamlet areas.

TABLE 2
HES INDICATOR IMPROVEMENT/REGRESSION
JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1968

	% of Hamlet Population	
	Improved	Regressed
1c VC military incidents	1.6	31.5
1b VC main forces	2.1	25.0
2c Infrastructure activities	1.5	20.7
1a VC village guerrillas	1.4	18.1
3b Friendly external forces	1.2	18.1
3a Hamlet defense plan	1.6	14.1
2b Village infrastructure	1.4	14.0
2a Hamlet infrastructure	1.2	12.6
3c Internal security activities	1.6	12.6
4c Information activities	1.9	10.1
6a Self help	1.7	8.2
4a GVN government management	1.3	7.6
5b Education	2.5	7.5
5c Welfare	2.3	7.4
6b Public works	1.7	6.6
4b GVN response to aspirations	2.5	6.5
5a Medical services	2.4	6.5
6c Economic improvement	1.7	6.5

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 3

COMPARISON OF HES IMPROVEMENTS/REGRESSIONS
1967 VS JAN - FEB 1968
(Hamlet Population in Thousands)

	Jan - Dec 1967 a/ Pop. (%)	Jan - Feb 1968 b/ Pop. (%)
<u>Improvements</u>		
"Contested" to "Secure"	869.8 (35.0)	N/A
"VC" to "Secure"	110.2 (4.4)	N/A
"VC" to "Contested"	218.1 (8.8)	N/A
Within "Secure"	1143.0 (45.9)	N/A
Within "Contested"	147.9 (5.9)	N/A
Total Improved	2489.0 (100.0)	167
<u>Regressions</u>		
"Secure" to "Contested"	412.9 (37.4)	1020 (35.8)
"Secure" to "VC"	21.1 (1.9)	279 (9.8)
"Contested" to "VC"	98.4 (8.9)	1 (.0)
Within "Secure"	527.2 (47.7)	1250 (43.9)
Within "Contested"	45.7 (4.1)	300 (10.5)
Total Regressed	1105.3 (100.0)	2850 (100.0)
<u>Net Improvement (+)/</u> <u>Regression (-)</u>	+ 1383.7	- 2683

a/ Source is MACCORDS/RAD Year End Synopsis of 1967 HES Data Changes.

b/ 1968 change data incomplete; N/A indicates detail not available. Sources are MACCORDS/RAD Synopsis of February HES Data Changes, and message from Ambassador Komer (see March Analysis Report, pp. 33-36).

NOTE: "Secure" - A, B, or C total HES score.
"Contested" - D or E total HES score.
"VC" - VC controlled.

Table 4 shows that 267 (22%) of the 1,214 1967 RD hamlets experienced some regression because of Tet. Again we do not know how serious the regression is, nor do we know which of the 267 had been worked by RD teams in 1967.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 4

IMPACT OF TET OFFENSIVE ON 1967 RD HAMLETS

<u>CTZ</u>	<u>December 31, 1967</u>		<u>Number</u>
	<u>Total</u>	<u>A-B-C</u>	<u>Regressed</u> <u>Jan-Feb 1968</u>
I	250	193	82
II	461	347	86
III	233	168	57
IV	<u>270</u>	<u>202</u>	<u>42</u>
SVN	1214	910	267

Recovery Prospects

Reports from MACV (CORDS) indicate that the bulk of pacification resources are intact and back on assigned rural security missions:

(a) 449 (72%) of 629 RD cadre teams are in planned 1968 hamlets, 96 (15%) are in other hamlets, and 84 (13%) are presumably still providing security in the cities. 519 teams (95% of the 545 teams in hamlets) reportedly are sleeping overnight in their assigned hamlets. Average RD team strength is now 49 out of 59 authorized, compared with 52 out of 59 on December 31, 1967.

(b) A record 56 out of 68 police field force companies are being employed as exploitation forces in attacking the VC infrastructure. A new high of 1323 identifiable members of the infrastructure were eliminated in March: 150 killed, 1099 captured, 74 rallied as Chieu Hoi. Comparable January and February totals were 488 and 540, for a first quarter total of 2351. This exceeds the MACV goal of 1800 by 31%.

(c) 46 of the 51 ARVN battalions with direct RD support missions have returned to RD campaign areas, a gain of 15 since February 29.

(d) 73.8% of total PF personnel and 81.8% of PF personnel are on rural security missions.

(e) More than 22,000 people have been trained (5,000 armed) as hamlet militia; there are now 63,599 members (6,888 armed) in city civil defense groups, where none existed before Tet.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

HES scores, particularly some security indicators which regressed the most, are likely to show strong recovery as pacification forces return to the field. There are some signs, however, that it may take time to restore the "climate of good security":

(a) Ambassador Komer pointed out on April 18 that the "psychological shock (of the VC Tet offensive) has not yet worn off. The VC propaganda line that they will return has strong influence.... Some commanders tend to remain overly defensive minded.... Rice shipments from the Delta are running only 50% of normal."

(b) MACCORDS states that VC pressure has seriously reduced the effectiveness of local GVN administration: before Tet 7259 hamlets reportedly had functioning GVN administrations (either elected or appointed officials who were carrying out normal government duties); now there are 4471 (62% of pre-Tet level). (Curiously, HES data in Table 2 shows that only 7.6% of hamlet population lived in hamlets where GVN governmental management suffered a setback in February.)

(c) The Chieu Hoi rate continues its downward trend (see article in this issue).

(d) The January-February worsening of the HES village guerrilla indicator in hamlets with 18.1% of the hamlet population (Table 2) suggests either a sudden jump in guerrilla capabilities or previous underestimation of those capabilities.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

July 68

STATUS OF PACIFICATION

Analysis of recent field reports and Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) data shows that: (1) in March and April about one-third of the Tet losses of relatively secure (A+B+C) population had been recovered while recovery from the May VC offensive was complete by June; (2) the 1968 RD program was halted or slowed down in 32 provinces in May 1968; (3) a higher percentage of hamlets with assigned RD or Truong Son cadre teams regressed during the Tet offensive than hamlets without teams; conversely, hamlets protected by RF/PF, Combined Action Platoons, or ARVN battalions assigned to support RD, regressed less often than hamlets unprotected by these forces; (4) 67% of the 1785 RD program hamlets for 1968 were either classified as pacified in 1966 or were previously in the 1967 RD program.

1. Deterioration of Security

The nine security indicators in the HES are designed to measure the VC military-political threat to hamlets, overt VC activity and GVN hamlet defense capabilities. Table 1 shows that HES security scores remained about the same from June 1967 to January 1968; about 68% of the SVN population was rated A-B-C, or relatively secure, throughout the period.*

After the Tet offensive, district advisors reassessed the security situation and reduced the hamlet security scores where appropriate; the relatively secure (A-B-C) population dropped to 59-60% in February-March. By June, 63% of the population was relatively secure despite a one-month setback in May. The secure population (A+B only) followed similar trends, but had only reached 38% by June. (During February and May, parts of the Saigon and Hue population lived in areas where security was questionable, so the secure population could be reduced further by about 4% of the total population.**)

2. Status of RD

The information from the 9 HES security measurements gives us a reasonably clear picture of the security setback, but does not show the status of the RD program. After the Tet offensive, MACV assessed that the RD program had been seriously affected (6 month setback) in 13 provinces, moderately affected (3 month setback) in 16, and only slightly affected (1 month setback) in 15. In May, MACV stated that the Tet offensive "had a profound, nationwide impact on pacification."***

* The figure is 67% if we use new GVN National Institute of Statistics census data setting the Saigon population at 1,736,880 instead of the HES figure of 2,204,900.

** Assumes that up to 25% of the Saigon population and up to 40% of the Hue population live in contested areas.

*** MACV report, "Pacification in South Vietnam during May 1968." Complete statement is, "Unlike the Tet offensive which had a profound, nationwide impact on pacification, the May attacks slowed but did not significantly disrupt the program."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 1

HES SECURITY SCORE DATA

	<u>1967</u>		<u>1968</u>					
	<u>June</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>
<u>Population (In Thousands)</u>								
Secure (A+B)	8169	7908	7880	6019	6138	6306	6339	6595
C	3414	3799	3831	4047	4131	4331	4250	4344
Relatively Secure (A+B+C)	11583	11707	11711	10066	10269	10637	10589	10939
Contested (D+E+Other)	2495	2640	2688	3968	3755	3453	3612	3398
VC	3087	2861	2834	3117	3137	3066	3043	3005
Total	17165	17208	17233	17151	17161	17156	17244	17342
<u>Percentages</u>								
Secure (A+B)	47.6	46.0	45.7	35.1	35.7	36.8	36.8	38.0
C	19.9	22.1	22.3	23.6	24.1	25.2	24.6	25.1
Relatively Secure (A+B+C)	67.5	68.1	68.0	58.7	59.8	62.0	61.4	63.1
Contested (D+E+Other)	14.5	15.3	15.6	23.1	21.9	20.1	20.9	19.6
VC	18.0	16.6	16.4	18.2	18.3	17.9	17.7	17.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

To assess the current status of RD, we examined pacification reports available in Washington, including province advisors' narrative reports for May which assess the status of the RD program and the posture of the RD teams; Table 2 shows our findings.

In 32 provinces during May the RD program was not progressing well: lack of security hampered the RD effort seriously in 17 provinces; in 15 other provinces, RD was making only mixed or slow progress. Since MACV listed only 23 of these provinces as seriously or moderately affected by the Tet offensive, longer term problems or the intensive enemy activity since Tet probably slowed RD progress in the other 9 provinces.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 2

1968 RD PROGRAM REPORTS BY PROVINCE ^{a/}
(Population in Thousands)

May 1968 Province Sr.
Advisor's RD Report ^{b/-}
OASD(SA) Assessment

Effect of Tet Offensive on RD - CORDS Assessment ^{c/}

	Seriously Affected	Moderately Affected	Slightly Affected
RD Hampered by lack of security during May	8 Provinces Pop 2744.5(18.7%) Thua Thien Kontum Tuyen Duc Phuoc Long Hau Nghia Gia Dinh Kien Giang Phong Dinh	5 Provinces Pop 2560.8(17.5%) Quang Tri Quang Nam Binh Dinh Phu Yen Binh Duong	4 Provinces Pop 598.6(4.1%) Pleiku Phu Bon Phuoc Tuy Sa Dec
RD Having slow or mixed success	4 Provinces Pop 1219.2(8.3%) Darlac Binh Thuan Kien Phong Vinh Binh	6 Provinces Pop 2303.7(15.7%) Quang Ngai Binh Long Long An Go Cong Vinh Long Chau Doc	5 Provinces Pop 982.1(6.7%) Quang Tin Ninh Thuan Quang Duc Lam Dong Tay Ninh
No Change reported in May but progress apparently satisfactory	1 Province Pop 572.1(3.9%) Kien Hoa	1 Province Pop 349.6(2.4%) Bien Hoa	2 Provinces Pop 781.4(5.3%) An Giang An Xuyen
Definite favorable RD Progress in May		4 Provinces Pop 1274.9(8.7%) Kien Tuong Dinh Tuong Chuong Thien Ba Xuyen	4 Provinces Pop 843.0(5.8%) Khanh Hoa Binh Tuy Long Khanh Bac Lieu
Total	13 Provinces Pop 4535.8(30.9%)	16 Provinces Pop 6489.0(44.3%)	15 Provinces Pop 3205.1(21.9%)

^{a/} Excludes Saigon, Hue, and Dalat (pop 2382.6) which have no RD program

^{b/} MACCORDS I Corps, II Corps, III Corps, IV Corps Provincial Reports for May 1968 (MACV Dir)

^{c/} Source: CORDS/Embassy Message 21332, 7 March 1968.

CONFIDENTIAL

PROVINCE a/
b/c

CARDS Assessment c/

	<u>Slightly Affected</u>	<u>Not Rated</u>	<u>Total</u>
(d)	4 Provinces Pop 598.6(4.1%) Pleiku Phu Bon Phuoc Tuy Sa Dec	1 City Pop 290.3(2.0%) Danang	17 Provinces, 1 City Pop 6194.2(42.3%)
(e)	5 Provinces Pop 982.1(6.7%) Quang Tin Ninh Thuan Quang Duc Lam Dong Tay Ninh		15 Provinces Pop 4505.0(30.7%)
(f)	2 Provinces Pop 781.4(5.3%) An Giang An Xuyen	2 Cities Pop 127.8(0.9%) Cam Ranh Vung Tau	4 Provinces, 2 Cities Pop 1830.9(12.9%)
(g)	4 Provinces Pop 843.0(5.8%) Khanh Hoa Binh Tuy Long Khanh Bac Lieu		8 Provinces Pop 2117.9(14.5%)
(h)	15 Provinces Pop 3205.1(21.9%)	3 Cities Pop 418.1(2.9%)	44 Provinces, 3 Cities Pop 14648.0(100.0%)

Program
as for May 1968 (MACV Directive 4-67).

CONFIDENTIAL

3. Relative Effectiveness of Pacification Forces During Tet Offensive

In an attempt to evaluate the performance of pacification forces in preventing hamlet security regression during the Tet offensive, we have tried the approach shown in Table 3 using HES data. We compared HES total scores before and after the Tet offensive (January versus March 1968) for hamlets with and without four types of forces assigned in January: (1) RF/PF units, (2) RD and Truong Son teams, (3) CAP units, and (4) ARVN battalions assigned to support RD.

Hamlets in districts to which ARVN RD battalions were assigned in January fared the best: HES scores regressed in only 8% of the hamlets in the "ARVN districts" but in 16% of the hamlets in "non ARVN districts." Hamlets nearest to CAP units and to RF/PF units also survived the Tet offensive better than hamlets not protected by these units. However, assignment of an RD or Truong Son cadre team increased the chances of a hamlet regressing: 22% of these hamlets with RD/TS teams regressed during Tet compared to 14% of those without such teams.

The foregoing findings are only tentative because a complete study of the effectiveness of the various forces would require more detailed data. For example, we do not know which hamlets the VC targeted, nor do we know from which hamlets the GVN forces withdrew to defend the cities. Also, we do not know precisely which hamlets the ARVN RD battalions, CAP units, or RF/PF are supposed to protect within their operating areas. We do not know how long each unit had been providing protection before the Tet offensive. Finally, we have not yet taken into account the effect of two or more forces protecting a hamlet. We will attempt to deal with these problems in a future study.

4. 1968 RD Hamlets

GVN province chiefs and the Ministry of Revolutionary Development (MRD) have selected 1785 hamlets to be pacified by the RD program in 1968, according to district advisors' May HES reports. RD teams are now operating in 666 hamlets. It appears that the deterioration in security during 1968 will prevent the RD program from pacifying or re-pacifying all of the 1785 hamlets by the end of this year.

Further, there is a great deal of lost ground to be retaken--67% of the hamlets (1201) in the 1968 RD program have been "pacified" or scheduled for RD before; in December 1967, 892 of them were Ap Tan Sinh hamlets ("new life" hamlets pacified in 1966 or earlier) and the other 309 were included in the 1967 RD program. (See Table 4) We recognize that the GVN's 6-point pacification criteria used in 1966 were not as stringent as the present 11-point criteria, and that many of the 1967 RD hamlets were never actually worked by RD teams (we do not know which ones or how many). Still, the GVN apparently feels that the pacification task is not complete in the 1201 hamlets, and that many of them must be redone or upgraded.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 3

REGRESSION OF HES TOTAL SCORES JANUARY - MARCH 1968 (Continuously Rated A-E and VC Hamlets Only)

	Either RF or PF Near Hamlet ^{a/}		RD/TS In Hamlet ^{b/}		ARVN DSRD Bn In District ^{c/}		CAP Unit Near Hamlet ^{d/}		All Hamlets
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	
<u>I CTZ</u>									
Regressed	123	246	39	298	59	278	7	330	337
Did Not Regress	652	1211	66	1797	631	1232	61	1802	1863
Percent Regressed	15.9	16.9	37.1	14.2	8.6	18.4	10.3	15.5	15.3
<u>II CTZ</u>									
Regressed	143	405	44	421	39	426			465
Did Not Regress	1009	1127	162	1974	289	1847	N/A		2136
Percent Regressed	12.4	26.4	21.4	17.6	11.9	18.7			17.9
<u>III CTZ</u>									
Regressed	122	206	12	276	46	242			288
Did Not Regress	795	768	75	1488	390	1173	N/A		1563
Percent Regressed	13.3	21.1	13.8	15.6	10.6	17.1			15.6
<u>IV CTZ</u>									
Regressed	233	387	30	580	42	568			610
Did Not Regress	1601	2686	144	4143	796	3491	N/A		4287
Percent Regressed	12.7	12.6	17.2	12.3	5.0	14.0			12.5
<u>SVN</u>									
Regressed	621	1244	125	1575	186	1514			1700
Did Not Regress	4057	5792	447	9402	2106	7743	N/A		9849
Percent Regressed	13.3	17.7	21.9	14.3	8.1	16.4			14.7

a/ From CORDS data on hamlets which regressed. Some hamlets in the "Yes-Regressed" category with multiple RF/PF units nearby are counted twice. We assumed that there were the same proportion of hamlets with both RF and PF in the "Did Not Regress" category as in the "Regressed" category. We also assumed that every RF/PF unit, regardless of primary mission, was located near some hamlet.

b/ From CORDS RD team assignment data, by hamlet, for January, 1968.

c/ From CORDS ARVN RD battalion assignment data, by district, for January, 1968.

d/ From CORDS CAP unit data, by hamlet, for January, 1968. CAP units are assigned to villages; our data covers only those hamlets nearest to assigned CAP locations.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 4

PREVIOUS PACIFICATION STATUS OF 1968 RD OBJECTIVE HAMLETS

	"Pacified" Prior to 1967 <u>a/</u>	Hamlet "Planned for RD" During 1967 <u>b/</u>	Not in RD Plans in 1966 or 1967 <u>c/</u>	Total RD Objective Hamlets in 1968 <u>d/</u>
I	79 (28.1%)	91 (32.4%)	111 (39.5%)	
II	135 (27.8%)	129 (26.6%)	221 (45.6%)	485
III	369 (72.2%)	47 (9.2%)	95 (18.6%)	511
IV	<u>309 (60.8%)</u>	<u>42 (8.3%)</u>	<u>157 (30.9%)</u>	<u>508</u>
SVN	892 (50.0%)	309 (17.3%)	584 (32.7%)	1785

Source: Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) - HAMIA File, RMCSSC.

- a/ Hamlets classified by the GVN as Ap Tan Sinh (ATS) ("pacified" hamlets) as of December 1967. The ATS status designation implied that the hamlet met the "6-point" pacification criteria (in effect in 1966) at the time the 1967 RD plans were made. ATS hamlets were not programmed for RD teams in 1967, and were not called "RD hamlets" in 1967.
- b/ Hamlets programmed by the GVN as 1967 Ap Doi Moi (ADM), 1967 Ap Binh Dinh (ABD), or 1967 Ap Cung Co (ACC), according to December 1967 plans. ADM, ABD, and ACC hamlets, collectively known as "1967 RD hamlets," were programmed to receive RD teams during 1967. ADM hamlets were programmed to be raised to the "11-point" pacification criteria; ABD hamlets were programmed to be raised to the "2-point" pacification criteria; ACC hamlets were reprogrammed to be raised to the "6-point" ATS standards.
- c/ Hamlets not classified ATS or programmed as ADM, ABD, or ACC in 1967 (as of December 1967).
- d/ Hamlets programmed by the GVN as 1968 Ap Doi Moi (ADM), 1968 Ap Binh Dinh (ABD), or 1968 Ap Cung Co (ACC) as of May 1968, collectively known as "1968 RD objective hamlets," are programmed to receive RD teams in 1968. A new RD classification scheme has been implemented, but was not in effect when May 1968 data was reported.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Aug 68

FIRST HALF 1968 HES REPORTS

HES reports for June 1968 indicate that the pacification program's recovery from the VC Tet offensive is only about 30% complete. The VC activity indicators in HES accounted for the major setbacks to HES scores during Tet and for most of the recovery afterwards. But the hamlet defenses and the VC infrastructure indicator scores had not recovered by June.

A-B-C Population Trends

The SVN population living in A-B-C hamlets or secure urban areas declined 1,256,900 in the wake of the VC Tet offensive (Table 1). By June, 711,500 of the loss had been recovered -- an apparent recovery of 57%. However, accounting-type changes in the HES (population changes and hamlet unrated in some months) had produced 306,600 (24%) of the Tet loss and, in turn, 427,000 (60%) of the post-Tet recovery. This means that hamlets with 950,300 people in them regressed from their A-B-C ratings as a result of Tet, and that post-Tet improvements raised 284,500 of those people back up to A-B-C rated hamlets -- a net real recovery of 30%.

The HES ratings did not recover equally well in all four corps areas. II and IV CTZ recovered 50 and 43% of their respective losses, but I CTZ recovered only 7,100 (7%) of its 98,800 loss, and III CTZ only regained 77,900 (19%) of the 414,400 loss there.

Recovery Problems

Table 2 shows that the important indicators on VC infrastructure, VC guerrillas, and friendly defense forces/plan regressed sharply at Tet, and have not recovered. Recovery in the indicators which measure VC forces and overt activities (1B, 1C and 2C) has been much better (37% on average). Most development indicators made strong (41% to 100%) recoveries, but they had not suffered as heavily as security indicators during Tet.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 1

1967-1968 CHANGES IN HES A-B-C POPULATION ^{a/}
(Population in Thousands)

	CTZ	Jan 67-Dec 67	Dec 67-Feb 68	Feb 68-Jun 68
<u>Start of Period</u>				
A-B-C population	I	1310.1 (48.5)	1853.5 (56.6)	1474.0 (45.6)
(incl. non-hamlet)	II	2021.2 (68.0)	2130.2 (74.7)	1984.6 (70.0)
(% of total	III	4012.6 (78.2)	4326.3 (81.4)	3839.5 (73.8)
population)	IV	2847.6 (50.9)	3204.8 (55.6)	2959.8 (50.9)
	SVN	10191.5 (62.1)	11514.8 (66.9)	10257.9 (59.9)
<u>Changes During Period</u>				
Hamlet population	I	181.8	13.5	73.3
improved	II	216.0	21.2	112.8
D-E-VC to A-B-C ^{b/}	III	250.7	25.4	178.6
	IV	331.4	40.2	227.9
	SVN	979.9	100.3	592.6
Hamlet population	I	98.5	112.3	66.2
regressed from	II	97.2	165.9	39.8
A-B-C to D-E-VC ^{b/}	III	113.0	439.8	100.7
	IV	125.3	332.6	101.4
	SVN	434.0	1050.6	308.1
Net A-B-C	I	+ 83.3	- 98.8	+ 7.1
improvement/regression	II	+118.8	-144.7	+ 73.0
	III	+137.7	-414.4	+ 77.9
	IV	+206.1	-292.4	+126.5
	SVN	+545.9	-950.3	+284.5
Accounting type	I	+460.1	-280.7	+163.5
changes to	II	- 9.8	- .9	+ 71.7
A-B-C ^{c/}	III	+176.0	- 72.4	+121.9
	IV	+151.1	+ 47.4	+ 69.9
	SVN	+777.4	-306.6	+427.0
<u>End of Period</u>				
A-B-C population	I	1853.5 (56.6)	1474.0 (45.6)	1644.6 (51.0)
(incl. non-hamlet)	II	2130.2 (74.7)	1984.6 (70.0)	2129.3 (73.7)
(% of total	III	4326.3 (81.4)	3839.5 (73.8)	4039.3 (75.7)
population)	IV	3204.8 (55.6)	2959.8 (50.9)	3156.2 (53.5)
	SVN	11514.8 (66.9)	10257.9 (59.9)	10969.4 (63.3)

^{a/} Based on HES total scores (nine security plus nine development indicators).

^{b/} Based on population in hamlets at end of period.

^{c/} Includes all increases or decreases in A-B-C population due to (1) revision of hamlet population estimates during period, (2) A-B-C hamlets "found" or previously unevaluated, (3) A-B-C hamlets dropped or no longer rated (including abandoned hamlets).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 2

1968 HES INDICATOR NET IMPROVEMENTS AND REGRESSIONS
(For Continuously Rated Hamlets)

<u>Indicator</u>	<u>Jan-Feb Net Regressions</u>	<u>Feb-June Net Improvements</u>	<u>Percent Recovered</u>
1C-VC Military Incidents	2258	950	42
1B-VC External Forces	1599	637	40
2C-VC Political/Terrorist Activities	1499	403	27
1A-VC Village Guerrillas	1313	-103	-8
2B-VC Village Infrastructure	1241	-84	-7
3B-Friendly External Forces	1157	25	2
2A-VC Hamlet Infrastructure	1105	11	1
3A-Hamlet Defense Plan	963	141	15
3C-Internal Security Activities	816	109	13
4C-Information/Psyop Activities	798	328	41
4A-GVN Governmental Management	686	50	7
5C-Welfare	556	335	60
4B-Census Grievance Program	554	407	73
6A-Self Help/Civic Action	550	293	53
5B-Education	543	266	49
6C-Economic Improvement	528	290	55
6B-Public Works	497	499	100
5A-Public Health	449	358	80
Avg. Per Security Indicator	1328	232	17
Avg. Per Development Indicator	573	314	55
Avg. for All Indicators	951	273	29
			29

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Sep 68

REBUTTAL FROM AMBASSADOR KOMER

We received the following message from Ambassador Komer, Deputy COMUSMACV for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), commenting on several articles appearing in our July and August Southeast Asia Analysis Reports:

"1. Hope you can print in September issue following contribution to constructive dialogue.

"2. As an avid reader of your Southeast Asia Analysis Reports, I am concerned lest use of out-of-date data in July and August articles give an unduly pessimistic view of current pacification recovery from the Tet 1968 low. For example, even August article is still based on old April/May/June data which do not portray the real situation at the time of publication. Your July article says that in March and April only about one-third of the Tet losses of relatively secure (A plus B plus C) population had been recovered. However, end-August data show more than 80 percent has been recovered--a much more encouraging picture.

"3. Also bear in mind that February-April period was highly atypical from standpoint of pacification in that substantial setback recurred as result of enemy Tet shift to attack on cities and consequent withdrawal extensive security forces. Pacifiers naturally pulled back too.

"4. Another problem arises when you take the same data base that we are using (and providing to you) but come up with different conclusions. Where this is a matter of legitimate difference we can hardly object, but all too frequently it is because you are unaware of the background and rationale underlying the statistics we provide. To cite a few specific cases:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

" A. In your July issue on page 27, paragraph 2, "Status of RD," you quote a MACV statement out of context and in so doing cast an aura of gloom on the pacification program which does not exist.

" B. In same issue on page 21, "Summary," you commiserate that the PF weapons modernization program will take at least one and one-half years to complete. In fact, the weapons modernization program for the PF has been designed to cover an 18-month period. In the same paragraph you state that the PF "by themselves" cannot increase territorial security significantly when in fact nobody ever expected the Popular Forces to provide territorial security "by themselves."

" C. On page 12, "Summary," your statement of the shortage of MACV advisors on 30 April presents a false picture. It should be obvious that a January decision to field 2,500 new advisors cannot be accomplished even by end-April. The fielding of the authorized MATS teams and other advisors in the 2,500 add-on was programmed to be accomplished incrementally over calendar year 1968. As of now, the program is on schedule.

" D. Your August Report, page 30, first paragraph, states that HES June reports indicate pacification recovery is only 30 percent complete. But your rationale ignores important facts known to us out here on the ground. For example, the large segment of population which you dismiss as "accounting type changes" included 380,000 persons in Thua Thien province who were not evaluated during February. Once the Tet offensive had subsided so that ratings could be made they were picked up in the March reports and, we feel, legitimately treated as having regressed in February and recovered in subsequent months. In addition, your use of only two categories of population, i.e., A-B-C and D-E-VC, presents a somewhat distorted figure. These two categories stress the movement of hamlets on the borderline and those which regress or progress in a spectacular way. Pacification changes are normally more modest and cannot be reflected in the

CONFIDENTIAL

type of measurement you have used. Also your Table 2 concerned itself with indicating movement by hamlet only. Since hamlets vary so widely in size, it would be more meaningful to express these changes in terms of population.

"5. While many of points in your articles are well taken, more recent data from HES and TFES shows much more substantial recovery of pacification momentum. Most impressive is solid 81 percent recovery in essentially five months, April-August, despite Mini-Tet in May. Note that rural recovery is also 70 percent complete, which shows that improvement actually took place in the countryside, not just in resecuring towns. As for RF/PF, the key point is not that re-equipment programs will take 18 months to complete but that they are already beginning to show significant results. For example, ratio of officers and NCOs showed improvement in July and will no doubt show more when August TFES results are in.

"6. Another way of looking at the data is from the enemy's point of view. By end-August VC population control was back down to 16.8 percent which is not far from record low of 16.4 percent at end-January. This means enemy's population base is indeed small and goes far to explain why he must bring in, at great trouble and expense, NVA troops to replace VC. Moreover, it helps account for marked decline in enemy guerrilla strength, which is most troublesome component of enemy's force to the pacifiers.

"7. Thus, viewed in context of the enemy's problems and expanding GVN territorial security forces, pacification is back on a rising curve which is in fact significantly sharper than that in last half of 1967.

"8. I suggest two courses of action to limit our differing viewpoints to those which are real:

"A. Use the most up-to-date information that we provide you as rapidly as we get it ourselves or point out the lack of currency of what you do present.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

"B. Attempt to use the data with the same categorizations that we do. We are always happy to explain the rationale behind ours if you will just ask us."

SEAPRO COMMENTS

We very much appreciate Ambassador Komer's cooperation in providing basic data and keeping us on our toes in our analyses. We consider his comments constructive and always helpful. However:

Status of RD

While we quoted one May 1967 MACV statement on the "severe, nationwide impact" of the Tet offensive on pacification in our July article ("Status of Pacification," p. 27), we were careful to give the complete statement in a footnote: "Unlike the Tet offensive which had a severe, nationwide impact on pacification, the May attacks slowed but did not significantly disrupt the program." We then went on to show (and Ambassador Komer does not refute our analysis) that the pacification program was hampered by lack of security or was showing only slow or mixed success in 32 of the 44 provinces in May.

Popular Forces

We recognize that "nobody ever expected the PF to provide territorial security by themselves." Perhaps we did not make our point clearly enough. The available data cited in our article indicated that RF/PF in contact were reinforced by ground support or fire only 35% of the time. This suggested to us that the PF in fact are often on their own, despite the territorial security concept under which they are supposed to receive help promptly.

We also know that the full weapons modernization program for PF is planned to take 18 months for re-equipment. Our statement that it will take "at least" that long tried to take account of training and maintenance problems in bringing the PF up to their full potential. Our purpose was to ensure that our Washington readers realize that achieving full results is going to take until 1970.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Advisors

Our article on the RF/PF Advisory Program (as of 30 April 1967) presented available information about the MACV RF/PF advisory program and indicated that it seemed to be proceeding on schedule. We did not say that MACV should have fielded the 2,500 advisors by the end of April nor did we question the goals of the established MATS deployment program. In fact, we stated at one point that "...while on 30 April there were only 744 RF/PF advisors assigned of 1124 authorized (34% short), this was still a good record since the authorization had been increased 925 advisory slots between January and April."

Since getting enough RF/PF advisors is a high priority effort, we did suggest three sources of advisory personnel for consideration should MACV desire to further accelerate the RF/PF MATS buildup. Ambassador Komer now indicates that MATS deployment continues to meet its original schedule (253 teams by end September 1968).

Recovery

Since lack of security prevented MACV from evaluating 378,900 people in Thua Thien in February, we agree that they can be considered as part of the Tet regression and recovery. We are glad this has been called to our attention and the gap reduces between our respective assessments. In our "Pacification Trends" article elsewhere in this issue, we find that if we (1) consider all regressions and recoveries (not just those between the A-B-C and D-E-VC categories), (2) use population instead of hamlet figures, and (3) add the 378,900 "regressions" and 289,700 "recoveries" from Thua Thien, the recovery by the end of June was 41%.

We do not yet have the detailed August data to verify Ambassador Komer's 80-81% recovery figures; he has apparently used the gross HES statistics showing a recovery of 6 percentage points of the 7.4 points lost in February. Another calculation (Table 1) shows a 91% recovery--1.2 million people added to the A-B-C population since February compared to 1.3 million who slipped at Tet. However, neither of these calculations accounts for the accounting changes or improvements in hamlets not hurt by Tet. In the June situation noted above, we believe the recovery from Tet was 41%, not 47% as calculated by Ambassador Komer's method or 54% as suggested by raw population data.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 1

HES A-B-C POPULATION DECEMBER 1967 - AUGUST 1968

Month	A-B-C Population		Current Month Minus February Pop (000)	Percent Post-Tet "Recovery" ^{a/}	
	Pop (000)	% of Total		Raw Population ^{b/}	Percentage Change ^{c/}
1967 Dec	11,515	(66.9%)	+1,257		
1968 Jan	11,582	(67.2%)	+1,324		
Feb	10,258	(59.8%)			
Mar	10,471	(61.0%)	+ 213	16%	16%
Jun	10,969	(63.3%)	+ 711	54%	47%
Jul	11,310	(64.9%)	+1,052	79%	69%
Aug	11,469	(65.8%)	+1,211	91%	81%

- a/ These figures are not corrected for accounting changes in the HES, or for improvements in hamlets not hit at Tet.
- b/ Ratio of the A-B-C population gained since February to the 1,324,000 lost between January and February.
- c/ Ratio of the percentage points gained since February to the 7.4 points lost between January and February.

Enemy Control and Guerrilla Strength

While the enemy's absolute control has dropped back to only 16-17% of the SVN population, both MACV-J2 and HES data indicate that guerrilla strength has remained fairly constant during January-July 1968:

(a) MACV J-2 intelligence estimates indicated a steady drop in VC guerrilla strength during 1967; from 126,100 in January to 69,800 in December. This trend has not been continued in 1968. The table below shows the fluctuations in 1968 with latest reports indicating a drop of only about 8,000 for the first 7 months of 1968 (compared to a decline of better than 32,000 for the same period in 1967).

VC GUERRILLA STRENGTH, 1968 (000)

<u>Dec 67</u>	<u>Jan 68</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>July</u>
69.8	64.0	66.0	53.9	61.1

(b) The HES VC village guerrilla indicator in June 1968 showed that 40% of the people live in relatively secure or contested areas where VC guerrillas can at least harass the GVN, up from 31% in January.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Up-To-Date Information

We appreciate very much the timely fashion in which MACV sends the HES data to Washington and we always use the most current information we have on our publication date.

We receive the HES summary data almost as soon as MACV does. But our pacification recovery studies depend on the detailed data from the HES computer tapes. MACV sends these as soon as they are ready and we usually receive them around the end of the following month (June data at the end of July). It then takes us a week or so to update our data base, run the necessary retrievals, etc. This means that, detailed June data was not ready for analysis until early in August. We are not complaining about the time lag. On the contrary, we cannot see any way that the process could be speeded up for the HES data. However our analyses of the detailed data will lag somewhat behind the availability of the summary data.

CONFIDENTIAL

Sep 68

CONFIDENTIAL

PACIFICATION TRENDS

While summary data from CORDS shows A-B-C population regaining 47-54% of the population lost during Tet by June (and 81-91% by August), detailed analysis shows that 41% of the population which regressed during Tet had recovered by the end of June. In June about 60% of the relatively secure hamlet population was subject to the actions of the VC infrastructure, 45% were subject to VC village guerrillas, and 39% lived in relatively secure hamlets where the VC collect taxes.

CORDS Summary Data

Table 1 shows that the number of people rated relatively secure (A-B-C) in the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) dropped 1,324,000, or 7.4 percentage points between January and February 1968 as a result of the Tet offensive. By August, A-B-C population was 1,211,000 people (6.0 percentage points) above the February low point, an apparent gain of 91% of the population lost at Tet and 81% of the percentage points lost. These calculations based on summary data do not give the full picture of the post-Tet recovery, however, because:

- (1) Accounting-type changes in the HES, such as population adjustment, hamlet additions and deletions, and abandonment of hamlets formerly rated obscure the results of hamlet rating improvements and regressions.
- (2) Not all post-Tet rating improvements are true "recoveries," since the cited gain includes many improvements in hamlets which did not regress at Tet.
- (3) The calculations ignore rating improvements and regressions within the A-B-C categories, and within the D-E-VC categories.
- (4) The calculations do not identify those hamlets which could not be rated at Tet because of bad security conditions, but which did "recover" to A-E ratings afterward.

TABLE 1

HES A-B-C POPULATION					
Month	A-B-C Population		Current Month Minus February Pop (000)	Percent Post-Tet "Recovery" a/ Raw Pop ^b / Per Chg ^c	
	Pop (000)	% of Total			
1967 Dec	11,515	(66.9%)	+1,257		
1968 Jan	11,582	(67.2%)	+1,324		
Feb	10,258	(59.8%)			
Mar	10,471	(61.0%)	+ 213	16%	16%
Jun	10,969	(63.3%)	+ 711	54%	47%
Jul	11,310	(64.5%)	+1,052	79%	69%
Aug	11,469	(65.8%)	+1,211	91%	81%

- a/ These figures are not corrected for accounting changes in the HES, or for improvements in hamlets not hit at Tet.
- b/ Ratio of the A-B-C population gained since Feb to the 1,324,000 lost between Jan & Feb.
- c/ Ratio of the percentage points gained since Feb to the 7.4 points lost between Jan & Feb.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Real Post-Tet Recovery

In the August report we analyzed the effect of accounting changes in the HES -- item (1) above. This month we are taking into account the other factors, (2) through (4) above, which also mask the real post-Tet recovery.

Table 2 shows that 2,662,900 population lived in hamlets which regressed one letter grade or more in total score at Tet (we compared December 1967 and February 1968 end-of-month ratings): of these, 941,300 recovered one letter grade or more between February and June, 129,400 regressed even further, and the remainder stayed the same or were not evaluated in June. Another 378,900 population in A-E hamlets could not be rated in February because of bad security conditions; of these, 289,300 "recovered" to A-E rating by June. Adding 941,300 plus 289,300 gives 1,230,600 population which actually recovered by June, or 41% of the 3,041,800 population in hamlets which regressed at Tet. (The same percentage holds for real recovery in the A-B-C categories.)

Our 41% recovery figure for June is less than either the 47% "percentage method" or 54% "population method" recovery figures from the CORDS summary data (Table 1). Ambassador Komer reports 80-81% "solid recovery" as of August (see his comments elsewhere in this issue), but we do not yet have the detailed August figures.

"Churning" in Ratings Becomes Significant

Table 2 also shows that in the hamlets not hit hard at Tet, GVN-US and VC-NVA efforts to expand population control were at a standoff between February and June: 601,500 were pushed toward the US-GVN side (i.e. improved one letter grade or more), while 618,800 regressed toward the VC/NVA side. Thus, in addition to the 3.0 million population regressed during Tet (of which 1.2 million were "recaptured" by the end of June), 1.2 million people were involved in a struggle for control which resulted in no substantial gain for either side. The evidence suggests that this "churning" of the population towards one side or the other has been going on, at lower intensity, ever since the pacification program began. In an earlier article we presented data which suggested that 67% of this year's target RD hamlets were in previous year's plans.

Growth of VC Potential

Three HES indicators give some measure of VC strength in the "relatively secure" and "contested" hamlets: VC Village Guerrillas (Indicator 1A), VC Hamlet Infrastructure (Indicator 2A), and VC Tax Collection (Problem Area Question 8A). Since we wished to measure the maximum VC potential in the countryside during 1967 and 1968, we added the population in hamlets rated C -- where guerrillas "can harass but not prevent GVN activities in hamlet," and where "some (VC infrastructure) agents under village or district control (are)

CONFIDENTIAL

still operative" -- to the D-E population for each indicator. For the VC tax collection question, we grouped district advisor' "Yes" and "Unknown" responses.

Table 3 shows that the population in hamlets rated C-D-E on the infrastructure and hamlet indicators and in hamlets taxed by the VC (plus contested non-hamlet population) started increasing about October 1967, increased markedly in February 1968 (Tet), and has continued to increase through June 1968. (VC controlled population has remained steady at 2.8-3.0 million throughout the past year.)

In June 1968, at least 60% of the "relatively secure" hamlet population was rated C-D-E on VC Hamlet Infrastructure -- i.e., this population lived in hamlets where at least some infrastructure under village or district control is still operative. Similarly, 45% of the "relatively secure" population lived in hamlets where village guerrillas can at least harass some GVN activities, and at least 39% of the "relatively secure" population were subject to VC tax collection. To obtain the foregoing results we used only hamlet population and assumed that all hamlets which were rated A-B on the infrastructure and guerrilla indicators (and where the VC do not collect taxes) must be "relatively secure;" the remaining "relatively secure" population (based on HES total scores) thus must have had C-or-lower indicator ratings, or were probably taxed by the VC. We plan further analysis to determine the exact percentages in both urban and rural hamlets.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 2

COMPARISON OF HES IMPROVEMENTS/REGRESSIONS Tet and Post-Tet Periods (Hamlet Population)

		Post-Tet Period (Feb 1968 - June 1968)		
		Hamlets.. Which Re- gressed at Tet	Hamlets Which Did Not Regress at Tet	All Hamlets
	Tet Period (Dec 67-Feb 68)			
<u>Improvements:</u>				
"Contested" to "Relatively Secure"	94,755	381,019	146,281	527,300
"VC" to "Relatively Secure"	5,597	40,139	25,133	65,272
"VC" to "Contested"	10,806	95,690	31,298	126,988
Within "Relatively Secure"	142,923	332,019	380,913	712,932
Within "Contested"	18,308	92,424	17,829	110,253
Total Improved	272,389	941,291	601,454	1,542,745
<u>Regressions</u>				
"Relatively Secure" to "Contested"	905,724	83,563	218,693	302,261
"Relatively Secure" to "VC"	144,872	1,959	3,967	5,926
"Contested" to "VC"	161,346	32,736	87,183	119,919
Within "Relatively Secure"	1,298,200	1,817	266,394	268,211
Within "Contested"	152,708	9,325	42,524	51,849
Total Regressed	2,662,850	129,400	618,766	748,166
<u>Hamlets "Not Evaluated" in February but Rated A-VC in December and June:</u>				
"Regressed" from "Relatively Secure"	263,834			
"Regressed" from "Contested"	115,108			
Total "Regressed"	378,942			
"Recovered" to "Relatively Secure"		117,675		117,675
"Recovered" to "Contested"		171,618		171,618
Total "Recovered"		289,293		289,293
<u>Net Improvement (+) or Regression (-)</u>				
	-2,769,403	+1,101,184	-17,312	+1,083,872

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 3

**SECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND TAXATION RATINGS
FROM THE HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM
(Population in Thousands)**

	<u>1967</u> <u>Jan</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>1968</u> <u>Jan</u>
Total Score						
"Relatively Secure" (A-B-C) a/	10191.5	10595.0	11256.2	11314.9	11514.8	11561.5
"Contested" (D-E- Other) b/	3377.7	3007.0	2821.7	2768.3	2832.3	2817.2
VC Controlled c/	2832.5	3152.3	3087.4	2943.6	2861.1	2834.2
Total	16401.7	16754.3	17165.3	17026.8	17208.2	17233.0
Guerrilla Indicator (1A)						
A-B a/	8877.5	9076.9	9281.5	9368.6	9082.6	9057.4
C-D-E-Other b/	4691.7	4525.1	4796.4	4714.6	5264.5	5341.2
VC Controlled c/	2832.5	3152.3	3087.4	2943.6	2861.1	2834.2
Total	16401.7	16754.3	17165.3	17026.8	17208.2	17233.0
Infrastructure Indicator (2A)						
A-B a/	6929.4	7243.2	7312.0	7311.1	7205.3	7154.1
C-D-E-Other b/	6639.8	6358.8	6765.9	6772.1	7141.8	7244.2
VC Controlled c/	2832.5	3152.3	3087.4	2943.6	2861.1	2834.2
Total	16401.7	16754.3	17165.3	17026.8	17208.2	17233.0
Taxation Question						
No VC Taxation a/	N/A	N/A	7983.3	8767.7	8834.1	8789.0
VC Taxation-Other b/d/	N/A	N/A	6094.6	5315.5	5513.0	5609.0
VC Controlled c/	N/A	N/A	3087.4	2943.6	2861.1	2834.2
Total	N/A	N/A	17165.3	17026.8	17208.2	17233.0

- a/ Includes GVN controlled non-hamlet population.
b/ Includes contested non-hamlet population.
c/ Includes VC controlled non-hamlet population.
d/ Includes hamlets with unknown VC tax collection status.

CONFIDENTIAL

D

CONFIDENTIAL

<u>Sep</u>	<u>Dec</u>	1968 <u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>
1314.9	11514.8	11581.5	10257.9	10471.1	10628.8	10692.7	10969.4	11309.9
2768.3	2832.3	2817.2	3776.0	3553.2	3461.4	3509.1	3367.9	3168.7
2943.6	2861.1	2834.3	3042.7	3064.6	2996.4	3042.6	3005.0	2942.6
17026.8	17208.2	17233.0	17076.6	17088.9	17086.6	17244.4	17342.3	17421.2
9368.6	9082.6	9057.5	7253.5	7427.7	7579.6	7244.0	7408.9	
4714.6	5264.5	5341.3	5780.4	6596.6	6510.6	6957.8	6930.4	
2943.6	2861.1	2834.2	3042.7	3064.6	2996.4	3042.6	3005.0	
17026.8	17208.2	17233.0	17076.6	17088.9	17086.6	17244.4	17342.3	
7311.1	7205.3	7154.8	6240.3	6147.4	6129.6	6218.6	6227.8	
6772.1	7141.8	7244.0	7793.6	7876.9	7960.6	7983.2	8109.5	
2943.6	2861.1	2834.2	3042.7	3064.6	2996.4	3042.6	3005.0	
17026.8	17208.2	17233.0	17076.6	17088.9	17086.6	17244.4	17342.3	
8767.7	8834.1	8789.8	7877.9	7983.8	7819.2	7752.1	7861.4	
5315.5	5513.0	5609.0	6156.0	6040.5	6271.0	6449.7	6475.9	
2943.6	2861.1	2834.2	3042.7	3064.6	2996.4	3042.6	3005.0	
17026.8	17208.2	17233.0	17076.6	17088.9	17086.6	17244.4	17342.3	

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Dec 68

GVN POPULATION CONTROL AND ENEMY ACTIVITY

Summary

SVN population regressions, as reported by HES, strongly correlate with various measures of VC/NVA military activity. Population gains do not correlate with measures of either VC/NVA or friendly military activity.

Population Regressions

The regressed population is the population of hamlets whose HES ratings have declined from the previous month. It is logical to expect a connection between VC/NVA activities and population regression, and we constructed several hypotheses for this relationship and applied statistical methods to test them.

TABLE 1

REGRESSED POPULATION AGAINST VC/NVA OPERATIONS
February 1967 through September 1968 by Month

Regressed Population Versus ^{a/}	R	R ²
	<u>Correlation Coefficient</u>	
Model 1. VC/NVA Attacks and Other Incidents ^{b/}	.86	.74
Model 2. Kill ratio ^{c/}	.82	.67
Model 3. PF/RF Casualties	.88	.77

^{a/} An independent variable for time is included in all three cases.

^{b/} Other incidents include terror, sabotage, and harassment. Attacks include large and small attacks.

^{c/} Kill ratio is Enemy to Friendly KIA.

CONFIDENTIAL

112

CONFIDENTIAL

Our first model relates regressed population to total enemy attacks, other incidents, and time.^{1/} This model explains 74% of the variation in population regression. The most significant variable is attacks -- the greater the number of VC attacks, the more population is likely to regress.

The effect of other incidents is moderately strong and the correlation is negative; the more terror, sabotage and harassment incidents, the less population regression. This result appears contradictory at first glance, but it is reasonable when the long term trend of attacks and incidents is considered. Since 1967, non-attack incidents have been generally declining in number while attacks have been increasing. Attacks have paralleled population regressions closely (see Graph 1) and incidents, moving in the opposite direction, must show a negative correlation.

Another question arises over the large weight given to attacks. Obviously each enemy attack does not cause 4,670 people to regress in HES scores. VC/NVA attacks seem to have a strong effect because they ^{2/} are a good over-all measure of enemy initiative and offensive activity. They seem to tell us when the VC is really on the move in all areas of endeavor that might cause HES scores to regress.

Although time is the weakest of the variables, it is not insignificant. Over time there is a negative trend which indicates that in later time periods more VC attacks or a higher level of VC activity are required to account for the same population regression. Again, this may be reasonable, assuming that allied security forces have become better able to cope with VC/NVA activities.

The second model relates population regressions to the kill ratio.^{3/} Again, a high positive correlation results. The time variable is statistically insignificant in this equation. High kill ratios are associated with periods of high VC/NVA activity, so this model is consistent with the first model discussed above.

The third model accounts for 77% of the variation in HES population regressions using the two variables of RF/PF casualties and time.^{4/} Although both variables are significant, RF/PF casualties have a far more important effect. Once again, the result accords with expectations and with the

^{1/} Population regressions (100's) = $15,446 + 46.7 \text{ (VC attacks)} - 10.6 \text{ (other incidents)} - 432 \text{ (time)}$.

^{2/} See "Military Initiative in South Vietnam," SEA Analysis Report, September 1968, p.6.

^{3/} Regressed population (100's) = $-11,055 + 3,600 \text{ (kill ratio)} - 150 \text{ (time)}$.


^{4/} Regressed population (100's) = $-5,016 + 5.8 \text{ (RF/PF casualties)} - 359 \text{ (time)}$.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

GRAPH 1

POPULATION REGRESSION AND VC/NVA TOTAL ATTACKS



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

previous models. The RF and PF are supposed to be close to the population and a rise in their casualties should indicate VC pressure against the population as well as more intense VC/NVA military activity. A similar model using total friendly KIA in place of RF/PF casualties accounted for only 53% of the variations in regressed population.

Thus, the three models all indicate that the intensity of combat as measured by enemy operations and their effects plays a significant role in determining the HES population regression during a given month.

Population Improvements

Population improvement is defined as the population of hamlets whose HES ratings improved over the previous month. We assumed that population improvements would correlate negatively with enemy activity; we expected more population improvements in months with low VC/NVA activity than in months of high activity. However, no significant correlations exist between the measures of VC/NVA military activity we used and population improvements. In every case shown in Table 2 our models accounted for less than 10% of the variation in improved population.

In an attempt to correct for delayed reporting, we repeated the tests to determine if enemy attacks in the current month affected population improvement in the following month. Although results were marginally better, they were not significant.

TABLE 2

POPULATION IMPROVEMENTS AGAINST VC/NVA ACTIVITY
February 1967 through September 1968 by Month

<u>Population Improvements Versus</u>	<u>a/</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>R²</u>
		<u>Correlation Coefficient</u>	
Model 1. VC Attacks and Other Incidents		.30	.09
Model 2. Kill ratio		.06	.004
Model 3. RF/PF total casualties		.095	.009

a/ Definitions, number of variables, and use of time is same as in Table 1.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

This situation leads us to suspect that population improvements and regressions are not associated with the same factors. This is supported by the lack of correlation between improvements and regressions within the HES. Regressions account for less than 4% of the variation in population improvements; they do not move together.

Since population regressions are linked to VC/NVA activity, we tried to link population improvement to measures of friendly activity. However, measures of small unit actions, small unit contacts, and battalion days of operation did not correlate significantly with population gains.

TABLE 3

POPULATION IMPROVEMENTS AGAINST FRIENDLY ACTIVITY

<u>Population Improvements Versus</u>	<u>R</u> <u>Correlation Coefficient</u>	<u>R²</u>
1. ARVN small unit contacts	.41	.17
2. Allied small unit operations	.16	.027
3. Friendly Bn. Days of Operation	.54	.29
4. Friendly Bn. Days of Operation (lagged)	.54	.29

Although VC/NVA activity is clearly related to population regressions, other factors govern population improvements, and we must dig further to see if we can determine what they are.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 4
REGRESSION ANALYSIS DATA

	1967									
	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	
Population Regressions(100's) <u>a/</u>	4742	2513	1275	1179	3758	1176	1934	1080	1385	
Population Improvements(100's) <u>a/</u>	3246	3778	2684	3983	8915	3859	1771	2182	838	
Total VC Attacks <u>b/</u>	117	219	162	193	168	197	204	260	264	
VC Other Incidents <u>b/</u>	1538	1894	2059	2059	1629	1880	1798	2354	1833	
Kill Ratio <u>b/</u>	4.47	4.08	3.42	3.88	3.90	5.08	3.43	3.16	3.31	
RF/PF Casualties <u>c/</u>	1504	2223	1293	1573	1783	1121	1545	1733	1653	
Total Friendly KIA <u>b/</u>	1642	2295	1823	2529	1885	1559	1693	2014	1895	
Friendly Bn Days of Operations <u>c/</u>	4593	5387	5296	5537	5214	5547	5587	5358	5696	
Friendly Small Unit Operations (100's) <u>c/</u>	1281	1465	1456	1648	1587	1786	1808	1747	1830	
RVN Small Unit Contacts <u>c/</u>	334	477	568	420	505	514	455	526	501	
Time	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	

Source: a/ HANLA
b/ OSD Statistical Summary
c/ OASD(SA) Statistical Tables
d/ Adjusted TFES Figure

CONFIDENTIAL

2

	1968													
	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>
16	1934	1080	1385	2871	2182	2558	25842	3861	2993	4587	1754	2718	3508	2956
19	1771	2182	868	2721	2239	2807	1558	3861	6129	3589	5723	7669	5227	6703
17	204	260	264	264	286	409	570	558	391	568	288	137	242	215
180	1798	2354	1833	1700	2051	1949	1542	3203	2216	2652	1621	1492	1334	1196
108	3.43	3.16	3.31	3.36	3.83	5.51	8.46	5.47	4.35	5.70	3.96	3.90	5.74	4.73
121	1545	1733	1653	1978	2616	1964	3400 ^d	2807	1889	2642	2473	1803	3314	3090
199	1693	2014	1895	2278	2075	2762	4714	3175	2807	4223	2605	1706	2697	2649
147	5587	5358	5696	5467	5447	5623	5474	7501	7809	7374	7378	7986	8530	8275
186	1808	1777	1830	1923	1995	1875	325	756	1567	2059	1840	1804	1926	1799
514	455	526	501	501	572	461	N/A	77	158	111	111	158	171	164
6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20

Feb 49

CONFIDENTIAL

PACIFICATION ASSESSMENT

Summary. MACV reports that US district advisors in South Vietnam (SVN) rated 13.3 million people (76%) of the SVN population relatively secure ^{1/} on December 31, 1968, up 1.8 million people from a year earlier (11.5 million or 67% on December 31, 1967) and up more than 3 million people from the Tet offensive low. During the last quarter of 1968, relatively secure population increased by 1.7 million people -- more than during all of 1967 (1.3 million), and more than during the post-Tet recovery period (1.4 million, March-September 1968). More important, the enemy lull and the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) produced the fourth quarter gain by upgrading hamlet ratings; accounting changes played a much lesser role than in the past.

The GVN-MACV goal of upgrading another 2.8 million people to achieve 90% A-B-C ratings in 1969 may be difficult to attain, since 2.3 million will have to come from rural VC hamlets and rural D-E hamlets with active VC infrastructures. Moreover, the pacification program has some vulnerabilities which could erase some 1968 APC gains.

Population Security Trends - 1968

Table 1 shows that for the first time, rating changes produced most (80%, .9 million of 1.1 million) of the October - November gains, and probably produced most of December's .5 million gains.^{2/} With the effects of population and other accounting changes removed, the retrospective trend line of relatively secure population (Table 2 and the graph) confirms the dramatic fourth quarter gains shown in the gross data as reported. (The graph and Table 2 also indicate that almost half (47%) of the population security gains in the past two years stemmed from accounting changes and, possibly, population movements.)

District advisors upgraded most of the 18 HES indicators in about 2000 hamlets during October - November 1968. Table 3 shows that 1906 hamlets improved in total score while only 172 regressed -- a net 1734 improved. Improvement of security scores was even better with a net total of 1860 with higher scores. The Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) alone could not have produced all of the rating improvements, since the GVN had entered only 1132 APC hamlets by December 8. Furthermore, HES ratings (at least on the downside) are not very sensitive to the presence of RF/PF; 660 PF platoons and 204 RF companies were reportedly redeployed from other hamlets to APC hamlets by December 8, but only 237-331 hamlets regressed on the HES friendly forces indicators. Thus, increased GVN presence in the rural areas does not account for all of the overall upswing.

- ^{1/} Population in hamlets rated A-B-C on the 18 HES indicators, plus secure non-hamlet (city) population.
- ^{2/} Detailed December data has not been received in Washington in time for analysis for this paper.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 1

SVN RELATIVELY SECURE POPULATION
(Hamlet Evaluation System - In Thousands)

	1967				1968								
	Jan	Jun	Dec	Change	Jan	Feb	Mar	Jun	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Change
<u>Total</u>													
Population	10192	11256	11515	1323	11582	10258	10471	10969	11671	12185	12813	13339	1824
%	62.1	65.6	66.9	4.8	67.2	59.8	61.0	63.2	66.8	69.8	73.3	76.3	9.4
<u>Changes</u>													
Rating													
Changes		524	-10	514		-1214			917		914	526 ^{a/}	1143
Population													
Moves &													
Accounting													
Changes		540	269	809		-43			496		228	02 ^{a/}	681
Total		1064	259	1323		-1257			1413		1142	526	1824

a/ December detailed data not available for analysis in time for this paper; we assume all December gains were from rating changes.

Both MACV reports and Table 3 indicate that a significant reason for the excellent 4th quarter 1968 performance was the sharp decline in enemy activity. The table shows that most improvement occurred on the three indicators reporting enemy military activities. Table 4 confirms that enemy activity decreased during the period; only two larger scale enemy attacks occurred and most of the other types of incidents also declined.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 2


RELATIVELY SECURE POPULATION TRENDS WITH ACCOUNTING CHANGES REMOVED

	1967			1968			
	Jan	Jun	Dec	Feb	Sep	Nov	Dec
<u>Raw Reports</u>							
Population (000)	10192	11256	11515	10258	11671	12813	13339
%	62.1	65.6	66.9	59.8	66.8	73.3	76.3
<u>Rating Changes</u>							
Only ^{a/}							
Population (000)	10192	10716	10706	9492	10409	11323	11849
%	62.1	62.4	62.2	55.3	59.5	64.8	67.8
<u>Cumulative Effect^{b/}</u>							
<u>of Population Moves</u>							
<u>& Accounting Changes</u>							
Population (000)	0	540	809	766	1262	1490	1490
%	0	3.2	4.7	4.5	7.3	8.5	8.5

a/ Rating changes only, using January 1967 as a base.

b/ Raw data minus rating changes.

A-B-C
Pop.
(Million)



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 3

HES INDICATOR RATING CHANGES

Indicator	Tet Period 31 Dec 67 - 29 Feb 68			30 Sep 68 - 30 Nov 68		
	Hamlets Improved	Hamlets Regressed	Net Regressed	Hamlets Improved	Hamlets Regressed	Net Improved
<u>VC Military Activities</u>						
1A-Village Guerrillas	133	1446	-1313	2133	264	+1869
1B-Main Forces	240	1839	-1599	2548	291	+2257
1C-Incidents	170	2428	-2258	2360	365	+1995
<u>VC Political & Subversion</u>						
2A-Hamlet Infrastructure	93	1198	-1105	1712	293	+1419
2B-Village Infrastructure	94	1335	-1241	1714	352	+1362
2C-Activities	151	1650	-1499	1929	395	+1534
<u>Friendly Capabilities</u>						
3A-Defense Plan	140	1103	- 963	1923	287	+1636
3B-Reinforcement	107	1264	-1157	1799	237	+1562
3C-Internal Security	168	984	- 816	1557	331	+1226
<u>Admin. and Political</u>						
4A-GVN Management	14	831	- 686	1511	321	+1190
4B-Census Grievance	183	737	- 554	1554	255	+1299
4C-Information	136	934	- 798	1699	274	+1425
<u>Services</u>						
5A-Health	230	679	- 449	1547	254	+1293
5B-Education	173	716	- 543	1256	321	+ 935
5C-Welfare	169	725	- 556	1494	215	+1279
<u>Economic Development</u>						
6A-Self Help	178	728	- 550	1728	329	+1399
6B-Public Work	164	661	- 497	1774	275	+1499
6C-Econ. Improvement	148	676	- 528	1705	210	+1495
<u>Overall Scores</u>						
Security (1-3)	231	2006	-1775	2093	233	+1860
Development (4-6)	320	946	- 626	1685	203	+1482
Total Scores	203	1575	-1372	1906	172	+1734

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 4

VC/NVA ACTIVITIES

		Total 1967	Total 1968	1968			
				1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q
<u>Attacks</u> a/	By Size:						
	Bn. Size	54	126	64	33	27	2
	Other	2,422	3,795	1,473	1,234	567	521
	Total	2,476	3,921	1,537	1,267	594	523
b/	By type:						
	Ground Assaults	1,482	1,341	635	346	198	162
a/	Attacks by fire	1,003	2,376	857	786	374	359
<u>Incidents:</u>							
	Harassment	19,231	18,233	5,489	5,674	3,671	3,399
	Terror	1,963	1,047	341	249	218	239
	Sabotage	1,443	1,609	864	566	133	46
	Propaganda	801	102	68	24	4	6
	Anti-aircraft fire	13,290	13,078	4,268	3,534	2,544	2,732
<u>Total Attacks & Incidents</u>		39,204	37,990	12,567	11,314	7,164	6,945

a/ Source: OSD SEA Statistical Summary.

b/ Source: DIA - figures are approximate only.

General Assessment of 1969 Pacification Program

Prognosis for achieving 90% A-B-C population. The GVN and MACV hope to bring 90% of SVA's population up to A-B-C ratings in the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) by December 31, 1969. If the momentum of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) could be carried forward into 1969, success would be relatively easy. MACV has stated, however, that the lack of enemy countermoves produced much of the APC's success. Another problem is that 1968 HES data suggests that as the GVN moves out to more contested areas, success will become more difficult.

To achieve 90% A-B-C population countrywide, the GVN must raise urban control from 95% to 100%, and rural control from 65% to 84%. To achieve these goals, Table 5 indicates that D-E-VC rural population will have to be upgraded to A-B-C at the rate of 191,000 people per month - 180% of the 105,000 per month rate during March-September, a period of moderate to high enemy activity, but only 40% of the rate achieved during the APC, a period of very low enemy activity.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 5

HES A-B-C POPULATION (In Thousands)

	<u>31 March 68</u>	<u>30 Sep 68</u>	<u>31 Dec 68</u>	<u>Goal</u> <u>31 Dec 69</u>
<u>Total SVN</u>				
A-B-C Population	10471	11671	13339	16150
% of Total	61.0%	66.7%	76.3%	90%
A-B-C Pop. Gained	+1200	+1668	+2811	
A-B-C Pop. Gained per Month	+ 200	+ 556	+ 234	
<u>Rural SVN</u>				
A-B-C Population	4900	5530	7052	9343
% of Total	45.6%	51.3%	65.1%	84.1%
A-B-C Pop. Gained	+ 630	+1522	+2291	
A-B-C Pop. Gained per Month	+ 105	+ 507	+ 191	
<u>Urban SVN</u>				
A-B-C Population	5571	6141	6287	6807
% of Total	85.7%	91.7%	94.7%	100%
A-B-C Pop. Gained	+ 570	+ 146	+ 520	
A-B-C Pop. Gained per Month	+ 95	+ 49	+ 43	

The remaining 5% of the urban population, mostly rated D, may be fairly easy to upgrade. Of the 19% of the rural population to be upgraded, on the other hand, 4/5ths live in areas where VC undercover (infrastructure) agents are still very active (i.e., rated D-E on the HES Hamlet Infrastructure Indicator), and the rest live in hard-core VC hamlets, most of which were controlled by the Viet Minh for many years.

Strength and Vulnerabilities. The GVN pacification program, while stronger now than ever before, still has some key vulnerabilities which threaten to erase APC gains.

Pacification program strengths include:

- (1) Increased friendly to enemy force ratio for the RF/PF. MACV estimates that GVN territorial forces will start 1969 with a 6.6 to one advantage over opposing VC forces, versus a 4.8 to one a year ago. These figures include the GVN's overhead forces, however, and include forces tied down defending province, district, and military headquarters.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(2) The events of 1968 (VC Tet offensive, President Johnson's March 31 speech, Paris talks) have shocked the GVN into a greater sense of urgency. President Thieu understands the critical political importance of pacification, and is exerting strong personal pressure on all levels of the GVN to focus plans, resources, and energy on pacification. In 1968 the GVN replaced 21 province and 92 district chiefs for corruption or inefficiency, but we have no estimates of the effect this had on GVN effectiveness in the countryside.

(3) Increased US role in pacification. Prior to the APC, only .5% of US operations and 5% of US expenditures in South Vietnam supported pacification. During the APC, MACV commanders estimated that half their operations supported pacification; if this rate were continued throughout the year, 22% of US expenditures would go toward pacification.

Pacification program vulnerabilities include:

(1) NVA units in SVN. Commitment of the NVA main force units would not only draw away some of the present US and regular RVNAF military support of pacification, but could result in fewer RF/PF being left to defend hamlets and villages. At present, 46% of RF and 78% of PF are assigned to provide population security from VC local forces and guerrillas.

(2) VC infrastructure. At village and hamlet level, the GVN has about 38,000 members of its political infrastructure while the VC has 70,000 or more of its political infrastructure. (If the 25,000 RD cadre engaged in political and development work in rural areas are included for the GVN, the ratio becomes 63,000 GVN versus 70,000 VC.) In any event, using end-November HES data, as much as 79% of the SVN rural population was subject to influence by the VC/NLF infrastructure: 21% in VC controlled hamlets, 25% rated D-E and 33% rated C on the HES infrastructure indicator (2A).

(3) APC follow up programs. The GVN "entered" all of the 1,332 APC hamlets, and established functioning local governments in 84% of them. We do not know whether US-GVN follow up programs (military and civil) will have much effect on the political loyalties of the people, who are reluctant to show allegiance to either side for fear of reprisals. Political consolidation of population control gains is hampered further by the lack of effective political cadre, and the ambitious 1969 goals (90% A-B-C population) will require spreading these assets very thin with the risk of losing prior gains.

Resources involved in pacification. The table below indicates the total personnel resources available to pacification. In cases where only part of the available personnel are actually committed to full time direct support of pacification, the approximate percentage is indicated; absence of a percentage indicates all of the personnel are working on pacification.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 6

PERSONNEL AVAILABLE FOR PACIFICATION

<u>GVN</u>	<u>End 1967</u>	<u>End 1968</u>
ARVN - Assigned Combat Strength	140,815	180,449
% of maneuver bns. in direct support of RD	35%	16%
RF - Present for Duty Combat Strength	85,330	119,942
% of companies on pop. security missions	50%	46%
PF - Present for Duty Combat Strength	126,871	148,454
% of platoons on pop. security missions	79%	78%
RD Cadre	49,380	59,653
PRU	3,433	5 32
National Police	70,291	78,431
People's Self Defense Forces	None Organized	1,000,000
% armed and trained	-	11%
<u>US</u>		
Military pacification advisory personnel	Unk	About 5,900
Civilian pacification advisory personnel	Unk	Under 1,500
Combat forces (maneuver battalion strength)	88,500	96,500
% of operations in direct support of pacification	Under 1%	About 50% during APC

We do not have detailed direct and indirect costs of US support to pacification, but they were estimated to be about 5% of the total US yearly budget for SVN before the APC. During the APC, with half of US combat forces assisting pacification, pacification support rose to about 22% (annualized rate) of the US budget.

Ways enemy could counter pacification progress. The enemy has a number of options open to him which could impact severely on pacification progress if not met quickly.

(1) Large scale main force offensives to draw US and ARVN and some RF/PF forces away from their territorial security support role. This action could leave some population centers more vulnerable to small scale attacks and heightened terrorist activities.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(2) Launch a full scale offensive against key population centers. While this tactic proved militarily unsuccessful during last year's VC Tet offensive, it had strong psychological impact by demonstrating GVN inability to protect the population.

(3) Increase guerrilla and terrorist campaigns in the countryside, targeting GVN infrastructure. These activities have been continuing at a low to moderate level..

(4) Attack APC hamlets and other selected pacification success areas to challenge the GVN's tenuous hold on these areas only recently removed from "VC" and "contested" categories. Despite captured documents which tell of VC plans to disrupt pacification, the enemy did not seriously challenge the GVN's moves during the APC.

Comment:

A summary and assessment of pacification different than the one published in the January 1969 Southeast Asia Analysis Report is available in the 1968 Year-End Review of Vietnam, chapter 5 (S), published by the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 15 January 1969, two volumes.

CONFIDENTIAL

July 69

CONFIDENTIAL

PACIFICATION PROGRESS REPORT

April reports from MACV indicate that the 1969 pacification program began about one month later than planned, but may still be able to meet the December goal of making 90% of the population "relatively secure."

1. Increased enemy activity in the first quarter of 1969 appears to have slowed pacification progress somewhat: the percent of population upgraded to A-B-C ("relatively secure") decreased from 3% per month, Nov 68-Jan 69, to 1.3% per month, Feb 69-Apr 69. The rate is still high enough to achieve 90% relatively secure population in 1969 if enemy activity remains at current levels.

2. Pacification resources are being spread even thinner for the 1969 program than they were for the APC. The GVN has assigned about twice as many RF, PF and RD cadre teams to support the 1969 pacification program as were available for the 1968 APC, but these forces have to cover 2.5 times as many target hamlets by the end of 1969. The extra RF and PF are moving from other assignments in relatively secure areas, where People's Self Defense Forces (PSDF) are now helping to provide territorial security. The extra RD cadre teams were formed in February by splitting the 779 59-man teams into 1456 30-man teams.

3. The GVN appears to be getting stronger at the village level, but HES data shows that the GVN probably will not achieve the 1969 goal of establishing a significant GVN presence in all villages of RVN.

Relatively Secure Population Trends

The enemy offensive during the three-week period February 22 - March 15 appears to have slowed the rate at which D-E-VC population is being upgraded to A-B-C. Table 1 shows that since February 1, the official start of the 1969 pacification program, 1.3% of the RVN population has been upgraded to A-B-C each month, compared to 3.0% per month during the APC. The 1.3% monthly rate is still higher than the .9% rate required to achieve the end-December 1969 goal of extending relative security to 90% of the RVN population. If enemy activity does not increase substantially, the GVN should be able to achieve its 1969 goal.

TABLE 1

HES POPULATION DATA Percent of Population "Relatively Secure"

	<u>Oct 68</u>	<u>Avg Inc Per Mo.</u>	<u>Jan 69</u>	<u>Avg Inc Per Mo.</u>	<u>Apr 69</u>	<u>Avg Inc Per Mo.</u>	<u>Dec 69 Goal</u>
Urban Population	93%	1.0%	96%	.3%	97%	.4%	100%
Rural Population	56%	4.3%	69%	2.0%	75%	1.3%	84%
Total Population	70%	3.0%	79%	1.3%	83%	.9%	90%

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

All types of overt enemy activity stepped up sharply in the first quarter of 1969 over the last quarter of 1968. For instance, terror incidents, many of which directly affect pacification, increased 32%, from 239 incidents in the 4th quarter 1968 to 315 incidents in the 1st quarter 1969. The increased enemy activity slowed progress on the two HES indicators which measure GVN elimination of VC activity: VC Military Incidents and VC Political/Subversive Activity. Table 2 shows that these two indicators had the smallest increase of all the 18 indicators in the A-B-C categories between December 31, 1968, and March 31, 1969. The enemy is making new plans to try to disrupt the pacification program, according to captured documents and agent reports; these activities may have already slowed progress on some of the other 16 HES indicators.

Pacification Resources

In February the 59-man RD cadre teams were reorganized into 30-man teams in order to provide maximum coverage to hamlets in target villages. Although efforts were made to permit RD cadres to serve permanently in their native villages, the reorganization resulted in confusion over assignments and missions which delayed actual deployment of teams about 1-2 months. In addition, MACV reports that RD cadre desertions increased sharply in March, possibly as a result of (1) the planting season, during which many cadre take unauthorized leave, and (2) increased VC military action against RD cadre teams.

The GVN reorganized other pacification resources quickly for the 1969 program, but its success will depend in part on the untested abilities of the People's Self Defense Forces (PSDF) to fill in for PF moved to target hamlets. Table 3 shows that RF/PF are being deployed even thinner for the 1969 program than they were for the APC: even though the GVN assigned twice as many RF/PF to protect pacification target hamlets, each platoon will have to protect 1.2 hamlets instead of 1.0. The RF/PF may have time to adjust, however, since the hamlets will be upgraded in two consecutive groups (Phase I - 1835, Phase II - 1281). Other forces, principally People's Self Defense Forces, are providing territorial security in the areas left behind. The PSDF are poorly armed (only one man in five organized will have a weapon, mostly M-1 rifles), but in some areas are showing remarkable enthusiasm and commitment.

CONFIDENTIAL

129

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 2

CHANGES IN POPULATION RATED A-B-C ON HES INDICATORS
DECEMBER 31, 1968 - MARCH 31, 1969
(Population in Thousands - RVN Total 17,224)

<u>Indicator</u>	<u>A-B-C a/ Dec 68</u>	<u>A-B-C b/ Mar 69</u>	<u>Change</u>
<u>VC Military Activities</u>			
1A-Village Guerrillas	12,973	13,531	+ 558
1B-Main Forces	11,746	12,525	+ 779
1C-Incidents	13,226	13,494	+ 268
<u>VC Political & Subversion</u>			
2A-Hamlet Infrastructure	11,996	12,834	+ 838
2B-Village Infrastructure	12,119	12,883	+ 764
2C-Activities	13,583	13,855	+ 272
<u>Friendly Capabilities</u>			
3A-Defense Plan	12,677	13,545	+ 868
3B-Reinforcement	13,300	13,813	+ 513
3C-Internal Security	12,490	13,067	+ 577
<u>Admin. & Political</u>			
4A-GVN Management	13,361	14,053	+ 692
4B-Census Grievance	12,352	12,933	+ 581
4C-Information	12,451	13,407	+ 956
<u>Services</u>			
5A-Health	11,991	12,712	+ 721
5B-Education	13,286	13,750	+ 464
5C-Welfare	11,856	12,621	+ 765
<u>Economic Development</u>			
6A-Self Help	12,423	13,088	+ 665
6B-Public Works	10,368	10,996	+ 628
6C-Economic Improvement	10,137	10,516	+ 379
<u>Overall Scores</u>			
Security (1-3)	13,332	14,001	+ 669
Development (4-6)	12,434	13,283	+ 849
Total (1-6)	13,339	14,137	+ 798

a/ Includes 3,025,000 GVN controlled non-hamlet population.

b/ Includes 2,627,000 GVN controlled non-hamlet population.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 3

RF/PF ASSIGNED TO PACIFICATION TARGET HAMLETS

	<u>APC (As of 26 Dec 68) a/</u>	<u>1969 Pacification Program b/</u>
RF Companies c/	204	534
PF Platoons	660	1034
RF/PF Equivalent Platoons	1272	2636
No. of Target Hamlets	1263	3116
No. Hamlets per Platoon	.99	1.18

a/ Source: COMUSMACV message 44492, dtd 261305Z Dec 68.

b/ From GVN Pacification Program for 1969, presented to the Cabinet on 28 February 1969.

c/ RF companies have 3 rifle platoons per company.

Local Government

The GVN has many programs underway whose goal is to bring local government to all villages of RVN and to strengthen existing governments. GVN/HES data shows, however, that 13% of the villages of RVN have no government at all (Table 4), and 27% do not have sufficient GVN presence to permit even one component hamlet to be rated relatively secure (Table 5). At the current rate of improvement (17 fewer "pure D-E-VC" villages per month), there will still be 370 villages (16%) with no significant GVN presence at the end of 1969.

TABLE 4

GVN VILLAGE GOVERNMENT DATA

<u>Type of Village Government</u>	<u>No. of Villages (% in Parentheses)</u>			
	<u>June 67</u>	<u>Jan 69</u>	<u>Mar 69</u>	<u>(Planned) Dec 69</u>
Elected	1045(41)	1111(44)	1700(67)	1830(72)
Appointed Government	N/A	N/A	500(20)	370(15)
No Government/Other	N/A	N/A	337(13)	337(13)
Total Villages	2537	2537	2537	2537

CONFIDENTIAL

131

CONFIDENTIAL

In 1969 the GVN is holding local elections in about half (719) of the 1426 villages which had appointed governments or no governments at the start of the year, bringing the total with elected governments to 1830 (72% of the 2537 villages recognized by the GVN). In addition, some powers formerly held by the province and district chiefs are being shifted down to the village; for instance, the Chairman of the Village Administrative Committee ("city manager") will receive operational control over RD cadre and PF. Under recent GVN decrees, however, "villages or hamlets that are underpopulated can be merged into adjacent ones." This decree allows GVN officials to annex contested hamlets to "relatively secure" villages. In this way, the GVN village administrations can extend government services to the annexed hamlets; however, annexation alone cannot make the contested hamlets more secure. Also, since qualified citizens are reluctant to run for office (there were 5 candidates for every 3 offices in March 1969), the GVN has encouraged RVNAF and RD personnel with two or more years of service to run for office.

TABLE 5

HES VILLAGE SECURITY DATA

<u>Village Type</u>	<u>No. of Villages (% in Parentheses)</u>			
	<u>Oct 68</u>	<u>Jan 69</u>	<u>Feb 69</u>	<u>Mar 69</u>
All Hamlets Rated A-B-C	793(33)	1007(45)	1106(46)	1123(47)
Mixed A-B-C and D-E-VC Hamlets	635(27)	585(24)	590(25)	609(26)
Subtotal	1428(60)	1672(69)	1696(71)	1732(73)
All Hamlets Rated D-E-VC	824(35)	558(24)	541(22)	524(21)
Other (All Hamlets Unevaluated or Uninhabited)	127(5)	178(7)	159(7)	132(6)
Total Villages	2379	2408	2396	2388

CONFIDENTIAL

June 69

CONFIDENTIAL

EFFECTS OF THE 1968 ACCELERATED PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN

Summary. Only 8% of the hamlets in the Accelerated Pacification Campaign last fall had regressed in HES security ratings by April 30 of this year, despite an 86% increase in VC assassinations targeted against those hamlets (compared with a 24% country-wide increase in 1st quarter 1969 assassinations). MACV reports for May indicate that the GVN will probably not be able to achieve all of its ambitious 1969 pacification programs. Only the programs to enter target hamlets, hold elections, and induce ralliers are on or ahead of schedule. The Phoenix program to eliminate the VC infrastructure is falling behind schedule in II and III CTZ.

Background

After the August 1968 enemy offensive failed to halt pacification progress, US and GVN officials decided to take advantage of the increasing atmosphere of confidence by launching a special 3-month Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) to seize the initiative from the enemy and expand GVN control in rural areas. Over 1,000 D, E, and VC rated hamlets were targeted for security upgrading and the initiation of simple development projects. The project was to run from November 1, 1968, to January 31, 1969. The campaign was successful in moving at least some US/GVN forces into or near all target hamlets by January 31, in extending village government services to all target hamlets, and in setting up elected hamlet officials in 41% of the target hamlets. Some of the apparent reasons for this success were:

- (1) Lack of enemy opposition. Enemy activity was very low during the last quarter of 1968.
- (2) US combat unit participation. MACV placed command emphasis at all levels on providing security in target areas and support for GVN forces during the APC.
- (3) Simple campaign goals. With emphasis on security and simple development projects, activities needed to be coordinated with very few of the South Vietnamese government service agencies. GVN province and district chiefs could concentrate all their resources on straightforward tasks in a relatively few target hamlets.
- (4) Deemphasis of the regular 1968 pacification program, and postponement of 1969 program planning. Province and district chiefs could shift pacification resources from their regular 1968 pacification projects to the APC. Furthermore, the GVN delayed the 1969 start date from January 1 to February 1 to allow completion of the APC.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(5) Emphasis on quick results and "developing momentum for 1969," rather than long-term security and development projects. GVN pacification forces assigned to APC target hamlets could look forward to moving on to 1969 hamlets after January 31, and were required only to achieve minimum security standards (e.g., "C" level HES security scores) before leaving.

HES Results in Target Hamlets

We compared Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) security scores in APC target hamlets with scores in non-target hamlets before and after the APC. We found that while ratings improved to A-B-C for about 70% of the APC target hamlets, the momentum of the APC and other military and development activities also upgraded 12% of non-target hamlets to A-B-C ratings. Table 1 shows that 70% (904) of some 1300 APC target hamlets improved to A-B-C ratings during the campaign, and all but six (898) were still A-B-C on April 30. At the same time, 1371 or 12% of over 11,000 non-target hamlets improved to A-B-C, most (75% or 1022 hamlets) improving to A-B ratings.

TABLE 1

HES SECURITY SCORES BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER THE 1968 ACCELERATED PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN

	<u>Number of Hamlets ^{a/}</u>			
	<u>Before:</u>	<u>During:</u>	<u>After:</u>	<u>Net Change</u>
	<u>30 Sep 68</u>	<u>31 Jan 69</u>	<u>30 Apr 69</u>	
<u>APC Target Hamlets</u>				
A-B	15	135	170	+155
C	215	999	958	+743
D-E	692	157	168	-524
VC	307	9	6	-301
Sub-Total	1229	1300	1302	+ 73
Other	35	11	9	- 26
Total	1264	1311	1311	+ 47
<u>Non-Target Hamlets</u>				
A-B	1968	2803	2990	+1022
C	2977	3100	3326	+ 349
D-E	1862	1285	1323	- 539
VC	3634	2841	2307	-1327
Sub-Total	10441	10029	9946	- 495
Other	1118	1657	1138	+ 20
Total	11559	11686	11084	- 475
Total	12823	12997	12395	- 428

^{a/} Forty-seven (47) more APC target hamlets were identified in the HES after initial 30 September GVN reports.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Terrorist Incidents During and After the APC

The VC continue to use terrorism to assert their presence against the GVN pacification program. In 1968 MACV set up the Terrorist Incident Reporting System (TIRS) automated reports to provide better reports of VC terrorism.^{1/} About two-thirds (64-71%) of the TIRS incident reports have detailed location information, including UTM coordinates to the nearest 100 meters and the identification number of the nearest hamlet. We based the conclusions below on assassination incidents with reported locations. Other terrorist incidents (abductions, woundings, destroyed/damaged incidents, harassment) followed patterns similar to assassinations, but in some cases were less striking.

The main finding is that APC hamlets were hit harder by assassinations after the APC than non-APC hamlets, or the population as a whole. Assassinations countrywide fell off about 15% during the period of the APC (fourth quarter 1968) from 663 incidents in the third quarter 1968 to 564 in the fourth quarter (Table 2). This tied in with the general decline of enemy activity which was reportedly a major factor in the APC's immediate success. Assassinations rose sharply (24% over pre-APC levels) after the APC, with the APC hamlets suffering the most (assassination incidents rose to 104, 86% over pre-APC level of 56). This trend was substantiated in HES reports. In every HES security category, APC target hamlets showed a greater increase in assassination incidents than hamlets not emphasized in the campaign. Thus, part of the enemy reaction to the APC appears to be an assassination campaign specifically targeted against APC hamlets. On the whole, however, APC gains generally withstood enemy counterattacks; Table 3 shows that only 8% of APC hamlets regressed to lower HES ratings during January-April 1969.

The APC vs. 1969 Results to Date

MACV reports for May indicate the GVN will apparently be unable to meet all of its ambitious 1969 pacification goals, which were largely based on extrapolations of APC accomplishments.^{2/} Momentum was lost during February and March as the Tet holidays interrupted planning and redeployments. Table 4 summarizes statistical progress toward specific 1969 goals, and Table 5 shows MACV's overall assessment of the pacification program. Only the programs to enter target hamlets, hold elections, and induce ralliers are on or ahead of schedule. The crucial Phoenix program to eliminate VC infrastructure is falling behind schedule in II and III CTZ. The GVN Joint General Staff (JGS) estimates 100,000 more FF will be required to nail down gains made and to maintain the momentum of expansion.

^{1/} See "Terrorism in SVN" elsewhere in this issue.

^{2/} See also Analysis Report for May 1969, "Pacification Progress Report," p. 38.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 2

ASSASSINATION INCIDENTS ^{a/} BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER THE 1968 ACCELERATED PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN

	<u>Before</u> 3Q 1968	<u>During</u> 4Q 1968	<u>After</u> 1Q 1969	<u>% Change-</u> After vs. Before
<u>Near APC Target Hamlets b/</u>				
Rated A-B (15 hamlets)	0	1	0	
Rated C (215 hamlets)	14	10	24	+ 71%
Rated D-E-Other (727 hamlets)	40	29	61	+ 53%
Rated VC (307 hamlets)	2	18	19	+850%
Total (1264 hamlets)	56	58	104	+ 86%
<u>Near Non-Target Hamlets b/</u>				
Rated A-B (1968 hamlets)	57	54	91	+ 60%
Rated C (2977 hamlets)	156	126	187	+ 20%
Rated D-E-Other (2980 hamlets)	120	101	136	+ 13%
Rated VC (3634 hamlets)	37	38	44	+ 19%
Total (11,559 hamlets)	370	319	458	+ 24%
<u>Not Near Any Hamlets c/</u>				
Total	663	564	820	+ 24%

a/ Source: TIRS computer file. Includes selective and general assassinations. On the average, 2 civilians or officials were killed in each incident.

b/ Hamlet ratings from September 1968 HES reports. Same hamlets included for each quarter, even if HES ratings changed.

c/ UTM coordinates and HES ID number not reported.

TABLE 3

HES SECURITY IMPROVEMENT VS. REGRESSIONS IN APC HAMLETS

	<u>During APC:</u> 31 Oct - 31 Jan	<u>After APC:</u> 31 Jan - 30 Apr
<u>Improved</u>		
D-E-VC to A-B-C	747 (59%)	71 (5%)
Within D-E-VC	62 (5%)	6 (1%)
Within A-B-C	62 (5%)	68 (5%)
Total Hamlets Improved	871 (69%)	145 (11%)
<u>Regressed</u>		
A-B-C to D-E-VC	8 (1%)	77 (6%)
Within D-E-VC	3 (-)	2 (-)
Within A-B-C	3 (-)	28 (2%)
Total Hamlets Regressed	14 (1%)	107 (8%)
Net Hamlets Improved	+857 (+68%)	+38 (+3%)
<u>No Change/Other</u>	379 (30%)	1059 (81%)
<u>Total Hamlets</u>	1264	1311

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 4

PROGRESS TOWARD SELECTED PHASE I
1969 PACIFICATION TARGETS

Phase I Start Date: February 1, 1969
Phase I End Date: June 30, 1969

<u>Objective</u>	<u>Goal</u> <u>(End June)</u>	<u>Attained</u> <u>(End May)</u>	<u>Percent</u> <u>Achievement</u> <u>(Months</u> <u>Elapsed = 80%)</u>
Target Hamlets Entered	1,691	1,479	87%
VC Infrastructure Mem- bers Neutralized	9,000	4,506 <u>a/</u>	50%
People's Self Defense Force: Organized	1,730,000	Feb 1: 1,152,000 May 30: 1,360,000	36%
Armed	295,000	Feb 1: 205,000 May 30: 237,000	35%
Village Elections Held	569	625	110%
Hamlet Elections Held	3,117	3,163	101%
Chieu Hoi Ralliers	15,600	11,265	72%
Refugees Resettled	1,083,691	149,862	14%
Information Programs	Improve	Marginal Improvement	NA
Rural Economy	Stimulate	Adequate Progress	NA

Source: MACV/CORDS.
a/ As of April 30.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

LE 5

MACV ASSESSMENT OF PROGRESS TOWARD PHASE I 1969 PACIFICATION GOALS ^{a/}

<u>Program</u>	<u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>	<u>RVN</u>
1. Security (target hamlets)	Adequate	Good	Good	Adequate	Adequate
2. VCI Neutralizations	Adequate	Inadequate	Inadequate	Marginal	Marginal
3. People's Self Defense Forces	Marginal	Marginal	Marginal	Marginal	Marginal
4. Local government elections	Good	Good	Good	Good	Adequate
5. Chieu Hoi	Adequate	Marginal	Inadequate	Good	Good
6. Refugees	Adequate	Marginal	Adequate	Inadequate	Adequate
7. Information	Adequate	Marginal	Marginal	Adequate	Marginal
8. Rural Economy	Adequate	Adequate	Adequate	Adequate	Adequate

^{a/} Based on arbitrary four-step scale of: Good, Adequate, Marginal, and Inadequate.

CONFIDENTIAL
38

138

Jul 69

CONFIDENTIAL

MEASUREMENT OF SECURITY IN RVN

Summary. Although the GVN continues to make more population "relatively secure" each month, detailed Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) data shows that 38% of the RVN population still lives in hamlets subject to long-range fire at night, occasional sniping, and mines on roads into their hamlets. The ambiguity of HES security measurements is shown by comparing them with other information which indicates that the VC assassinate about 45 people in "secure" (A-B) hamlets every month, and still have one or more guerrilla platoons intact in 24% of the villages where HES reports VC control of the village broken and activity below platoon level. The HES, despite its defects, continues to be the best single source of data for following the security trends in South Vietnam.

Source of RVN Security Data. MACV reports are designed to measure various aspects of security in RVN. They include statistical reports such as the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES); the Terrorist Incident Reporting System (TIRS); MACV computerized intelligence reports of enemy-initiated activities; road, rail and waterway security reports; and narrative reports such as the monthly Province Senior Advisor's Report, and periodic intelligence reports.

The most useful reports for measuring security trends come from the HES, followed by the VC/NVA activities reports (including terror incidents in TIRS), with both supported by the narrative province reports. The road, rail, and waterway security reports are less helpful, because they only represent the situation on a single day (a snapshot, so to speak). Moreover, measurement of the security status of a line across the countryside is inherently difficult. Thus, results from the HES and VC activity data are the main basis for the analysis of security below.

HES Measurements of GVN Progress. The GVN now accepts HES statistics as the official measurement of the pacification program. For instance, President Thieu recently announced a Special 1969 Pacification and Development Campaign whose goal is to raise the percentage of hamlet population in A-B hamlets from 44% (June 30) to 50% (October 31). The previous goal, to raise 90% of the countrywide population to A-B-C by December 31, will be reached by the end of October if the 1969 progress rate shown in Table 1 continues.

TABLE 1

HES SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT RATINGS
(Population in Thousands)

<u>Hamlet Category</u>	<u>Jan 67</u>		<u>Jan 69</u>		<u>June 69</u>	
	<u>Pop</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Pop</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Pop</u>	<u>%</u>
A-B-C	10,192	62	13,755	79	14,826	86
D-E	3,378	21	1,624	9	1,295	7
VC	2,832	17	1,984	12	1,190	7
Total	16,402	100	17,363	100	17,311	100

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

The US district senior advisor still makes the evaluations of each hamlet on the 18 HES indicators, but he now consults more closely with his counterpart, the GVN district chief, using HES worksheets printed in both English and Vietnamese. As of June 30, US advisors reported that GVN district chiefs strongly disagreed with their ratings of only 4% of all hamlets (505 out of 12,116 hamlets).

Interpretation of HES Average Scores. The average score of all 18 HES indicators is widely used for convenience (as in Table 1, for instance), but is very difficult to interpret. A hamlet with average score "B", for instance, could have any rating from A to E on a single indicator, just so the average of all 18 indicators is a "B". Although MACV considers hamlets with average scores of A, B and C (A-B-C) to be "relatively secure," many examples doubtless exist of borderline C hamlets having D or E ratings on important security indicators.

We used two approaches to obtain a clearer understanding of what the HES average scores represent. First, using VC assassination data, we found that even the supposedly secure A-B hamlets have an average of 45 people killed by VC every month. Second, we found that 3.7 million of the 14.3 million population rated A-B-C or relatively secure in April 1969 (average of all indicators) were subject to long range fire at night, occasional sniping, or mines on roads during the month, according to the HES VC Military Incidents indicator. Thus, a high average HES rating does not mean complete security.

Table 2 shows VC/NVA assassination incidents which are known to have occurred in or near a hamlet, and indicates the average HES security ratings (first 9 indicators) for the hamlets in which assassinations occurred. It clearly indicates the problem of measuring security in Vietnam, because 203 assassination incidents, killing over 400 people, occurred in the hamlets rated most secure (A-B) during the 9 month period. Moreover, 517 incidents occurred in C hamlets, more than the 487 which occurred in D-E hamlets.

TABLE 2

ASSASSINATIONS IN OR NEAR HAMLETS a/

	<u>1968</u>		<u>1969</u>	
	<u>3rd</u>	<u>4th</u>	<u>1st</u>	<u>9 Month</u>
	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Hamlets b/</u>				
Rated:				
A-B	57	55	91	203
C	170	136	211	517
D-E	160	130	197	487
VC	39	56	63	158
Total	<u>426</u>	<u>377</u>	<u>562</u>	<u>1365</u>

a/ Source: TIRS computer file. Includes selective and general assassinations. On the average, 2 civilians or officials were killed in each incident.

b/ Hamlet ratings from September 1968 HES reports. Same hamlets included for each quarter, even if HES ratings changed.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

In Table 3 we compare the number of people in the A-B-C categories (average of 18 indicators) to the number of people meeting selected criteria on individual HES indicators in April 1969. For instance, an A-B rating obtained by averaging all 18 indicators is approximately equivalent to having no VC taxation in the hamlet, since about the same population achieved the A-B categories (8.5 million) as lived in hamlets with no VC taxation (8.6 million). Similarly, the A-B-C hamlet category appears to be equivalent to having no overt VC infrastructure (VCI) incidents in a hamlet (but some VC taxation or extortion suspected), or to a hamlet safe enough for hamlet officials usually to be present at night.

However, other indicators in Table 3 suggest that at least some hamlets rated A-B-C are subject to varying degrees of insecurity from VC military activities: While 14.3 million people (83% of countrywide) were rated A-B-C (average score), only 10.6 million (62%) had no nearby VC military incidents during the month; the remaining 6.6 million people (38%), including up to 3.7 million rated A-B-C (average score) were subject to long range fire at night, occasional sniping, or mines on roads leading to the hamlet. Viewed in this way, close to 40% of the total SVN population could be considered insecure, compared to the 14% figure implied in Table 1.

Confidence in Security Assessments. Our analysis above is valid only if we can have confidence in the basic HES indicator data. MACV has commissioned several different independent studies to validate and cross-check the advisor's ratings with other data and with the opinions of experts. These studies have generally shown that, while there may be differences of opinion on the ratings for particular hamlets, or differences between district advisors on scoring criteria, the HES data remains valid enough to measure trends. The studies also have shown a heavy reliance on GVN sources for the information used in scoring, and limitations stemming from differences in the training and linguistic abilities of the advisors themselves.

One MACV study required the advisors themselves to give factual data about the enemy guerrillas in some sample villages. We have compared the HES ratings on the VC Village Guerrilla Units indicator for a sample of 2143 hamlets in the same villages (Table 4). The data show that the HES indicator gives only an approximate description of conditions, probably because it is vaguely worded and subject to wide interpretations. Furthermore, it shows that the HES indicator ratings often overstate as well as understate actual security: A "C" rating is supposed to mean that VC village guerrillas operate at less than platoon size, yet 24% of hamlets rated C were in villages where advisors reported there were one or more platoons able to operate. On the other hand, a "D" or "E" rating is supposed to mean that VC guerrillas may actually have military control of the village, yet 12% of hamlets rated D-E were in villages with only a squad or less of VC guerrillas capable of operating.

141

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 3

HES TOTAL SCORE RATINGS VERSUS
SELECTED HAMLET CONDITIONS
As of April 30, 1969

HES Category	Population Included ^{a/}		Hamlet Conditions for Population Included	
	Pop. (Millions)	%	Indicators Involved	Rating and Interpretation in HES Handbook
A-B Ratings	4.0	23%	2A, 2B	A-B ratings on both hamlet & village VCI - VCI "largely eliminated".
	6.3	36%	1A,1B,1C,2C	A-B ratings on all four indicators - VC forces & activities not likely to repenetrate hamlet.
	6.7	39%	3C,4A,4B	A-B ratings on all three indicators - effective internal security, local government, census grievance.
	6.9	40%	2A	A-B rating on hamlet VCI - all hamlet VCI effectively eliminated, though village VCI may still operate.
	8.5	49%	(All 18)	"Secure," or simply "A-B".
	8.6	50%	Problem Area 8A	No VC taxation in hamlet.
	10.6	62%	1C	A-B rating on VC military incidents - no incidents in hamlet during month.
	11.8	68%	3C,4A,4B	A-B-C rating on all three indicators - at least marginally functioning internal security, local government, census grievance.
	12.8	74%	1B	A-B-C rating on VC main forces - no company size VC operations or any mortar fire during month.
	13.8	80%	1A,1B,3A,3B	A-B-C ratings on friendly forces wherever enemy forces rated D-E - no more security forces needed.
A-B-C ("Relatively Secure")	14.1	82%	2C	A-B-C rating on VCI activities - some VC taxation or extortion suspected, but no overt incidents.
	14.2	83%	4A	A-B-C rating on local GVN government activities - appointed hamlet management group usually present at night.
	14.3	83%	(All 18)	"Relatively secure".

^{a/} Secure non-hamlet (city) population of 2.6 million included.

Hamlet Cond
Population

Population
or if "rel
VCI can ca
Population
if "relati
ject to VC

GVN interne
government
either not
only margi
Some or all
village on
still open
identified

"C", contes

Population
by VC, or
known.
Either VC
to long r
occasional
on roads.
GVN govern
non-exist

VC main fo
in distri
size oper

Population
"relative
forces an

Controlled
during pe
predomin

GVN offic
or presen

Contested

CONFIDENTIAL

142

2

Hamlet Conditions for Population Excluded	Population Excluded	
	Pop. (Millions)	%
Population contested or VC, or if "relatively secure," VCI can cause regression.	13.2	77%
Population contested or VC, or if "relatively secure," sub- ject to VC penetration.	10.9	64%
GVN internal security, local government & census grievances either not working, or working only marginally.	10.5	61%
Some or all of hamlet VCI under village or district control still operative, even if mostly identified.	10.3	60%
"C", contested, or VC .	8.7	51%
Population controlled or taxed by VC, or taxation status un- known.	8.6	50%
Either VC controlled or subject to long range fire at night, occasional sniping, or mines on roads.	6.6	38%
GVN governmental management either non-existent or ineffective.	5.4	32%
VC main forces 75-100% intact in district, can make company size operations.	4.4	26%
Population contested or VC, or if "relatively secure", more security forces are needed.	3.4	20%
Controlled or terrorized by VC during past month; VC taxation predominant.	3.1	18%
GVN officials either non-existent or present only in daytime.	3.0	17%
Contested or VC	2.9	17%

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 4

ENEMY GUERRILLA UNITS PRESENT IN VILLAGE VERSUS HES INDICATOR RATINGS ^{a/} (As of January 1969)

HES Indicator 1A (VC Village Guerrillas) Rating for Sample Hamlets

	A-B		C		D-E	
HES Worksheet Description	Village guerrillas control only 1-2 hamlets on periphery of village; could make des- <u>peration raid</u>		Activity below platoon level; can harass but not prevent GVN activities in hamlet		Guerrillas may have military control of village; can attack in platoon strength from within village.	
Size of VC Guerrilla Threat in Village Reported by District Advisor:	No. of Hamlets	(%)	No. of Hamlets	(%)	No. of Hamlets	(%)
No Guerrillas	351	(40)	72	(8)	22	(6)
Less than a Squad	187	(21)	146	(17)	24	(6)
1-2 squads	235	(26)	426	(49)	160	(42)
1-2 platoons	103	(12)	196	(22)	146	(36)
3 or more platoons	1	(0)	18	(2)	15	(4)
Unk/No Report	9	(1)	16	(2)	16	(4)
	<u>886</u>	<u>(100)</u>	<u>874</u>	<u>(100)</u>	<u>383</u>	<u>(100)</u>

^{a/} For selected sample of 2143 hamlets either participating in 1968 Accelerated Pacification Campaign, or attaining A-B-C overall hamlet category.

MACV recognizes the ambiguities of the current HES worksheet, and is now field testing a new worksheet which asks detailed, factual questions which can usually be answered with little or no subjective interpretation. If the July-September field tests prove satisfactory, the new HES data will replace the current 18 indicators late this year. MACV is attempting to insure that the new data can be compared directly with the old data, so that trend analysis can proceed satisfactorily.

CONFIDENTIAL

Feb 70

PACIFICATION STATUS REPORT

Summary. The pacification program developed increasing momentum in 1969, but began to level off in the last quarter: A-B-C population expanded steadily at a rate of 1.6% per month during January-September, but slowed to .8% per month in October-December. Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF) and People's Self Defense Forces (PSDF) expanded and improved during the year, but National Police (NP) encountered manpower problems in meeting its 1969 goals.

Population and Area Security Statistics. Pacification momentum developed in 1969 as GVN Territorial Forces (RF/PF) expanded rapidly into newly cleared D, E, and VC hamlets in the first half of the year; the momentum leveled off after the expansion reached its maximum, and as VC forces began reasserting their influence in some rural areas in November and December. Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) security data in Table 1 shows that the percentage of population rated A-B-C (relatively secure) increased from 76% in December 1968 to 91% in September 1969, a steady rate of expansion of 1.6% per month. In the next three months, however, the increase slowed to half the January-September rate (to .8% per month). The same trends occurred in the A-B category: the percentage of population rated A-B (secure) increased from 31% to 54% in the first three quarters, but leveled off at 57% in the fourth quarter.

Area security data dramatically depicts the expansion of security: during the one year period September 1968-October 1969, Secure Areas (A-B), measured in square kilometers, increased 155% and the area within the Secure Area and Consolidation Zone (A-B-C) increased 60%. The expansion means that very little contested (D-E) or VC controlled population remains (only 9% of the rural population), but that territorial forces are now responsible for consolidating and preserving security in an area about 60% larger than one year ago. If security is extended in 1970 to the remaining D, E, and VC population, the area would increase to 94% larger than in September 1968.

145

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 1

POPULATION AND AREA SECURITY Based on HES Security Scores

<u>% of SVN Total Population</u>	<u>Dec 67</u>	<u>Dec 68</u>	<u>Sept 69</u>	<u>Oct 69</u>	<u>Nov 69</u>	<u>Dec 69</u>
A-B	28.2	30.8	53.6	57.1	57.0	57.4
A-B-C*	68.0	75.4	90.8	92.5	93.0	93.0
D-E	15.3	11.3	5.4	4.3	4.2	4.0
VC	16.7	12.3	3.8	3.2	2.8	2.7

* Non-hamlet population in major cities (Saigon, Hue, etc.) carried as "C" rated (relatively secure).

<u>% of SVN Rural Population</u>						
A-B	25.4	28.6	51.4	56.2	56.1	56.4
A-B-C	53.2	64.9	86.6	89.5	90.2	90.5
D-E	21.2	16.2	8.2	6.2	6.1	6.0
VC	25.6	18.9	5.2	4.3	3.7	3.5
		<u>Sept 68</u>		<u>Oct 69</u>		<u>% Change</u>

<u>Area in Km²</u>			
Secure Area (A-B) ^{a/}	1,572	4,013	+155%
Consolidation Zone (C)	17,405	26,423	+ 52%
Subtotal ^{b/}	18,977	30,436	+ 60%
Clearing Zone (D-E-VC)	23,059	6,436	- 72%
Subtotal Population ^{c/}	42,036	36,872	- 12%
Unpopulated	132,293	137,757	+ 4%
Total Area in SVN	174,629	174,629	

a/ No. of 1-km squares containing A-B hamlets.

b/ No. of 1-km squares containing A-B-C hamlets, plus adjacent 1-km squares.

c/ No. of 1-km squares containing A-B-C-D-E-VC hamlets, plus adjacent 1-km squares.

GVN Territorial Security. All evidence indicates that GVN territorial security forces improved significantly in quantity and quality during 1969. RF/PF tactical units expanded 18-19% in assigned strength and improved 2-6% in the percentage of units receiving high US advisor ratings on responsiveness and leadership (see Table 2). By the end of 1969, 95% of RF/PF present for duty had M-16 rifles, and 89-95% of the units had firepower rated equivalent or superior to VC forces in their area.

CONFIDENTIAL

146

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 2

TERRITORIAL FORCES IMPROVEMENT

	1968-1969					
	<u>Regional Forces (RF)</u>			<u>Popular Forces (PF)</u>		
	<u>Dec 68</u>	<u>Dec 69</u>	<u>% Change</u>	<u>Dec 68</u>	<u>Dec 69</u>	<u>% Change</u>
Total Strength Asgd	219,762	257,581	+17	172,536	210,380	+22
No. Tactical Units (RF Cos./PF Platoons)	1,119	1,473	+32	4,731	5,672	+20
Strength Asgd to Tactical Units	135,383	161,037	+19	160,214	189,311	+18
% Units Rated High In:						
Responsiveness	74	77	+ 3	65	71	+ 6
Leadership	61	63	+ 2	46	52	+ 6
Relative Firepower	71	95	+24	63	89	+26
No. Operations per Unit per Mo. (Average for Year)	48.4	69.1	+43	18.5	32.1	+74
No. Contacts per Unit per Mo. (Average for Year)	1.6	2.0	+25	.4	.6	+50
Kill Ratio (Total for Year)	4.6:1	4.0:1	-13	2.7:1	3.3:1	+22
Weapons Capt/Lost Ratio (Total for Year)	2.6:1	4.4:1	+69	1.0:1	3.0:1	+200

GVN Local Security - Police. Unless the National Police (NP) solves its manpower problems, the program to extend NP presence into local villages which began in 1969 cannot expand in 1970. Also, better training may be required in order to improve NP performance in rural areas, and to improve NP participation in Phoenix.

The NP failed to meet their 1969 goal of expanding to 92,200 total strength (December 1969 strength was 85,200) both because of difficulties in recruiting 13,000 volunteers for police service from within ARVN, and because ARVN retains first priority in the draft. Consequently expansion in 1969 was limited to only the National Police Field Forces (NFFF), and the NP available for assignment in the provinces remained constant at 36,000-37,000 (see Table 3). Unless new GVN priorities for manpower use are set, it appears unlikely that the NP can meet their 1970 goal of expanding by 30,000 men to (122,200)

CONFIDENTIAL

147

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 3

LOCAL SECURITY FORCES EXPANSION 1968-1969

	<u>Dec 68</u> ^{a/}	<u>Dec 69</u>	<u>Change</u>
<u>National Police (NP)</u>			
DGNP Hqs	11,100	10,300	- 800
Saigon	15,200	13,400	-1,800
Autonomous Cities	2,500	2,400	- 100
NP Field Forces (NPFF)	11,600	17,300	+5,700
Marine Police	1,800	2,100	+ 300
Detached	--	2,800	+2,800
Subtotal	42,200	48,300 ^{c/}	6,100
Available Within Provinces	36,200	36,900 ^{b/}	+ 700
Total Strength	78,400	85,200 ^{d/}	+6,800
<u>People's Self Defense Force (PSDF)</u>			
Armed	98,500	399,500	+ 301,000
Trained	517,000	1,898,000	+1,381,000
Organized	1,007,700	3,219,100	+2,211,400

- a/ NP data as of January 1, 1969 from MACV/CORDS Public Safety Division Personnel Statistics, January 31, 1969.
- b/ November 1969 data, from National Police Evaluation System (NPES), reported by MACV/CORDS, U-127 Report, December 1969.
- c/ Breakout by type estimated from September 1969 NPES.
- d/ Official GVN December 1969 total strength, from OASD(Comptroller), SEA Statistical Summary.

The NP program to achieve a strong presence in rural areas began successfully in 1969: by December, NP sub-districts had been organized in 1629 villages, with an average assignment of 4 police per village. If the NP expands to its programmed 122,200 level in 1970, the GVN hopes to organize NP stations in 1840 villages, and increase the number of police per village to 6-18 depending on population. There are no figures indicating how many of the 1629 sub-district stations are occupied day and night or have adequate physical facilities; however, a May 1969 CORDS study found that NP presence often consists of only daily visits rather than full time day-night presence, since to live overnight in a village means separation from family and no extra pay. No special funds have been provided for NP sub-district facilities or transportation. As a recent JCS report states, performance of NP in rural areas is not as good as in urban areas; the CORDS study points out that this may be due to (1) the lack of special rural training (the NP have not functioned in rural areas for years), (2) the fact that police do not normally volunteer for rural duty due to varying security conditions, and (3) the NP are not necessarily loyal to their village chief, since they are still paid through province and district channels.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

The NP participation in Phoenix is not yet satisfactory, although CORDS is making an effort to "Vietnamize" the anti-infrastructure program. Part of the problem is quality of US advisors: a CORDS study found that NFFC companies with good advisors far outperformed those with poorer advisors.

GVN Local Security - PSDF. The armed strength of the People's Self Defense Force (PSDF) increased dramatically in 1969, and the political purpose of the PSDF - to establish a mutual trust between the GVN and the people - was largely achieved. The 1970 program intends to improve the PSDF militarily by forming the 500,000 arms-bearing PSDF into 35-man interteams (platoons), and by training four men per team (60,000 in all) in one week courses. The plan should greatly strengthen those forces, provided the GVN can find the resources to train the 60,000.

Enemy Activities Affecting Pacification. The enemy's current strategy affects pacification in two ways: (a) his strategy of maintaining a generally low level of activity punctuated by an occasional "high point" causes localized setbacks in security, usually temporary, and (b) by building a decentralized force, capable of waging protracted political/military warfare, he is focusing his efforts against the GVN pacification program as opposed to purely military targets.

The "high point" strategy in late 1969 caused temporary security setbacks in rural areas, but did not seriously affect the GVN's military and political control in the countryside. Table 4 shows that enemy attacks, incidents, and assassinations all reached a relative high point in November 1969. At the same time, the Chieu Hoi rate began to decline, possibly suggesting an increase in enemy control procedures in some areas in anticipation of future activities. As a result, the VSSG indicator measuring the absence of enemy activity in the countryside^{1/} showed a 1% dip in November (from 55.7% of the population rated low in enemy activity in October to 54.5% in November), but recovered by December (to 55.2%). The VSSG indicator^{2/} measuring GVN military and political control in the countryside continued to show progress throughout the 4th quarter, indicating that GVN military and political control was generally strong enough to withstand the temporary rise in VC activity.

1/ A special indicator developed from the HES by the NSC-sponsored Vietnam Special Studies Group (VSSG) to measure the levels of enemy activity in the countryside.

2/ A special indicator developed by the VSSG to measure GVN control in the countryside (i.e., the population rated high in local security forces and village/hamlet chief presence, and low in VC guerrillas and infrastructure).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 4

INDICATORS OF ENEMY ACTIVITY

1969

(Monthly Average)

	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2nd Qtr</u>	<u>3rd Qtr</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>
<u>Enemy Incidents</u>						
Attacks by Fire	207	255	147	96	184	128
Engaged, Assault, Ambush	107	162	105	110	206	169
Total Attacks	314	417	252	206	390	297
Harassment, Sabotage, Terror	1215	1597	1088	910	1258	NA
<u>Enemy Assassinations</u>	653	561	454	306	430	340
<u>Chieu Hoi Ralliers</u>	3309	3568	4425	4992	4260	3234
<u>VSSG Indicators^{a/}</u>						
(% of Rural Population)						
Pop. with Low VC Activity	34.7	38.3	51.6	55.7	54.5	55.2
Pop. GVN Controlled	32.5	39.2	54.1	59.8	61.3	61.6
Pop. A-B HES Security	31.7	37.3	51.4	56.2	56.1	56.4

^{a/} Indicators from the HES developed by the NSC-sponsored Vietnam Special Studies Group (VSSG). End of quarter data used, 1st-3rd Qtr 1969.

CONFIDENTIAL

Feb 70

CONFIDENTIAL

HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM: 1970 REVISION

Summary. MACV has completed a two-year review of the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), and in January 1970 introduced a completely revised HES, called HES/70. The new HES/70 reports from July-December 1969 showed about 1% less A-B population and 4-6% less A-B-C population, and registered less sensitivity to changes in GVN pacification goals, than the HES showed for the same period. The difference probably arose because HES/70 is more objective and is reported in more detail than the old HES.

Because of criticisms of the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), MACV undertook a two year reassessment of it, and decided to implement a carefully revised system, called HES/70, starting in January 1970. MACV has briefed the concept of HES/70 to GVN officials, to US pacification advisors in the field, and to officials and analysts in Washington.

HES/70 attempts to overcome the identifiable biases which developed in three years of HES reporting; it asks US District Senior Advisors (DSAs) to supply facts, not subjective judgments (see six sample HES/70 questions in Appendix), and applies experts' rating criteria uniformly throughout the country to develop the composite HES/70 hamlet and village scores. The following table shows how the HES/70 differs from the old HES.

TABLE 1

<u>DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OLD HES AND HES/70</u>	
<u>"Old HES"</u> <u>January 1967-December 1969</u>	<u>HES/70</u> <u>(Tested July-December 1969)</u> <u>Begins January 1970</u>
<u>Summary:</u> Subjective "A-E" ratings by District Senior Advisors (DSAs)	<u>Summary:</u> Objective "factual" reports by DSAs; conversion to experts' A-E
37 multiple-choice questions per month per hamlet (18 indicators, 19 problem areas)	21 monthly hamlet questions 4 monthly village questions 56 quarterly hamlet questions 58 quarterly village questions
Training required to make ratings	Asks detailed questions about easily observed, verifiable facts
Different DSAs used different crite- ria at different times	Standard countrywide MACV rating crite- ria do not change over time
Gaps in coverage (e.g. economics, in- formation, education, land reform)	Covers all aspects of pacification (security, political, socio-economic)
DSAs disliked "unclear" rating criteria	DSAs prefer providing "facts," even though more detailed
Three-year data base	One-time discontinuity in trend lines; new starting data base resting on more realistic foundation.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

To obtain A, B, C, D, E, and VC ratings comparable to those in HES, HES/70 uses a uniform but complex weighting scheme built upon experts' judgments of 19 different aspects of pacification. The experts' judgments are converted to A, B, C, D, E, and VC scores by a standard mathematical technique (Bayesian probability analysis). The resulting population percentages from HES/70 and the older HES are compared in Table 2.

TABLE 2

1969 DATA FROM HES AND HES/70

	<u>1969</u> <u>July</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sept</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>
<u>A-B Ratings (%)</u>						
HES/70	49.4	49.6	51.1	54.4	52.9 ^{a/}	57.1
"Old HES"	42.3	48.0	51.4	55.1	56.7	57.5
Difference	+ 7.1	+ 1.6	- .3	- .7	- 3.8	- .4
<u>A-B-C Ratings (%)</u>						
HES/70	81.7	83.4	86.1	88.2	86.9 ^{a/}	87.2
"Old HES"	87.6	88.9	90.5	92.0	92.5	92.7
Difference	- 5.9	- 5.5	- 4.4	- 3.8	- 5.6	- 5.5

a/ Decrease from October probably due to accounting changes in the HES/70 system.

The data show that:

1. HES/70 rated 4-6% less population in the A-B-C ("relatively secure") category than HES throughout the period.
2. HES/70 A-B population improved at a much slower rate than HES A-B population during July-August 1969 when the G and US were placing command emphasis on increasing HES A-B population.
3. HES/70 A-B-C ratings showed a 1-2% drop in the enemy high-point months of November-December, while HES continued to show progress.

The differences probably arose because HES/70 is more objective than the HES, and therefore tends to "deflate" the rate of progress shown by the more subjective HES during a period of progress and optimism, or when command emphasis is placed on upgrading ratings. Moreover, HES/70 is more detailed, and can detect the more subtle changes which occur when the enemy changes his activities.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Since the HES/70 uses an entirely new data base, the HES/70 ratings vary somewhat from HES ratings when compared hamlet-by-hamlet or province-by-province. For example, MACV found that for October 1969, HES/70 rated 58% of all hamlets the same as HES, 24% lower than HES, and 18% higher than HES; 97% of the HES/70 hamlet ratings were within one letter grade of the HES rating. MACV also found that 38 of the 44 provinces in SVN achieved HES/70 ratings within 10% of HES ratings.

In the province with the greatest difference (Hau Nghia--38%), detailed analysis shows that the old HES ratings were probably "inflated," compared to the facts of the situation reported by the same DSAs in the HES/70 (see Table 3). HES rated 93% of Hau Nghia's population A-B-C, yet only 20% of the population was free from VC taxation, only 39% was free of armed enemy forces during the month, and only 37% had hamlet chiefs present day and night.

TABLE 3

HES AND HES/70 DATA FOR HAU NGHIA PROVINCE As of October 31, 1969

Rating Data

	<u>% Pop. Rated A-B</u>	<u>% Pop. Rated A-B-C</u>
HES/70	NA	55
"Old HES"	41	93
Difference	NA	-38

Facts from HES/70

	<u>% of Pop. Having Condition</u>
Hamlets where hamlet chief present at night	37
Population not subject to enemy taxation	20
Hamlets with active PSDF	74
Hamlets with no platoon size enemy force nearby	29
Hamlets where no armed enemy forces present during month	39
Hamlets with no regular overt VCI activity	52

HES/70 computer tapes will be sent to Washington monthly. When the first ones arrive, we will begin analysis to: (1) reassess the situation in the countryside, including effects of US redeployments, (2) examine HES/70 implications for our Area Security Concept forces and measurements, and (3) link old HES time series to HES/70 (if appropriate).

CONFIDENTIAL
5

APPENDIX

SIX SAMPLE HES/70 QUESTIONS

1. Is the GVN hamlet chief regularly present in this hamlet? (Answered quarterly for each hamlet)
 0. No
 1. No, irregularly
 2. Yes, regularly, but only by day
 3. Yes, regularly, day and night
 8. Not Applicable
 9. Unknown/Unable to Judge
2. Do enemy forces tax goods and produce moving to or from this village? (Answered quarterly for each village)
 0. No
 1. Yes, sporadically
 2. Yes, regularly
 8. Not Applicable
 9. Unknown/Unable to Judge
3. How active is the PSDF in this hamlet? (Answered quarterly for each hamlet)
 0. None organized
 1. Organized, but inactive
 2. Training and drills only
 3. Organized non-military activity only
 4. Standing armed guard in the hamlet
 5. Armed patrols and guard within the hamlet
 8. Not Applicable
 9. Unknown/Unable to Judge
4. What was the estimated size of the largest enemy local or main force unit present in or near inhabited areas of this village at any time during the month? (Answered monthly for each village)
 0. None
 1. Less than a platoon
 2. About a platoon
 3. About a company
 4. A battalion or more
 8. Not Applicable
 9. Unknown/Unable to Judge

(5. Were armed enemy military forces present in inhabited areas of this hamlet during the month? (Answered monthly for each hamlet)

- 0. No
- 1. Yes, once
- 2. Yes, sporadically
- 3. Yes, regularly
- 8. Not applicable
- 9. Unknown/Unable to Judge

6. Which of the following most closely reflects the activity of the village level VC infrastructure in the village? (Answered quarterly for each village)

- 0. No known or suspected infrastructure
- 1. Sporadic covert activity, little or no overt activity
- 2. Regular covert activity, sporadic overt activity
- 3. Regular overt activity, but not firmly established
- 4. Unchallenged authority in the village
- 8. Not Applicable
- 9. Unknown/Unable to Judge

CONFIDENTIAL

HES/70 DATA FOR JANUARY 1970

Summary. Data from the revised Hamlet Evaluation System (HES/70) for January 1970, the first official month of reporting, shows that A-B-C population continued to increase at the fourth quarter 1969 rate registered in the old HES--7% per month. A-B population, on the other hand, declined .1%, the second time HES/70 has shown a decline in A-B scores during its six months of testing and one month of official operation. January HES/70 data, the base month from which all future changes will be measured, also provides considerably refined data on the security status of the six autonomous cities.

HES Versus HES/70 Trends. An article last month ("Hamlet Evaluation System: 1970 Revision") described MACV's new HES/70 system, which is a more objective refinement of the three-year-old HES. Table 1 below compares composite pacification ratings from the two systems, and shows the first official month of HES/70 data (January 1970).

TABLE 1
POPULATION DATA FROM HES AND HES/70

	1969 HES/70 Test Period						1970 Jan
	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	
<u>A-B Ratings (%)^{a/}</u>							
HES/70	62.5	62.7	64.1	67.3	65.6 ^{b/}	69.6	69.5
Old HES	55.0	60.7	64.2	67.8	69.3	70.1	
Difference	+7.5	+2.0	-.1	-.5	-3.7	-.5	
<u>A-B-C Ratings (%)</u>							
HES/70	81.7	83.7	86.2	88.4	86.4 ^{b/}	87.2	87.9
Old HES	87.6	88.9	90.5	92.0	92.5	92.7	
Difference	-5.9	-5.2	-4.3	-3.6	-6.1	-5.5	

- a/ Includes Saigon as "B," based on HES/70 ratings for all precincts in Saigon by US Saigon Civil Assistance Group (SCAG) advisors in December 1969-January 1970.
- b/ Preliminary analysis by MACV-CORDS shows that most, but not all, of the decrease in November was due to accounting changes in the HES/70 system.

The data show that district advisors rated 87.9% of the South Vietnam population A-B-C in the HES/70 system in January 1970, up from 87.2% in the December 1969 HES/70 test data, but still 5% under the old HES ratings for December. On the other hand, A-B population dropped .1% (69.6% in December to 69.5% in January), the second time HES/70 has shown a decline in A-B scores.

Security, Political, Socio-Economic Scores. To investigate the possible causes for the decline in A-B population we examined the HES/70 data by Corps for each of the three main areas of Pacification: Security, Political and Socio-Economic. US advisors in the field now answer detailed, objective questions about each of these aspects of pacification, and the automated HES/70 scoring system computes A, B, C, D, E and VC ratings for each aspect (sub-model). The results are shown in Table 2. They indicated that security continued to improve in all four Corps, and political ratings improved in all but II Corps, but socio-economic ratings declined in all four Corps.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 2
PACIFICATION SUB-MODEL SCORES
December 1969 - January 1970

A-B (%) By CTZ	Sub-Models						Overall Pacification	
	Security		Political		Socio-Econ			
	Dec	Jan	Dec	Jan	Dec	Jan	Dec	Jan
I	70.5	72.7	69.9	70.4	26.5	25.4	63.3	64.7
II	53.0	64.9	69.6	67.7	46.8	43.2	63.2	61.0
III	82.1	82.5	83.2	83.2	81.6	78.9	86.8	87.1
IV	57.0	57.6	66.6	66.3	51.8	48.4	60.1	60.1
RVN	68.3	69.3	72.9	72.6	55.9	53.1	69.6	69.5

Without more detailed data in either hardcopy or computer tape form, we can only speculate about the exact reasons for the decline in socio-economic ratings. Among the events measured in HES/70 which could have caused a decline are:

--movement of population from more well-developed hamlets to newly-secured less-developed hamlets

--decreased accessibility of health stations, maternity clinics, hospitals, drugs, or medical service workers to village/hamlet residents

--decreased accessibility of schools, decrease in teachers relative to needs, increased overcrowding in schools

--increased corruption of local officials

--fewer Self Development projects started, or participation in projects down

--enemy taxation in villages/hamlets up, or GVN taxation down

--decreased availability of market goods, or village/hamlet/market activity down

--cultivation curtailed by security

--more families needing social welfare assistance

--decreased activity of village Land Reform Committees

Data on Autonomous Cities. The HES/70 system now collects detailed evaluation data on all population residing in urban areas, including those in the six autonomous cities. Table 3 shows that the autonomous cities were collectively rated 3% A, 92% B, and 5% C in January 1970. In the older HES, urban population which could not be allocated to specific hamlets (including the estimated 2.2 million people in Saigon), was arbitrarily designated C ("relatively secure") without any careful attempt to evaluate actual conditions.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 3

HES/70 RATINGS OF AUTONOMOUS CITIES As of January 1970

		A	B	C	D	E	VC	Non Evaluated	Total
Hue	- pop (000)		115.1	74.7					189.9
	%		60.6	39.4					100.0
Danang	- pop (000)		355.5	12.0				15.0	382.5
	%		93.0	3.1				3.9	100.0
Dalat	- pop (000)	23.4	54.2	4.5					82.0
	%	28.5	66.1	5.4					100.0
Cam Ranh	- pop (000)		52.3	45.8					98.1
	%		53.3	46.7					100.0
Vung Tau	- pop (000)	1.6	81.9						83.5
	%	1.9	98.1						100.0
Saigon	- pop (000)	65.0	2116.6	9.2				1.7	2192.5
	%	3.0	96.5	.4				.1	100.0
<u>Autonomous Cities Total</u>	- pop (000)	90.0	2775.6	146.2				16.7	3028.5
	%	3.0	91.6	4.8				.6	100.0
All Other	- pop (000)	1131.7	8264.3	3098.4	1429.7	109.4	384.9	196.0	14614.4
	%	7.7	56.6	21.2	9.8	.8	2.6	1.3	100.0
Total RVN	- pop (000)	1221.7	11039.9	3244.6	1429.7	109.4	384.9	212.7	17642.9
	%	6.9	62.6	18.4	8.1	.5	2.2	1.2	100.0

CONFIDENTIAL

Mar 70

HES/70 DATA FOR FEBRUARY 1970

TALKING POINTS

1. HES/70 summary data for February arrived last week
 - Detailed data (computer tapes) has not yet arrived, due to a defective tape
 - Trip to Saigon by 5 analyst/programmers was successful; will be ready to extract data for analysis when first good tapes arrive
2. A-B and A-B-C population continued to increase at fourth quarter 1969 rates (.6-.7% per month)
 - A-B-C population up .6% to 88.5%
 - A-P population up .6% to 70.1%
3. Security increased in all four Corps, but Political and Socio-Economic ratings remained at January levels
 - IV Corps lags in Security and Political ratings
 - I Corps is lowest in Socio-Economic ratings
4. Fact sheet shows first detailed data available from HES/70 questions (as of December 1969)
 - Hamlet chiefs reportedly present day and night in hamlets with 80% of population
 - Local villagers in PF and PSDF were the primary security force defending 70% of the population
 - Friendly military activities caused civilian deaths in 71 hamlets in December

HES/70 DATA FOR FEBRUARY 1970

Data from the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES/70) for February 1970 arrived last week in hard copy form from Saigon. A-B-C population continued to increase at the fourth quarter 1969 rate registered in the old HES: .6-.7% per month. The table below shows that 88.5% of the South Vietnam population was rated A-B-C in February 1970, up from 87.9% in January 1970. A-B population recovered from a .1% drop in January (69.5%) to a new high of 70.1% in February.

POPULATION DATA FROM HES AND HES/70

	1969 (HES/70 Test Period)						1970	
	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb
A-B Ratings (%) a/	62.5	62.7	64.1	67.3	65.6 ^{b/}	69.6	69.5	70.1
A-B-C Ratings (%)	81.7	83.7	86.2	88.1	86.4 ^{b/}	87.2	87.9	88.5

a/ Includes Saigon as "B," based on HES/70 ratings for all precincts in Saigon by US Saigon Civil Assistance Group (SCAG) advisors in December 1969-January 1970.

b/ Preliminary analysis by MACV-CORDS shows that most, but not all, of the decrease in November was due to accounting changes in the HES/70 system.

The trends noted last month in the three components of pacification -- Security, Political, and Socio-Economic -- continued in February (see table below). Security improved in all four Corps, but Political and Socio-Economic ratings remained at January levels. None of the Corps recovered from last month's declines in Socio-Economic ratings, and I Corps remains very low (only 25-26% rated A-B).

PACIFICATION SUB-MODEL SCORES
December 1969 - February 1970

A-B (%) By CTZ	Sub-Models									Overall Pacification		
	Security			Political			Socio-Econ			Dec	Jan	Feb
	Dec	Jan	Feb	Dec	Jan	Feb	Dec	Jan	Feb			
I	70.6	72.7	72.8	69.9	70.4	70.9	26.5	25.4	25.7	63.3	64.7	64
II	63.0	64.9	67.8	69.6	67.7	67.5	46.8	43.2	43.0	63.2	61.7	62
III	82.1	82.5	82.9	83.2	83.2	83.0	81.6	78.9	78.9	86.8	87.1	86
IV	57.0	57.6	59.2	66.6	66.3	66.6	51.8	48.4	48.9	60.1	60.1	61
RVN	69.3	69.1	70.7	71.7	71.6	72.6	35.9	53.1	53.1	69.6	69.5	70

While current detailed data is still not available, a tabulation of US District Senior Advisors' December 1969 responses to selected HES/70 questions will provide a useful base point for evaluation of later data. The tables on the next two pages show the following interesting points:

- Local villagers in the PF and PSDF are the primary local security force defending 70% of SVN's population. However, 61% of the population are in villages immediately adjacent to large GVN, US, or FVMAF bases.

- 54% of the population lived in hamlets completely free from VC taxation and recruitment at night; however, the VC have partial access to most of the rest of the hamlets, and 18% of the population lived in hamlets in which enemy military forces were present one or more times during the month.

- Hamlet chiefs for 80% of the population were regularly present day and night in their hamlets. This figure is somewhat higher than data collected from hamlet residents during a December MACV public opinion poll in B and C hamlets: 16% thought their officials stayed in their home every night, 43% thought their officials stayed in their home or PF outpost every night, and 33% thought their officials stayed at home or in PF outposts only "sometimes," "seldom," or never.

- Friendly external military activities (troops in contact, artillery, air strikes) affected 23-26% of the population during the month; these activities caused 1 or more civilian deaths in 71 hamlets containing .4% of SVN's population

The OASD/SA five-man team of analysts and programmers has returned from Saigon, and is now ready to extract detailed data from the HES/70 computer file as soon as the first tapes arrive. (An advance copy of the tapes, hand-carried back to Washington, was found to be defective; MACV is expediting a replacement copy.)

SELECTED CONDITIONS REPORTED IN HES/70
As of December 1969

HES/70 Question Number	Condition	Percent of Population				
		RVN	I CTZ	II CTZ	III CTZ	I C
VMB2 (2,3)	Main surface route from village to province capital open or subject to only sporadic taxation/harassment	87.9	74.9	85.7	94.7	8
VMB1	Largest enemy local or main forces in or near inhabited areas of village this month:					
(0)	None	41.1	42.6	24.5	63.3	28
(1)	Less than a platoon	23.3	24.9	29.7	18.4	23
(2)	About a platoon	17.2	15.6	22.0	12.4	20
(3)	About a company	13.1	12.2	19.1	4.2	18
(4)	A battalion or more	4.3	2.7	3.8	1.3	8
HQC4	% of hamlet households subject to night VC taxation, recruitment, etc.					
(0)	None	53.6	56.9	61.2	54.8	46
(1)	1-10%	24.6	25.9	19.4	22.9	28
(2,3,4)	11% or higher	16.3	12.5	11.0	13.1	23
HMB4	Were armed enemy military forces present in inhabited area of hamlet this month?					
(0)	No	75.9	83.5	74.9	75.4	73
(1)	Yes, once	6.0	4.4	7.2	5.4	6
(2)	Yes, sporadically	9.3	5.5	12.3	7.8	11
(3)	Yes, regularly	3.1	2.4	2.1	1.0	5
HQC1	Friendly forces primarily responsible for security of hamlet:					
(4)	PF	45.1	42.5	48.7	30.5	55
(5)	RF	15.5	16.4	18.9	12.9	15
(1)	PSDF	23.4	18.9	13.8	40.0	15
(2,3)	NP/NPTF	4.5	12.0	2.9	4.6	1
(6,7)	ARVN/US/FWMAF/CIDG	4.4	2.8	10.7	2.4	3
(0)	None present	2.4	2.6	2.1	.2	4
HQE2	GVN hamlet chief present:					
(3)	Regularly day and night	80.5	69.0	81.9	84.6	81
(2)	Regularly day only	8.2	10.3	12.2	4.8	8
(0,1)	Irregularly/not at all	5.5	15.2	2.7	1.3	6
VQC5	Village security plan:					
(3)	Works well	55.7	50.4	56.3	73.3	41
(2)	Works poorly	21.3	15.8	23.7	20.5	23
(1)	Not followed	9.5	9.3	10.8	4.7	13
(0)	Not formulated	9.5	7.0	3.1	.9	19

HES/70 Question Number	Condition	Percent of Population				
		<u>RVN</u>	<u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>
HMD3 (2,3)	Friendly military activities caused 1 or more civilian deaths this month in hamlet	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.1	0.
VMCI	Did friendly external forces (forces normally based outside the village) operate in this village this month?					
(0)	No	37.4	38.3	61.3	25.4	35.
(1)	Yes, no enemy contact	36.1	22.9	21.9	58.3	29.
(2)	Yes, light enemy contact	20.6	21.2	14.3	14.7	29.
(3)	Yes, heavy enemy contact	2.6	1.7	1.9	1.6	4.
VMC2	Were any friendly artillery fires or air strikes directed in or near inhabited area of village this month?					
(0)	No	70.6	65.0	71.8	83.2	61.
(1,2)	Yes	18.8	13.8	22.1	13.8	24.
(3)	Yes repeatedly	7.6	6.7	5.4	3.0	13.
VQCI (1,2,3)	GVN/US/FWMAF military base (co. size or larger) within or adjacent to village (excluding RF)	61.0	68.0	78.2	74.6	35.

NOTE: Percentages do not add to 100% because of "Not Applicable," "Unable to Judge," etc. responses (not shown).

April 1970

HES/70 DATA THROUGH MARCH 1970

Summary. Both A-B and A-B-C population increased substantially (3.4% and 1.2% respectively) over February, breaking a five month pattern of small month-to-month changes. Security scores in I, III, and IV Corps led the upswing, but in II Corps, where over half of the March 31-April 2 enemy high point attacks occurred, Security ratings fell 3.0% in March.

Pacification Trends. Data from the HES/70 for March show that both A-B and A-B-C population increased substantially over February, breaking the pattern of small month-to-month increases from October 1969 through February 1970. Table 1 shows that 89.7% of the South Vietnamese population was rated A-B-C in March, up from 88.5% in February. A-B population jumped to 73.5% in March from 70.1% in February, a gain of 3.4%.

TABLE 1

HES/70 PACIFICATION RATINGS

	1969 (HES/70 Test Period)						1970		
	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar
A-B Ratings (%) a/	62.5	62.7	64.1	67.3	65.6	69.6	69.5	70.1	73.5
A-B-C Ratings (%)	81.7	83.7	86.2	88.4	85.4	87.2	87.9	88.5	89.7

a/ Includes Saigon as "B," based on HES/70 ratings for all precincts in Saigon by US Saigon Civil Assistance Group (SCAG) advisors.

Security, Political, Socio-Economic Scores. The overall pacification ratings above are based on Security, Political, and Socio-Economic components. We examined these components on a corps-by-corps basis (as shown in Table 2), and found that:

- Security scores have shown a general upward trend of 1-3% per month, giving a total increase of 5.2% during the first quarter of 1970 -- an addition of 1.0 million people to the A-B (Security) category in three months.
- The recent high point on March 31-April 2 and the preparations for it did not slow the upward trend in Security ratings in I, III, or IV Corps. But in II Corps, where over half of the high point attacks occurred, Security ratings fell 3.0% in March. April Security ratings may show some declines (particularly in II Corps) as a result of increased enemy activity during the month.
- Political ratings also increased substantially in all Corps except II Corps, and Socio-Economic ratings rose substantially in I Corps where they had been particularly low.

TABLE 2

PACIFICATION SUB-MODEL SCORES

A-B (%) By CTZ	Security			Political			Socio-Economic			Overall Pacification		
	Dec	Feb	Mar	Dec	Feb	Mar	Dec	Feb	Mar	Dec	Feb	Mar
I	70.3	72.8	76.3	69.9	70.9	75.9	26.5	25.7	31.9	63.3	64.4	72.1
II	64.0	67.8	64.8	69.6	67.5	67.4	46.8	43.0	42.3	63.2	62.8	62.2
III	82.2	82.9	87.6	83.2	83.0	91.8	81.6	78.9	77.1	86.8	86.4	89.5
IV	56.5	59.2	63.6	66.6	66.6	70.7	51.6	48.4	49.9	60.1	61.8	65.3
RVN	68.3	70.5	73.5	72.9	72.6	77.6	55.9	53.1	54.0	69.6	70.1	73.5

In order to analyze the countrywide improvement in Security during the first quarter of 1970, we examined the changes on a province-by-province basis as shown in Table 3. III and IV Corps together accounted for 80% of the countrywide increase of 1.0 million in A-B population. Virtually all provinces in the two Corps showed gains; the major exception was Bac Lieu, which fell from 46% A-B in December 1969 to 24% A-B in March 1970. In I Corps, all provinces registered modest increases (5-12%) except Quang Tin (3% decrease). On the other hand, II Corps provinces showed an overall net loss (the gain in Pleiku, the only significant increase in II Corps, was due to major rescoring in January following a misinterpretation of the HES/70 question). Increases in enemy activity against pacification in Phu Yen, Phu Bon, and Binh Dinh more than offset modest gains in the remaining II Corps provinces.

A thorough evaluation of province-by-province changes must await detailed examination of the 139 HES/70 questions, and reports from the field on factors not reported in the HES/70 system. There are some indications that factors such as re-evaluations based on new information plus accounting changes in the system may be producing some of the major increases and decreases from month to month rather than actual changes in the situation.

HES/70 Question Responses. The basis for the Security, Political, and Socio-Economic ratings analyzed above is the HES/70 question set. US District Senior Advisors provide monthly and quarterly answers to 139 village and hamlet level multiple choice questions about all aspects of Pacification. Complete analysis of this data awaits development of a special computer program designed to handle the large quantity of data records produced.

Though detailed time series data is not yet available, a tabulation of US District Senior Advisors' December 1969 responses to selected HES/70 questions yields the following types of information (see Table 4):

- Local villagers in the IV and PSDF are the primary local security force defending 70% of SVN's population. However, 61% of the population is in villages next to large GVN, US, or FVNAR bases.

TABLE 3

HES/70 SECURITY SCORES BY PROVINCE

December 1969 - March 1970

Province	December	March	Change	Change in A-B Population (000)
Quang Tri	87	91	+ 4	+ 15
Thua Thien	78	90	+12	+ 66
Quang Nam	58	66	+ 8	+ 49
Quang Tin	71	68	- 3	+ 4
Quang Ngai	47	53	+ 6	+ 41
Hue	100	100	0	+ 10
Danang	93	100	+ 7	+ 26
I CTZ	70.3	76.3	+ 6.0	+211
Kontum	55	63	+ 8	+ 10
Binh Dinh	64	61	- 3	- 24
Pleiku	22	54	+32	+ 79
Phu Bon	86	74	-12	- 7
Phu Yen	66	50	-16	- 47
Darlac	66	71	+ 5	+ 13
Khanh Hoa	88	88	0	+ 3
Ninh Thuan	68	68	0	+ 4
Tuyen Duc	19	18	- 1	0
Quang Duc	16	31	+15	+ 5
Lam Dong	98	82	-16	- 9
Binh Thuan	49	58	+ 9	+ 22
Cam Ranh	89	94	+ 5	+ 10
Dalat	89	86	- 3	- 3
II CTZ	64.0	64.8	+ .8	+ 56
Binh Tuy	52	54	+ 2	+ 3
Long Khanh	40	54	+14	+21
Phuoc Long	27	76	+49	+ 21
Binh Long	44	57	+13	+ 9
Binh Duong	66	80	+14	+ 37
Tay Ninh	84	94	+10	+ 42
Hau Nghia	16	21	+ 5	+ 12
Bien Hoa	70	87	+17	+ 76
Phuoc Tuy	52	63	+11	+ 13
Long An	66	77	+11	+ 43
Gia Dinh	86	91	+ 6	+ 84
Vung Tau	100	100	0	+ 1
Saigon	100	99	- 1	- 16
III CTZ	82.2	87.6	+ 5.4	+346

Go Cong	85	92	+ 7	+ 13
Kien Tuong	63	53	-10	- 5
Kien Phong	61	78	+17	+ 64
Dinh Tuong	45	55	+10	+ 60
Kien Hoa	37	45	+ 8	+ 44
Vinh Binh	13	55	+42	+161
Vinh Long	48	51	+ 3	+ 14
An Giang	58	100	+ 2	+ 11
Kien Giang	53	54	+ 1	+ 4
Chuong Thien	32	54	+22	+ 49
Phong Dinh	69	69	0	+ 9
Ba Xuyen	71	77	+ 6	+ 26
An Xuyen	45	54	+ 9	+ 28
Bac Lieu	46	24	-22	- 62
Chau Doc	68	70	+ 2	+ 10
Sa Dec	70	73	+ 3	+ 3
IV CTZ	56.5	63.6	+ 7.1	+429
SVN	68.3	73.5	+ 5.2	+1042

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 54% of the population lived in hamlets completely free from VC taxation and recruitment at night; however, the VC have partial access to most of the rest of the hamlets, and 18% of the population lived in hamlets in which enemy military forces were present one or more times during the month.
- Hamlet chiefs for 80% of the population were regularly present day and night in their hamlets. This figure is somewhat higher than data collected from hamlet residents during a December MACV public opinion poll in B and C hamlets: 16% thought their officials stayed in their home every night, 43% thought their officials stayed in their home or PF outpost every night, and 33% thought their officials stayed at home or in PF outposts only "sometimes," "seldom," or never.
- Friendly external military activities (troops in contact, artillery, air strikes) affected 23-26% of the population during the month; these activities caused 1 or more civilian deaths in 71 hamlets containing .4% of SVN's population.

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 4

SELECTED CONDITIONS REPORTED IN HES/70
As of December 1969

HES/70 Question Number	Condition	Percent of Population				
		RVN	I CTZ	II CTZ	III CTZ	IV CTZ
VMB2 (2,3)	Main surface route from village to province capital open or subject to only sporadic taxation/harassment	87.9	74.9	85.7	94.7	89.
VMB1	Largest enemy local or main forces in or near inhabited areas of village this month:					
(0)	None	41.1	42.6	24.5	63.3	28.1
(1)	Less than a platoon	23.3	24.9	29.7	18.4	23.1
(2)	About a platoon	17.2	15.6	22.0	12.4	20.1
(3)	About a company	13.1	12.2	19.1	4.2	18.1
(4)	A battalion or more	4.3	2.7	3.8	1.3	8.1
HQC4	% of hamlet households subject to night VC taxation, recruitment, etc.					
(0)	None	53.6	56.9	61.2	54.8	46.6
(1)	1-10%	24.6	25.9	19.4	22.9	28.3
(2,3,4)	11% or higher	16.3	12.5	11.0	13.1	23.9
HMB4	Were armed enemy military forces present in inhabited area of hamlet this month?					
(0)	No	75.9	83.5	74.9	75.4	73.1
(1)	Yes, once	6.0	4.4	7.2	5.4	6.8
(2)	Yes, sporadically	9.3	5.5	12.3	7.8	11.2
(3)	Yes, regularly	3.1	2.4	2.1	1.0	5.8
HQC1	Friendly forces primarily responsible for security of hamlet:					
(4)	PF	45.1	42.5	48.7	30.5	58.0
(5)	RF	15.5	16.4	18.9	12.9	15.5
(1)	PSDF	23.4	18.9	13.8	40.0	15.3
(2,3)	NP/NIFF	4.5	12.0	2.9	4.6	1.6
(6,7)	ARVN, US/FWMAF/CIDG	4.4	2.8	10.7	2.4	3.9
(0)	None present	2.4	2.6	2.1	.2	4.5
HQE2	GVN hamlet chief present:					
(3)	Regularly day and night	80.5	69.0	81.9	84.6	81.8
(2)	Regularly day only	8.2	10.3	12.2	4.8	8.3
(0,1)	Irregularly/not at all	5.5	15.2	2.7	1.1	6.0
VQC5	Village security plan:					
(3)	Works well	55.7	50.4	56.3	73.3	41.7
(2)	Works poorly	21.3	15.8	23.7	20.5	23.7
(1)	Not followed	9.5	9.3	10.8	4.7	13.3
(0)	None formulated	9.6	7.0	8.1	.9	19.7

HES/70 Question Number	Condition	Percent of Population				
		RVN	I CTZ	II CTZ	III CTZ	IV CTZ
HT3 (2,3)	Friendly military activities caused 1 or more civilian deaths this month in hamlet	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.1	0.
MC1	Did friendly external forces (forces normally based outside the village) operate in this village this month?					
(0)	No	37.4	38.3	61.3	25.4	35.
(1)	Yes, no enemy contact	36.1	22.9	21.9	58.3	29.
(2)	Yes, light enemy contact	20.6	21.2	14.3	14.7	29.
(3)	Yes, heavy enemy contact	2.6	1.7	1.9	1.6	4.
VMC2	Were any friendly artillery fires or air strikes directed in or near inhabited area of village this month?					
(0)	No	70.6	65.0	71.8	83.2	61.2
(1,2)	Yes	18.8	13.8	22.1	13.8	24.2
(3)	Yes repeatedly	7.6	6.7	5.4	3.0	13.2
VQC1 (1,2,3)	GVN/US/FWMAF military base (co. size or larger) within or adjacent to village (excluding RF)	61.0	68.0	78.2	74.6	35.8

NOTE: Percentages do not add to 100% because of "Not Applicable," "Unable to Judge," etc. responses (not shown).

April 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

HES/70 DATA FOR APRIL 1970

Summary. Declining security in the countryside during April, apparently caused by heightened enemy activity during and after the March 31-April 1 high point, caused a slight drop in both A-B (down 1.5%) and A-B-C (down .8%) population from their high March levels. Downward security trends involving about 2.5% of SVN's population have been confirmed throughout II Corps and in two "problem provinces" of IV Corps (Bac Lieu and Chau Doc). While no trends can yet be confirmed in the 19 provinces which furnished ARVN forces to the Cambodian cross-border operations, 8 of the provinces showed one month security declines in April, 3 continued earlier downward trends, and 8 showed security improvements.

Background. Province-level security data from the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES/70) has arrived from Saigon. The following analysis is based on MACV's rating system which assigns A, B, C, etc., letter grades to hamlets. More complete analysis, involving US District Senior Advisors' responses to 25 monthly and 114 quarterly questions, will be possible after the April computer tapes are processed.

Countrywide and Corps Results. Declining security in the countryside during April apparently caused a slight drop in both A-B (down 1.5%) and A-B-C (down .8%) population from the high March levels. Table 1 shows that 88.9% of the South Vietnam population was rated A-B-C in April, down from 89.7% in March, but still above January-February levels of 87.9-88.5%. A-B population moved in a similar pattern, falling to 72.0% in April, but still above January-February levels of 69-70%.

TABLE 1

HES/70 PACIFICATION RATINGS

	<u>1969 (HES/70 Test Period)</u>			<u>1970</u>			
	<u>July</u>	<u>Sept</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>
A-B Ratings (%) a/	62.5	64.1	69.6	69.5	70.1	73.5	72.0
A-B-C Ratings (%)	81.7	86.2	87.2	87.9	88.5	89.7	88.9

a/ Includes Saigon as "B," based on HES/70 ratings for all precincts in Saigon by US Saigon Civil Assistance Group (SCAG) advisors.

MACV states that the one-month decline in April reflects the impact on pacification and security of the March 31-April 1 high point and subsequent higher activity levels. This appears to be correct based on the pattern of VC/NVA activity recently. Table 2 below shows that the only area that declined below January-February levels was II Corps, where over half of the high point attacks occurred, and where enemy attacks against pacification in Phu Yen and Binh Dinh had already caused declines in March. The only corps which continued to improve in Pacification was I Corps, which had the least number of high point attacks. Detailed analysis of March data has shown that the overall

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Security and Pacification ratings are particularly sensitive to changes in enemy activity and presence, especially redeployments of enemy units and reassessments of enemy strength.

TABLE 2

PACIFICATION SUB-MODEL SCORES

A-B (%) By CTZ	Security			Political			Socio-Economic			Overall Pacification		
	Feb	Mar	Apr	Feb	Mar	Apr	Feb	Mar	Apr	Feb	Mar	Apr
I	72.8	76.3	75.9	70.9	75.9	76.7	25.7	31.9	32.0	64.4	72.1	72.7
II	67.8	64.8	59.1	67.5	67.4	66.5	43.0	42.3	42.4	62.8	62.2	59.2
III	82.9	87.6	85.9	83.0	91.8	91.8	78.9	77.1	78.1	86.4	89.5	88.6
IV	59.2	63.6	60.5	66.6	70.7	70.1	48.4	49.9	49.9	61.8	65.3	62.9
AVN	70.5	73.5	70.9	72.6	77.6	77.4	53.1	54.0	54.3	70.1	73.5	72.0

Province Trends in Security. Although month-to-month countrywide and corps trends are considered reasonably accurate, MACV has found that for analyzing individual provinces, one-month changes in its HES Security ratings are not a particularly reliable indicator when considered alone. There are some initial indications that the MACV rating formulas may "overreact" when a small number of question responses change, especially when several responses change simultaneously. Therefore, this analysis recognizes "confirmed" trends in province security ratings only when HES scores moved in the same direction for two or more months.

The map on the following page shows provinces which were experiencing confirmed up- or downward security trends as of April 30, 1970. Downward trends involving losses of 2.5% of the South Vietnam population from the A-B category have been "confirmed" in the following areas:

- Northern II Corps, where an enemy anti-pacification campaign has been underway for several months, especially in Binh Dinh and Phu Yen.

- The VC Military Region 6 area, including Dalat city and four coastal lowland provinces along the II Corps - III Corps border, where MACV ratings show the enemy increasing his military activity, and friendly military forces decreasing their security activities.


- Two "problem provinces" of IV Corps: Chau Doc, where two enemy main force regiments have been very active in the Seven Mountains base camp area, and Bac Lieu, where IV Corps advisors have identified some GVN leadership problems in coping with recent enemy attacks.

On the other hand, encouraging upward trends are underway in some 7 provinces of I, III and IV Corps (see map). About 2.3% of South Vietnam's population has been added to the A-B security category by these provinces. While these provinces with "confirmed" upward trends tend to cancel most of the losses in provinces with "confirmed" downward trends, the additional impact of provinces with one-month changes produced the countrywide increase in March and decrease in April. Table 3 shows the province-by-province data in detail.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

"CONFIRMED" HES/70
SECURITY TRENDS
as of
April 30, 1970
Based on A-E Security Scores



Security in downward trend for last 2 or more months.*



Security in upward trend for last 2 or more months.*

*5,000 or more population involved in trend (gained or lost from A-E)

CONFIDENTIAL 10

CONFIDENTIAL
TABLE 3

HES SECURITY SCORES
(% of Population Rated A-B)

Province	Dec 69	Changes				Apr 69	Current Trends in A-B Population	
		Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr		Direction & No. Mos.	A-B Pop (000) Gain/Loss During Trend
Quang Tri	87.4	- 3.0	- 1.5	+ 8.4	+ .4	91.7	Up 2 mos.	+27.0
Thua Thien	77.4	+ 6.5	- 1.4	+ 7.3	+ 4.2	94.0	Up 2 mos.	+69.9
Quang Nam	57.6	+ 3.9	+ 2.8	+ 1.4	- 3.1	62.3		
Quang Tin	70.6	- .2	- 3.5	+ .9	+ 1.7	69.5	Up 2 mos.	+22.4
Quang Ngai	46.6	0	+ 1.3	+ 5.0	- 4.2	48.7		
Hue	100.0	0	0	0	0	100.0		
Danang	93.2	+ 6.6	0	+ .2	0	100.0		
I Corps	70.3	+ 2.4	+ .1	+ 3.5	- .4	75.9		
Kontum	54.6	- 4.3	+ 2.4	+10.4	- 4.1	59.0		
Binh Dinh	64.0	- 1.7	- 1.8	+ .9	- 4.0	56.5	Down 4 mos.	-67.2
Pleiku	22.4	+34.2	+ 4.0	- 6.4	-15.2	39.0	Down 2 mos.	-51.8
Phu Bon	85.8	- 4.5	+ 2.1	- 9.8	- 5.5	62.1	Down 2 mos.	-10.1
Phu Yen	65.8	+ 1.7	- 3.7	-13.5	- 3.5	46.5	Down 3 mos.	-63.7
Darlac	65.6	- .8	+ 3.6	+ 2.6	- 4.3	66.7		
Khanh Hoa	88.0	+ .9	+ 3.4	- 4.3	- 1.2	86.8	Down 2 mos.	-22.0
Ninh Thuan	68.4	- 5.2	+ 8.9	- 3.6	- 7.0	61.5	Down 2 mos.	-14.8
Tuyen Duc	18.8	- 5.4	+19.0	-14.2	+ 2.1	20.3		
Quang Duc	16.0	+ 8.3	- 1.8	+ 8.8	- 5.0	26.3		
Lam Dong	98.4	-13.4	+ .3	- 2.9	- 6.2	75.2	Down 4 mos.	-14.2
Binh Thuan	49.0	- 3.8	+16.8	- 3.7	- 5.5	49.8	Down 2 mos.	-34.0
Cam Ranh	89.5	+ 8.2	+ 1.0	- 4.6	- 2.4	91.7	Down 2 mos.	- 4.9
Da Lat	89.4	- 1.8	+ 1.7	- 3.3	-10.4	55.6	Down 2 mos.	-28.2
II Corps	64.0	+ .8	+ 3.0	- 3.0	- 5.7	59.1		
Binh Tuy	52.4	+26.8	-16.8	- 8.2	-10.4	-3.5	Down 3 mos.	-23.4
Long Khanh	39.7	- 3.9	+ 5.5	+12.4	-13.5	-0.2		
Phuoc Long	27.0	+ .1	0	+49.0	-10.2	63.8		
Binh Long	43.9	- 2.4	+12.9	+ 2.2	-11.0	45.6		
Binh Duong	65.5	+ 4.5	+ 7.9	+ 2.3	+ 3.6	83.2	Up 4 mos.	+47.8
Tay Ninh	83.9	+ .9	-11.8	+21.1	-14.9	79.2		
Hau Giang	15.8	+ .6	+ 6.1	- 1.4	- .1	21.0	Down 2 mos.	- 1.8
Bien Hoa	69.7	- 2.5	+ 3.2	+16.1	+ .5	87.0	Up 3 mos.	+100.1
Phuoc Tuy	52.2	+ 2.2	+ 1.8	+ 6.8	- 7.5	55.4		
Long An	65.7	0	- .4	+11.1	- 2.5	73.9		
Gia Dinh	85.7	- .3	+ 1.3	+ 4.7	+ .2	91.5	Up 3 mos.	+89.7
Vung Tau	100.0	0	0	0	0	100.0		
Saigon	98.4	- .3	0	+ .6	- .1	99.6		
III Corps	81.7	+ .1	+ .5	+ 5.3	- 1.7	85.9		
Go Cong	84.8	+ .7	+ 1.8	+ 4.4	- 9.1	82.6		
Kien Tuong	62.7	+ 3.1	+20.2	-33.3	+ 9.2	61.9		
Kien Phong	60.5	+ 4.7	+ 5.2	+ 7.4	- 4.2	73.7		
Dinh Tuong	45.2	- .4	- 1.5	+11.4	- 3.5	51.2		
Kien Hoa	37.2	- .2	+ .7	+ 7.6	- 7.0	38.3		
Vinh Binh	13.4	- .6	- 1.0	+3.1	-24.2	30.7		
Vinh Long	47.9	- 1.8	+6.7	- 2.3	+ .	50.9		
An Giang	97.7	0	0	+ 2.3	0	100.0		
Kien Giang	52.7	+ 1.2	+ 1.0	- .9	+ 4.5	58.5	Up 4 mos	+22.8
Chuong Thien	32.5	+ 9.9	- 2.6	+14.5	- 1.3	53.0		
Phong Dinh	69.5	+ .8	- .1	- 1.1	- 1.3	67.3	Down 3 mos	- 2.2
Ba Xuyen	71.4	+ 2.1	- .5	+ 4.2	+ 2.3	73.2	Up 4 mos.	+31.4
An Xuyen	45.0	+ 3.3	+ .5	+ 5.2	- 5.3	45.7		
Bac Lieu	46.1	- 6.8	+10.2	-25.8	- 1.5	21.3	Down 2 mos.	-72.4
Chau Doc	68.4	+ 5.4	+ .4	- 4.2	- 1.3	65.7	Down 2 mos.	-27.6
Sa Dec	69.5	+ .7	+ 4.1	- 1.5	+ 1.5	70.7		
IV Corps	76.5	+ 1.1	+ 1.6	+ 4.1	- 3.1	80.3		
SVN	68.1	+ 1.0	+ 1.2	+ 3.2	- 2.6	70.9		

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Effects of Cambodian Operations. Without May HES data we cannot confirm any trends which may be developing as a result of Allied operations into the enemy's Cambodian base areas. However, we have analyzed end-April HES Security ratings in order to detect any one-month changes which may be correlated with (a) departures of RVNAF units from their normal areas during April 20-22 and April 28-30 to operate in Cambodia, and (b) security improvements due to disruption of enemy activities in the base areas.

Thirty-four (34) different RVNAF maneuver battalions moved from their customary areas in 19 provinces of III-IV Corps in late April to operate in Cambodia opposite Kien Tuong province. (Additional operations involving US and RVNAF forces began on May 2.) These were the results as of April 30, accumulated from the basic data shown in Table 4:

- The moves reduced RVNAF forces in the 19 provinces by 6% during April 20-22, and by 41% during April 28-30.
- Over 40% (8) of the 19 provinces showed a one-month security decline in April (measured by A-B population). Three additional provinces (Hau Nghia, Phong Dinh, Chau Doc) also declined in April, but probably because of conditions existing in earlier months.
- An equal number of provinces (8) showed increases in April, half of which (4) had begun to increase in earlier months.
- Kien Tuong province, immediately adjacent to the April cross-border operations, showed a security increase in April.

While the above analysis reveals one-month changes which are worth monitoring, we do not yet have enough information from the April HES to determine whether the Cambodian operations in fact produced the HES results with which they seem to be correlated. More complete analysis will be possible when the April computer tapes and May summary data arrive.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE -

RVNAF BATTALION EMPLOYMENT IN CAMBODIA VS. RES SECURITY SCORES

During April, 1970

Area From Which Battalion(s) Moved			No. of Battalions In Province as of:		Deployments To Cambodia		% of Population Rated A-B (RES Security)		
Corps	DTA	Province	4th Qtr 69 (Range)	31 Mar 70	No. Bns.	Dates	Mar	Apr	Change
III	31	Hau Nghia	5-6	7	3	28-30 Apr	21.1	21.0	- .1 c/
		Tay Ninh	2-5	4	3	28-30 Apr	94.1	79.2	-14.9
	32	Binh Long	3-4	4	1	28-30 Apr	56.5	45.6	-11.0
		Phuoc Long	1-8	5	2	28-30 Apr	76.1	65.8	-10.3
	33	Bien Hoa	1-3	3	2	28-30 Apr	86.5	87.0	+ .5 c/
		Long Khanh	9-12	12	4	28-30 Apr	53.7	40.2	-13.5
	CMD	Gia Dinh	11-18	6	2	28-30 Apr	91.4	91.6	+ .2 c/
IV	70	Dinh Tuong	8-10	9	1	28-30 Apr	54.7	51.2	- 3.5
		41	An Giang	1	1	1	{ 20-22 Apr 28-30 Apr	100.0	100.0
	Sa Dec		1-4	0	0 b/	-	72.8	74.7	+ 1.9
	Vinh Binh		1-5	5	4	28-30 Apr	54.9	30.7	-24.2
	Vinh Long		2-7	1	1	{ 20-22 Apr 28-30 Apr	50.5	50.9	+ .4
	42	Ba Xuyen	1-2	1	1	28-30 Apr	77.2	79.2	+ 2.9 c/
		Chuong Thien	4-14	11	4	28-30 Apr	54.3	53.0	- 1.3
		Kien Giang	2-7	0	0 b/	-	54.0	53.5	+ 4.5 c/
		Phong Dinh	3-5	5	2	{ 20-22 Apr 28-30 Apr	69.1	67.8	- 1.3 c/
	44	Chau Doc	0-2	3	{ 1 1	20-22 Apr 28-30 Apr	70.0	68.7	- 1.3 c/
		Kien Phong	0	1	1	28-30 Apr	77.9	73.7	- 4.2
		Kien Tuong	0	0	0 a/	28-30 Apr	52.7	51.9	+ 9.2
Totals		19 Provinces	82-86	80	34				

a/ 5 RF Cos. and 3 IDG Cos. participated.

b/ Included in table because deployments to Cambodia involved units which had operated in province during 4th quarter 1969 and/or Jan-Feb 1970.

c/ Change in same direction also noted in March (before Cambodian operations).

CONFIDENTIAL

June/July 70

CONFIDENTIAL

HES/70 DATA FOR MAY 1970

Summary. Security trends recovered somewhat in May 1970 for South Vietnam as a whole, but remained depressed at or below April levels in areas hit by the May high point in enemy activity. Improvements in areas hit in April but not in May, plus improvements elsewhere, boosted country-wide pacification ratings in the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES/70) for both A-B (up .1%) and A-B-C (up .6%) population. Security declined significantly for the first time in I Corps, and continued to decline steadily in large areas of II Corps; both areas were hit hard by April-May enemy campaigns.

Eight of 11 provinces bordering Allied Cambodian operations improved in security, and we have found no direct connection between security declines and decreased Allied maneuver battalions in SVN as yet.

Background. This analysis is based on complete HES data for May 1970 just received from Saigon. It reflects results of MACV's rating system which assigns A, B, C, etc. letter grades to hamlets based on US District Senior Advisors' most recent responses to the 25 monthly and 114 quarterly questions in HES/70. Most advisors have not changed their responses to the quarterly questions since March; thus, the quarterly questions have acted as a damper on month-to-month rating changes in April and May. June ratings will likely change considerably to incorporate advisors' assessments of the cumulative impact of events throughout the quarter. Where appropriate, we analyzed answers to each of the 139 questions to compensate for "damping" of the security trends, and to refine our understanding of the total situation.

Countrywide and Corps Results. Security trends recovered somewhat in May 1970 for South Vietnam as a whole.^{1/} Table 1 shows that 89.7% of the SVN population was rated A-B-C in May, recovering completely the .6% population lost in April. A-B population recovered only .1% of the 1.3% lost in April, standing at 72.3% in May.

TABLE 1
HES/70 PACIFICATION RATINGS ^{a/}

	1969 (HES/70 Test Period) ^{1/}			1970				
	July	Sept	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May
A-B Ratings (%)	62.6	53.9	69.3	69.3	69.9	73.5	72.2	72.3
A-B-C Ratings (%)	81.6	83.3	87.5	87.7	88.2	89.7	89.1	89.7

^{a/} Percent of SVN population. Saigon and Danang data for December assumed to apply for July-November 1969 also. Pleiku data for May assumed to apply for April 1970 also.

^{1/} Due to a reporting error in Pleiku province in April, we assumed May data applied also for April 1970 in Pleiku. The result was to increase country-wide A-B and A-B-C ratings .2% for April. We use corrected data throughout this article.

CONFIDENTIAL

The damping effect of the unchanged responses to quarterly questions is clear from Table 2: the 114 quarterly questions produced most of the large changes between quarters, while the 25 monthly questions produced the smaller month-to-month range (plus or minus) about the quarterly average. The monthly questions mostly relate to security; the political and socio-economic ratings show very small month-to-month changes since they are almost entirely based on quarterly questions.

TABLE 2

QUARTERLY RES/70 RATINGS a/
(Percent of Population)

Qtrly Responses as of: Monthly Responses as of:	<u>3rd Qtr (Sep69)</u> <u>Sept-Nov 69</u>	<u>4th Qtr (Dec69)</u> <u>Dec 69 - Feb 70</u>	<u>1st Qtr (Mar70)</u> <u>Mar-May 70</u>
<u>A-B</u>			
Pacification	65.1 ± 1.3	69.5 ± .3	72.7 ± .7
Security	63.7 ± 1.5	69.2 ± 1.1	72.3 ± 1.3
Political	68.6 ± 1.1	72.5 ± .1	77.5 ± .1
Socio-Econ	52.2 ± .5	53.1 ± .1	54.3 ± .2
<u>A-B-C</u>			
Pacification	85.2 ± 1.9	87.8 ± .4	89.5 ± .3
Security	84.5 ± 2.4	87.2 ± .6	88.4 ± .5
Political	92.0 ± .7	93.5 ± .1	94.9 ± .1
Socio-Econ	82.4 ± .6	84.6 ± .1	86.9 ± .1

a/ Average figure for the reporting quarter, with range representing month-to-month variations about the average. Assumes Saigon and Danang data for December applied to July-November also, and that Pleiku data for May applied to April also.

The overall impact on security ratings of the May enemy high points was less than that registered for the April high points. Table 3 shows that:

-- Security ratings recovered almost completely in III Corps which was hit by the April but not the May high point.

-- For the first time security ratings in I Corps dropped significantly (1.6%), reflecting renewed enemy campaigns in Quang Tri, Quang Nam, and Quang Tin.

-- Security remained depressed in II and IV Corps which were hit in both April and May high points. The continuing decline in many II Corps provinces (see next section) is cause for concern.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 3

PACIFICATION SUB-MODEL SCORES a/

A-B (%) by CTZ	Security			Political			Socio-Economic			Overall Pacification		
	Mar	Apr	May	Mar	Apr	May	Mar	Apr	May	Mar	Apr	May
I	76.3	75.9	74.3	75.9	76.7	77.0	31.9	32.0	31.9	72.1	72.7	70.8
II	64.8	59.8	61.0	67.5	66.5	67.0	42.3	42.4	42.3	62.2	60.1	60.0
III	87.6	85.9	87.4	91.8	91.8	91.8	77.1	78.1	79.2	89.5	88.6	89.0
IV	63.6	60.5	62.9	70.7	70.1	69.8	49.9	49.9	49.3	65.3	62.9	63.8
RVN	73.5	71.0	72.3	77.6	77.4	77.4	54.0	54.3	54.5	73.5	72.2	72.3

a/ Percent of South Vietnam population. Pleiku data for May assumed to apply for April 1970 also.

Province Security Trends. Although month-to-month countrywide and corps trends are considered reasonably accurate, MACV has found that for analyzing individual provinces, one-month changes in its HES security ratings are not a particularly reliable indicator when considered alone. Therefore, this analysis recognizes "confirmed" trends in province security ratings only when HES scores moved in the same direction for two or more months.

The map and Table 4 show provinces which were experiencing up or downward security trends as of May 31, 1970. Downward trends (losses from the A-B category) have been confirmed in the following areas:

-- Most of northern II Corps, where enemy anti-pacification campaigns continue, especially in Phu Yen province (fifth straight month). Analysis of question responses indicates that Binh Dinh should probably be added to the downward trend category also; security had been declining there during January-April, and while enemy activity eased up slightly in May, enemy presence (main and local force platoons in or near villages) increased and friendly external forces in villages decreased in May.

-- Quang Nam province in I Corps, where enemy activity was up sharply in May following a buildup of enemy forces near villages in April. Danger signs are also evident in Quang Tri, where enemy forces are embarking on a campaign to cut off the province from secure neighboring Anua Thien, and in Quang Tin, where heavy action along the Hiep Duc infiltration corridor may be jeopardizing security in the populated coastal areas.

-- Chau Doc province in IV Corps, where provincial forces not dependent on support from Cambodian base areas continued increased activity for the third month in a row. One encouraging sign, however, was a 27% increase (from 48% to 75%) in the population in villages with friendly external forces present.

On the other hand, significant upward trends began or continued in the following areas:

-- The already secure (92-95% A-B) provinces of Thua Thien (I Corps) and Gia Dinh (III Corps).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
TABLE 4

HES SECURITY SCORES
(% of Population Rated A-B)


		Changes					1970	Current Trends in A-B Population	
Province	Dec 69	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	May	Direction and Number Months	A-B Pop. (000) Gain/Loss During Trend
Quang Tri	87.4	- 3.0	- 1.5	+ 8.4	+ .4	- 2.2	83.5	Up 3 mos. Down 2 mos.	+73.1 -71.0
Thua Thien	77.4	+ 6.5	- 1.4	+ 7.3	+ 4.2	+ 1.2	95.1		
Quang Nam	57.6	+ 3.9	+ 2.8	+ 1.4	- 3.2	- 7.9	54.4	Up 3 mos. Down 2 mos.	+73.1 -71.0
Quang Tin	70.6	- .2	- 3.5	+ .9	+ 1.7	- 2.7	65.8		
Quang Ngai	46.6	0	+ 1.3	+ 5.0	- 4.2	+ 4.2	52.8	Up 3 mos. Down 2 mos.	+73.1 -71.0
Hue	100.0	0	0	0	0	0	100.0		
Danang	93.2	+ 6.6	0	+ .2	0	0	100.0	Up 3 mos. Down 2 mos.	+73.1 -71.0
I Corps	70.3	+ 2.4	+ .1	+ 5.5	- .4	- 1.6	74.3		
Kontum	54.6	- 4.3	+ 2.4	+ 10.4	- 4.1	- .3	58.7	Down 2 mos.	- 8.7
Binh Phuok	64.0	- 1.7	- 1.8	+ .9	- 4.9	+ 3.2	59.7		
Pleiku	22.4	+34.2	+ 4.0	- 6.4	+ 6.2	0	48.0	Down 3 mos.	-31.7
Phu Bon	85.8	- 4.5	+ 2.1	- 9.8	- 5.5	- .3	67.8		
Phu Yen	55.8	+ 1.7	- 3.7	- 13.5	- 3.5	- 4.2	42.1	Down 4 mos.	-75.9
Darlac	14.6	- .8	+ 3.6	+ 2.6	- 4.3	+ 2.3	69.0		
Khanh Hoa	68.0	+ .9	+ 3.4	- 4.3	- 1.2	- .6	66.2	Down 3 mos.	-75.1
Ninh Thuan	68.4	- 5.2	+ 8.9	- 3.6	- 7.0	- 7.5	69.0		
Tuyen Duc	18.8	- 5.4	+ 19.0	- 14.2	+ 2.1	+ 7.6	27.3	Up 2 mos.	+ 9.4
Quang Duc	16.0	+ 8.3	- 1.8	+ 8.8	- 5.0	+ 22.9	49.2		
Lam Dong	98.4	- 13.4	+ .3	- 2.9	- 6.2	+ 3.9	80.1	Down 3 mos.	-21.8
Binh Thuan	49.0	- 3.8	+ 16.8	- 3.7	- 8.5	+ 2.7	52.5		
Cam Ranh	89.5	+ 8.2	+ 1.0	- 4.6	- 2.4	- 17.3	74.4	Down 3 mos.	-21.8
Dalat	89.4	- 1.8	+ 1.7	- 3.3	- 30.4	- 1.0	56.6		
II Corps	64.0	+ .8	+ 3.0	- 3.0	- 5.0	+ 1.2	61.0	Down 3 mos.	-21.8
Binh Tuy	52.4	+26.8	- 16.8	- 8.2	- 10.4	+ 4.1	48.2		
Long Khanh	39.7	- 3.9	+ 5.5	+ 12.4	- 13.5	+ 16.6	86.8	Down 2 mos.	-12.2
Phuoc Long	27.0	+ .1	0	+ 49.0	- 10.3	+ 6.9	72.7		
Binh Long	43.9	- 2.4	+ 12.9	+ 2.2	- 11.0	+ 2.7	48.3	Up 4 mos.	+93.0
Binh Duong	65.5	+ 4.5	+ 7.9	+ 2.3	+ 3.6	- 3.5	80.3		
Tay Ninh	83.9	+ .9	- 11.8	+ 21.1	- 14.9	+ 15.2	94.4	Down 2 mos.	-12.2
Hau Nghia	15.8	+ .6	+ 6.1	- 1.4	- .1	+ 3.2	24.1		
Bien Hoa	69.7	- 2.5	+ 3.2	+ 16.1	+ .5	- 12.9	74.1	Up 4 mos.	+93.0
Phuoc Tuy	52.2	+ 2.2	+ 1.8	+ 6.8	- 7.6	- 3.2	52.2		
Long An	65.7	0	.4	+ 11.1	- 2.5	+ 5.5	79.4	Up 4 mos.	+93.0
Gia Dinh	85.7	- .3	+ 1.3	+ 4.7	+ .2	+ .3	91.9		
Vung Tau	100.0	0	0	0	0	0	100.0	Up 4 mos.	+93.0
Saigon	98.4	- .3	0	+ .6	- .1	+ .1	98.7		
III Corps	81.7	+ .1	+ .5	+ 5.3	- 1.7	+ 1.5	87.4	Up 2 mos.	+ 7.5
Go Cong	84.8	+ .7	+ 1.8	+ 4.4	- 9.1	+ 7.1	89.7		
Kien Tuong	62.7	+ 3.1	+ 20.2	- 33.3	+ 9.2	+ 5.2	67.1	Up 2 mos.	+ 7.5
Kien Phong	60.5	+ 4.7	+ 5.3	+ 7.4	- 7.2	+ 10.6	84.2		
Vinh Tuong	45.2	- .4	- 1.5	+ 11.4	- 3.5	+ 4.3	55.5	Up 2 mos.	+25.0
Kien Hoa	37.2	- .2	+ .7	+ 7.6	- 7.0	+ 6.3	44.6		
Vinh Binh	13.4	- .6	- 1.0	+ 43.1	- 24.2	+ 9.6	40.3	Up 2 mos.	+25.0
Vinh Long	47.9	- 1.8	+ 6.7	- 2.3	+ .4	+ 3.4	35.2		
An Giang	97.7	0	0	+ 2.3	0	0	100.0	Down 3 mos.	-74.4
Kien Giang	52.7	+ 1.2	+ 1.0	- .9	+ 4.5	- 3.2	55.2		
Chuong Thien	32.5	+ 9.9	- 2.6	+ 14.5	- 1.3	+ 1.3	54.3	Up 2 mos.	+18.5
Phong Dinh	69.5	+ .8	- .1	- 1.1	- 1.3	+ .4	68.2		
Ba Xuyen	71.4	+ 2.1	- .5	+ 4.2	+ 2.0	- 3.8	75.4	Down 3 mos.	-74.4
An Xuyen	45.0	+ 3.3	+ .5	+ 5.2	- 5.3	+ 1.3	50.0		
Bac Lieu	46.1	- 6.8	- 10.2	- 25.8	- 1.8	+ 1.4	23.3	Up 2 mos.	+18.5
Chau Doc	68.4	+ 5.4	+ .4	- 4.2	- 1.3	- 1.6	65.1		
Sa Dec	69.5	+ .7	+ 4.1	- 1.5	+ 1.9	+ 5.3	75.5	Up 2 mos.	+18.5
IV Corps	56.5	+ 1.1	+ 1.6	+ 4.4	- 3.1	+ 2.2	62.9		
SVN	68.1	+ 1.0	+ 1.2	+ 3.2	- 2.6	+ 1.2	72.3	Up 2 mos.	+18.5

a/ Due to April reporting error, May data assumed to apply to April 1970 also.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

"CONFIRMED" HES/70
SECURITY TRENDS
as of
May 31, 1970
Based on A-B Security Scores



*5,000 or more population involved in trend (gained or lost from A-B)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(1) Allied Deployments from III and IV Corps: From 57-58% of the total US/FW/RVNAF maneuver battalions in III and IV Corps participated at one time or another in the April-May Cambodian operations. Virtually all provinces in the two corps areas contributed battalions to the operations directly or indirectly. The effect of the redeployments was mitigated somewhat, however, because remaining forces were reshuffled to fill the gaps left by the departing forces, and because the average battalion sent to Cambodia spent only 4 days out-of-country in April and 16-20 days out-of-country in May.

As noted in earlier sections, security ratings improved in III Corps and IV Corps in May, with IV Corps remaining below March levels. It appears that most of the security rating changes in these corps occurred independently of Allied deployments to Cambodia; we could not trace declines in province security scores to specific decreases in US/RVNAF maneuver battalions present. On the contrary, it appears that some effort was made not to take battalions out of provinces which had declining security in April: no Allied battalions were removed from Binh Tuy, Go Cong, or Bac Lieu provinces, and these three provinces all showed security declines in April and improvements in May.

(2) Allied Deployments from II Corps: To support Cambodian operations opposite II Corps, 26 US/RVNAF battalions were removed from the 6 provinces having the majority of battalions (51 of 66) in the corps. As in III and IV Corps, it appears some effort was made not to remove battalions from provinces with declining security scores: no battalions were removed from Phu Yen, and although 11 of Binh Dinh's 24 battalions were removed, none were taken from the US 173rd Brigade which is conducting pacification operations in the relatively insecure northern districts of the province. Table 6 shows supporting data.

We could discover no clear cause-and-effect relationship between security declines and battalion redeployments in II Corps. On the contrary, the provinces which contributed battalions had a slightly better record (only 2.8% A-B population decline, March-May) than those provinces which did not contribute battalions (5.2% decline). Nevertheless, HES ratings, Province Senior Advisor Reports, and comments from US and ARVN commanders indicate that pacification may be in serious trouble in some areas of the corps, and any reductions in US/RVNAF battalions (even temporary) are bound to make it easier for the enemy to build up his forces and increase his activity rates near the populated coastal regions.

(3) Effects on Border Provinces: It is still too early to tell what the ultimate impact of the Cambodian operations will be on the war in SVN. However, it is reasonable to expect that any improvements will be felt first in the II, III, and IV provinces which are immediately adjacent to Cambodia. Our analysis of security in the populated areas of these provinces shows:

-- Six of the seven border provinces of III-IV Corps showed improved HES security ratings in May. Only Chau Doc decreased (see earlier section on Province Trends), but probably because of increased enemy presence and activity beginning in March.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-- Tuyen Duc in II Corps (the May 30-31 VC attack on Dalat city will not be reflected until June HES reports).

-- Kien Tuong, bordering the Parrot's Beak in IV Corps, where village population affected by enemy main and local force platoons dropped to zero (from 40% in March). Allied operations in Cambodia reportedly played a large role in drawing the enemy out of the province.

Effects of Cambodian Operations. In this section we used HES ratings to help analyze two aspects of the first full month of US/RVNAF operations in Cambodia: (a) possible detrimental effects to security of moving US/RVNAF battalions out of their normal operating areas to operate in Cambodia, and (b) possible security improvements due to disruption of enemy activities in the Cambodian base areas. Table 5 shows the size and distribution of battalions deployed to Cambodia on a corps-by-corps basis.

TABLE 5
FRIENDLY BATTALION EMPLOYMENT IN CAMBODIA
April-May 1970

	RVNAF Battalions		Total (US/FW/RVNAF) Battalions	
	April	May	April	May
<u>I CTZ</u>				
Total Bns	40	40	78	78
<u>II CTZ</u>				
Total Bns	34	34	66	66
Bns in Cambodia a/	-	17	-	26
% of Total	-	50%	-	39%
Bn-Days in Cambodia	-	249	-	325
% of Total	-	24%	-	16%
<u>III CTZ</u>				
Total Bns	61	61	100	100
Bns in Cambodia a/	19	32	19	57
% of Total	31%	52%	19%	57%
Bn-Days in Cambodia	67	660	67	1139
% of Total	4%	35%	2%	37%
<u>IV CTZ</u>				
Total Bns	52	52	52	52
Bns in Cambodia a/	16	30	16	30
% of Total	31%	58%	31%	58%
Bn-Days in Cambodia	60	495	60	495
% of Total	4%	31%	4%	31%
<u>XVN</u>				
Total Bns	187	187	296	296
Bns in Cambodia a/	35	80	35	112
% of Total	19%	43%	12%	38%
Bn-Days in Cambodia	127	1404	127	1957
% of Total	2%	24%	1%	21%

Source: OPREP reports (manually extracted) and SEAFA computer file.

a/ Note that battalions were not employed simultaneously or for entire length of operations. Average battalions employed for 4 days in April and 13-24 days in May.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-- Of particular note were Kien Tuong, where village population affected by enemy main and local force platoons dropped to zero, and Tay Ninh, which recovered from high enemy activity in April.

-- Of the four border provinces in II Corps, two improved (Darlac, Quang Duc) and two regressed (Kontum, Pleiku) in security ratings. In the case of Kontum and Pleiku, the security decline was probably due to a continuation of increased enemy activity begun in March and April.

TABLE 6

II CORPS BATTALIONS IN CAMBODIA VS. HES SECURITY SCORES

	No. of Bns in Prov. As Of:		May Deploy- ments to Cambodia	Percent Of Population Rated A-B		
	4th Qtr 69	31 Mar 70		March	May	Change
<u>6 Provinces Supplying</u>						
<u>Bns to Cambodia</u>						
Kontum - RVNAF	4-6	10	4	63.1	58.7	- 4.4
Binh Dinh - US	8-9	10	6	61.4	59.7	- 1.7
RVNAF	8	8	5			
3rd Cty	6-9	6	0			
Pleiku - US	4-5	1	2	54.2	48.0	- 6.2
RVNAF	0-3	3	3			
Darlac - US	0-3	0	0	71.0	69.0	- 2.0
RVNAF	2-6	4	4			
Quang Duc - RVNAF	1-8	4	1	31.3	49.2	+17.9
Binh Thuan- US	2-3	2	0	58.3	52.5	- 5.8
RVNAF	3	3	1			
Subtotal - US	17	13	8	60.8	58.0	- 2.8
RVNAF	24-29	32	18			
3rd Cty	6-9	6	0			
	<u>50-55</u>	<u>51</u>	<u>26</u>			
<u>8 Provinces Not Supplying</u>						
<u>Bns to Cambodia</u>						
Subtotal - US	0	0	0	70.1	64.9	- 5.2
RVNAF	5-10	3	0			
3rd Cty	9-12	12	0			
	<u>14-19</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>0</u>			
<u>II Corps Total</u>						
US	17	13	8	64.8	61.0	- 3.8
RVNAF	34	35	18			
3rd Cty	18	18	0			
	<u>69</u>	<u>66</u>	<u>26</u>			

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

HES/70 DATA FOR JUNE 1970

Summary. Pacification in the countryside recovered in June from two straight months of enemy high point activity, and registered significant socio-economic and political gains. The increase from May to June for both A-B (up 4.6%) and A-B-C (up 1.2%) population was primarily due to socio-economic gains, followed by political and security increases. Decreased enemy activity in the second half of June and friendly force rating improvements stopped the 3-4 month downtrends in II Corps, and produced new upward trends in 17 provinces in all four corps. II Corps showed a net security loss for the quarter, however, and remains a problem area.

Background. This analysis is based on hardcopy reports from MACV, including province security data. Data on the 139 Hamlet Evaluation System (HES/70) questions is not yet available, nor have we been able to complete an assessment of friendly participation in Cambodian operations for June.

Countrywide and Corps Results. Pacification recovered in June from two straight months of enemy high-point activity, and registered significant socio-economic and political gains in the countryside. The one-month increase from May to June for both A-B (up 4.6%) and A-B-C (up 1.2%) population was primarily due to socio-economic gains, followed by political and security increases. Table 1 shows that 91.1% of South Vietnam's population was rated A-B-C in June, compared with 89-90% in March-May; 77.1% was rated A-B in June, up from 72-74% in March-May.

TABLE 1

	<u>HES/70 PACIFICATION RATINGS a/</u>								
	<u>1969 (HES/70</u>			<u>1970</u>					
	<u>Test Period)</u>			<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>
	<u>July</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Dec</u>						
A-B Ratings (%)	62.6	63.9	69.3	69.3	69.9	73.5	72.2	72.5	77.1
A-B-C Ratings (%)	81.6	83.3	87.5	87.7	88.2	89.7	89.1	89.9	91.1

a/ Percent of South Vietnam population (17.9 million in June). Saigon, Danang Dec. data used for July-Nov. also. Pleiku May data used for April also. May data for Chau Doc corrected for keypunch errors.

Enemy activity dropped off sharply in the last two weeks of June, leading to an overall improvement in HES/70 security ratings after the April and May enemy high points. Security improved 2.4% in A-B population in June countrywide; Table 2 shows that security ratings (A-B population) registered gains of .8-4.5% in the four corps areas over May levels.

-- I Corps recovered sharply from significant losses in May, led by improvement in the southern I Corps province of Quang Ngai.

-- Only II Corps (63% A-B) remained below March levels (65%), reflecting the cumulative impact during the quarter of enemy campaigns in many provinces, including Phu Yen.

-- III and IV Corps continued upward trends established in May.

185

CONFIDENTIAL

OASD/SA

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 2
PACIFICATION SUB-MODEL SCORES ^{a/}

% Pop Rated A-B By Corps	Security				Political		Socio- Economic		Pacification			
	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Mar	Jun	Mar	Jun	Mar	Apr	May	Jun
I	76.3	75.9	74.4	78.8	75.9	82.8	31.9	42.8	72.1	72.7	70.8	76.8
II	64.8	59.8	61.0	63.0	67.5	71.5	42.3	51.8	62.2	60.1	60.0	64.3
III	87.6	85.9	87.4	88.2	91.8	94.3	77.1	83.7	89.5	88.6	89.0	91.4
IV	63.6	60.5	63.7	66.9	70.7	76.3	49.9	57.8	65.3	62.9	64.6	70.8
SVN	73.5	71.0	72.5	74.9	77.6	81.7	54.0	62.3	73.5	72.2	72.5	77.1

^{a/} Percent of population. Pleiku data for May assumed to apply for April 1970 also. May data Chau Doc province corrected for keypunch errors.

For the first time both socio-economic and political ratings in the HES/70 improved significantly. (Note that most information for these ratings is collected quarterly, not monthly.) Table 2 shows that socio-economic ratings (A-B) population improved 7-11% in the corps areas, and political ratings improved 3-7%. I Corps led the improvements in both ratings. MACV states that the socio-economic improvements are the result of increased activities in the Village Self Development programs; the payment of Ministry of Social Welfare benefits to refugees and displaced persons; and an overall revitalization of interest and activity at the local level.

Province Security Trends. Although month-to-month countrywide and corps trends are considered reasonably accurate, MACV has found that for analyzing individual provinces, one-month changes in its HES security ratings are not a particularly reliable indicator when considered alone. Therefore, this analysis recognizes "confirmed" trends in province security ratings only when HES scores moved in the same direction for two or more months.

The map on the next page and the data in Table 3 shows that the reduced enemy activity in late June apparently stopped all the downward trends noted in April-May, and established upward trends in 17 provinces in all four corps:

-- In I Corps, Quang Nam recovered from April-May A-B losses, but still showed a decline in A-B-C due to increased enemy presence. Quang Ngai showed a significant improvement mainly due to improved friendly force presence near hamlets.


-- In II Corps, Binh Dinh showed a tenuous improvement for the second month in a row, but enemy presence remains strong. The broad band of provinces from the northern border areas to the coastal lowlands of Phu Yen-Khanh Hoa are still in a shaky security position after April-May enemy campaigns, and most showed net security (A-B) losses for the quarter as a whole.

^{1/} Note that the downward trend noted last month in May in Chau Doc province was due to a data processing error. Corrected May data showed an increase in security in Chau Doc.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

"CONFIRMED" HES/70
SECURITY TRENDS
as of
June 30, 1970
Based on A-B Security Scores



Security in downward trend for
last 2 or more months.*



Security in upward trend for
last 2 or more months.*

* 5,000 or more population
involved in trend (gained or
lost from A-B)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-- The entire band of III-IV Corps provinces bordering Cambodia showed marked security improvements in May-June in the wake of allied Cambodian operations. (Tay Ninh regressed 1.7% in June after improving 15% in May.) In addition, security showed signs of improving in the troubled Dinh Tuong-Kien Hoa area of northern IV Corps, primarily because of improved friendly force ratings.

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 3

CONFIDENTIAL

RES SECURITY SCORES
(% of population rated A-B)

Province	1969 Dec	Changes		1970 June	Current Trends in A-B Population	
		Jan-Mar	Apr-June		Direction and Number of Months	A-B Pop. Gain or Loss During Trend
Quang Tri	87.4	+ 3.9	+ 2.4	93.7		
Thua Thien	77.4	+12.4	+ 6.3	96.1	Up (4 mos.)	+ 80,400
Quang Nam	57.6	+ 8.1	- 8.4	57.3		
Quang Tin	70.6	- 2.8	- .9	66.9		
Quang Ngai	66.6	+ 6.3	+13.2	66.1	Up (2 mos.)	+110,200
Hue	100.0	0	0	100.0		
Danang	93.2	+ 6.8	0	100.0		
I Corps	70.3	+ 6.0	+ 2.5	78.8		
Kontum	54.6	+ 8.5	- 1.3	61.8		
Binh Dinh	64.0	- 2.6	+ .7	62.1	Up (2 mos.)	+ 54,900
Pleiku a/	22.4	+11.8	+ 3.1	37.3		
Phu Bon	85.8	-12.2	+ 3.4	77.0		
Phu Yen	65.8	-15.5	- 3.1	47.2		
Darlac	65.6	+ 5.4	- 4.6	66.4		
Khanh Hoa	88.0	0	- 1.8	86.2		
Ninh Thuan	68.4	+ .1	+ 5.2	73.7	Up (2 mos.)	+ 23,000
Tuyen Duc	18.8	- .6	+ 5.6	23.8		
Quang Duc	16.0	+15.3	+16.8	48.1		
Lam Dong	98.4	-16.0	- 4.3	78.1		
Binh Thuan	49.0	+ 9.3	- 1.7	56.6	Up (2 mos.)	+ 18,500
Cam Ranh	89.5	+ 4.6	-17.9	76.2		
Dalat	87.4	- 3.4	-47.0	39.0		
II Corps	64.0	+ .8	- 1.8	63.0		
Binh Tuy	52.4	+ 1.8	-11.2	43.0		
Long Khanh	39.7	+14.0	+32.1	85.8		
Phuoc Long	27.0	-49.1	+ 6.2	82.3	Up (2 mos.)	+ 7,700
Binh Long	43.9	+12.7	- 6.9	49.7	Up (2 mos.)	+ 5,000
Binh Duong	65.5	+14.7	+ 5.2	85.4		
Tay Ninh	83.9	+10.2	- 1.4	92.7		
Nam Nghia	15.8	+ 5.3	+ 7.1	28.2	Up (2 mos.)	+17,000
Bien Hoa	69.7	+16.8	- 4.3	82.2		
Phuoc Tuy	52.2	+10.6	+ .7	63.7		
Long An	65.7	+10.7	+ 5.4	81.8	Up (2 mos.)	+ 30,500
Gia Dinh	85.7	+ 5.7	- 1.5	89.5		
Vung Tau	100.0	0	0	100.0		
Saigon	98.4	+ .3	0	98.7		
IV Corps	61.7	+ 5.9	+ .6	68.2		
Go Cong	24.8	+ 6.9	+ .4	32.1	Up (2 mos.)	+ 17,300
Kien Tuong	62.7	-10.0	+33.7	86.4	Up (3 mos.)	+ 17,500
Kien Phong	60.5	+17.4	+10.4	88.3	Up (2 mos.)	+ 76,500
Binh Tuong	45.2	+ 9.5	+10.9	65.6	Up (2 mos.)	+ 83,100
Kien Hoa	37.2	+ 8.1	+10.3	55.6	Up (2 mos.)	+101,500
Vinh Binh	13.4	+11.5	-17.6	37.3		
Vinh Long	47.9	+ 2.6	+ 8.7	59.2	Up (3 mos.)	+ 30,100
An Giang	97.7	+ 2.3	0	100.0		
Kien Giang	32.7	+ 1.3	+ 5.3	39.3		
Chuong Thien	32.5	+21.8	- 9.7	44.6		
Phong Dinh	69.5	- .4	- 1.0	68.1		
Ba Xuyen	71.4	+ 5.8	+ .1	77.3		
An Xuyen	45.0	+ 9.0	- 6.0	48.0		
Bao Lieu	46.1	-22.4	+ 5.8	29.5	Up (2 mos.)	+ 20,800
Chau Doc b/	68.4	+ 1.6	+ 6.4	76.4	Up (2 mos.)	+40,500
Sa Dec	69.5	+ 3.3	+ 5.4	78.2		
IV Corps	56.5	+ 7.1	+ 3.3	66.9		
SVN	68.1	+ 5.4	+ 1.4	74.9		

a/ Due to April reporting error, May data assumed to April 1970 also.
b/ May data corrected for keypunch error.

CONFIDENTIAL

This preliminary analysis is based on countrywide and corps ratings from the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES/70) for July which arrived yesterday from Saigon. Detailed analysis of province-by-province data will be available in about one week.

Pacification continued to progress during the month of July, the first month of the new GVN Special Pacification and Development Plan, primarily as a result of improved security during a low point in enemy activity. The improvement was reflected in increases for both A-B (up .9%) and A-B-C (up 1.3%) population. The table below shows that 92.4% of South Vietnam's population was rated A-B-C in July, compared with 91.1% in June; 78.0% was rated A-B in July, up from 77.1% in June.

HES/70 PACIFICATION RATINGS a/

	1969 (HES/70 Test Period)			1970				
	<u>July</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>
A-B Ratings (%)	62.6	63.9	69.3	73.5	72.2	72.5	77.1	78.0
A-B-C Ratings (%)	81.6	83.3	87.5	89.7	89.1	89.9	91.1	92.4

a/ Percent of South Vietnam population (17.9 million in July). Saigon, Danang Dec. data used for July-Nov. also. Pleiku May data used for April also. May data for Chau Doc corrected for keypunch errors.

Security improved 2.9% in A-B population in July, probably due to the drop-off in enemy activity during the month. Gains of 1.8-5.1% were registered in the four Military Regions (MRs). II MR improved for the third straight month to 68.1%, surpassing the March level of 64.8%; there are indications the enemy terror campaign in Phu Yen province and others in northern II MR is subsiding.

PACIFICATION SUB-MODEL SCORES a/

% Pop Rated A-B	Security					Pacification				
	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>
I MR	76.3	75.9	74.4	73.9	82.3	72.1	72.7	70.8	76.8	78.9
II MR	64.8	59.8	61.0	63.0	68.1	62.2	60.1	60.0	64.3	66.1
III MR	87.6	85.9	87.4	88.2	90.7	89.5	88.6	89.0	91.4	92.0
IV MR	63.6	60.5	63.7	65.8	68.6	65.3	62.9	64.6	70.8	70.9
RVN	73.5	71.0	72.5	74.9	77.8	73.5	72.2	72.5	77.1	78.0

a/ Percent of population. Pleiku data for May assumed to apply for April 1970 also. May data Chau Doc province corrected for keypunch errors.

CONFIDENTIAL

OASD/SA
August 18, 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

Aug 70

HES/70 DATA FOR JULY 1970

Summary. Pacification progressed during July at the same average rate (about 1% a month) experienced for the last twelve months under Hamlet Evaluation System (HES/70). The increases in July for A-B (up .9%) and A-B-C (up 1.3%) population were primarily due to continued recovery from the high levels of enemy activity in I and II MR (Corps) during April-May, together with continued security improvements in the 11 provinces bordering Cambodia. The GVN's Special Pacification campaign, which began July 1, have not yet increased the rate of improvement in scores as previous accelerated campaigns have done.

Most (35) provinces showed improvements in July, and 26 improved for the second or third month in a row. Two provinces showed serious downtrends for the second straight month: Binh Tuy (in III MR), where the US 199th Light Infantry Brigade and RF/PF have been conducting operations against an active NVA Regiment (the 33rd), and Chuong Thien (in IV MR), where the ARVN 21st Division was slow to return to its local operations after participating in highly successful Cambodian operations.

The primary effect of the Cambodian operations on pacification was to reduce the size of VC/NVA forces in or near populated areas in the 11 provinces bordering Cambodia. From April 30 to July 31 the percentage of population free from any VC/NVA main or local forces increased 24% in border provinces, but only 5% in non-border provinces.

Background. This analysis is based on complete HES/70 data through July 1970, and reflects the responses of US District Advisors to the 139 monthly and quarterly HES/70 questions about each hamlet and village in South Vietnam. It includes a preliminary assessment of the effects of the Cambodian operations on pacification in the 11 provinces bordering Cambodia. The analysis of overall effects is not yet complete.

Countrywide and Corps Results. Pacification continued to progress throughout the country during July, which was a low month for enemy activity, and the first month of the GVN's four-month Special 1970 Pacification and Development Plan. The improvement was reflected in increases for both A-B (up .9%) and A-B-C (up 1.3%) population. Table 1 shows that 92.4% of South Vietnam's population was rated A-B-C in July, compared with 91.1% in June; 78.0% was rated A-B in July, up from 77.1% in June.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 1

HES/70 PACIFICATION RATINGS a/

	1969 (HES/70 Test Period)			1970				
	<u>July</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>
A-B Ratings (%)	62.1	63.9	69.3	73.5	72.2	72.6	77.1	78.0
A-B-C Ratings (%)	81.1	82.8	87.5	89.7	89.1	89.9	91.1	92.4

a/ Percent of South Vietnam population (17.9 million in July). Saigon, Danang Dec. data used for July-Nov. also. Pleiku May data used for April also. May data for Chau Doc corrected for keypunch errors.

The rate of progress continues to be about 1% a month for both A-B and A-B-C population, the same average rate experienced for the past months under the HES/70. After one month of the Special P&D Plan, however, the rate of improvement has not increased countrywide as it did with the 1968 and 1969 GVN Accelerated Pacification Campaigns (APCs). The lack of acceleration may be due to the GVN's concentration on consolidating previous gains, rather than expansion into the few remaining contested areas. (Graph 1 indicates the progress made under the two APCs, showing both old HES and HES/70 A-B and A-B-C population percentages for the last 2½ years.)

The population rated A-B in security improved 2.9% in July, primarily due to continued recovery from the high April-May levels of enemy activity in I and II MR, together with continued security improvements in the 11 provinces bordering Cambodia (see section on Cambodia below).

Table 2 shows that gains of 3.4-5.1% were registered in A-B population in I-II MR, where enemy activity near population centers was low in July. II MR improved for the third straight month to 68.1%, surpassing the March level of 64.8%; there are indications the enemy terror campaign in Phu Yen province and others in II MR subsided some what in July. III-IV MR increased 1.8-2.5% in A-B population, about the same rate as in the previous 2-3 months.

Political and socio-economic ratings changed very little in July, because they depend primarily on responses given quarterly (June, September, etc.).


CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CHART 1

% of RVN
Population

HES AND HES/70 PACIFICATION RATINGS



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 2

PACIFICATION SUB-MODEL SCORES a/
(% of Population Rated A-B)

	Security					Political			Socio-Economic		
	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Mar	June	July	Mar	June	July
I MR	76.3	75.9	74.4	78.9	82.3	75.9	82.8	82.5	31.9	42.8	43.6
II MR	64.8	59.7	61.0	63.0	68.1	67.5	71.5	70.3	42.3	51.8	51.6
III MR	87.6	85.9	87.4	88.2	90.7	91.8	94.3	94.0	77.1	83.7	83.6
IV MR	63.6	60.5	63.7	66.8	68.6	70.7	76.3	74.1	49.9	57.8	57.9
RVN	73.5	71.0	72.5	74.9	77.8	77.6	82.2	81.1	54.0	62.3	62.5

a/ Pleiku data for May assumed to apply for April 1970 also. May data for Chau Doc province corrected for keypunch errors.

Province Security Trends. Most (35 out of 44) provinces showed improvements in July, and 26 improved for the second or third month in a row (see map, and Table 3). The greatest single factor contributing to the improvements was the lull in enemy activity. The provinces in I and II MR which had suffered most during the April-May high points of enemy activity all showed increases for the second or third month in a row.


Two provinces showed serious downtrends for the second straight month. Binh Tuy in III MR dropped from 48.2% A-B (security) in May to 21.5% in July, because of the presence and activities of an NVA regiment (the 33rd) and local force units in the populated areas of the province. The US Province Senior Advisor (PSA) reported that search operations were conducted throughout the province by RF/PF forces and elements of the US 199th Infantry Brigade with no significant results; the US forces appeared to account for most of the results (48 enemy KIA by US forces, vs 14 by RF/PF), even though the RF/PF participated in joint operations with the US.

Chuong Thien province in IV MR declined from 54.3% A-B in May to 38.0% in July, approximately the same level as in December 1969. In June, the PSA reported that the ARVN 21st Division's reaction to tactical intelligence and its support for RF/PF units in contact "varied from inadequate to non-existent." He speculated that the Division "may have temporarily lost its stomach for hard fighting after the easy victories of Cambodia." In July, he reported a somewhat improved situation: support from the 21st Division had improved, a district chief has been replaced, and the enemy was complying with COSVN directives by attacking only targets of opportunity with indirect fire and small arms fire.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

"CONFIRMED" HES/70
SECURITY TRENDS
as of
July 31, 1970
Based on A-B Security Scores



CONFIDENTIAL 27

195

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 3

HES SECURITY SCORES
(% of Population Rated A-B)

Province	Dec 69	Mar 70	Changes				July 70	Number Months & Direction	A-B Population Gain/Loss
			Apr	May	June	July			
Quang Tri	87.4	91.3	+ .4	- 8.2	+10.2	- 4.8	88.9	Up 5 mos.	
Thua Thien/Hue	83.5	92.7	+ 3.0	+ .8	+ .6	0	97.1	Up 5 mos.	+93,100
Quang Nam/Danang	71.6	79.2	- 1.7	- 4.7	+ 1.4	+ 5.9	80.1	Up 2 mos.	+ 77,300
Quang Tin	70.6	67.8	+ 1.7	- 2.8	+ .2	+13.2	80.1	Up 2 mos.	+31,300
Quang Ngai	46.6	52.9	- 4.2	+ 4.2	+13.2	+ 1.3	67.4	Up 3 mos.	+125,600
I MR	70.3	76.3	- .4	- 1.5	+ 4.5	+ 3.4	82.3		
Kontum	54.6	63.1	- 4.1	- .3	+ 3.1	+15.6	77.6	Up 2 mos.	+ 25,600
Binh Dinh	64.0	61.4	- 4.9	+ 3.2	+ 2.4	+ 3.6	65.7	Up 3 mos.	+ 77,680
Pleiku a/	22.4	54.2	- 6.1	0	+ 9.3	+ 3.6	61.0	Up 2 mos.	+ 25,900
Phu Bon	85.8	73.6	- 5.5	- .3	+ 9.1	+12.6	89.5	Up 2 mos.	+ 13,900
Phu Yen	65.8	50.3	- 3.8	- 4.4	+ 5.1	+10.0	57.2	Up 2 mos.	+51,000
Darlac	65.6	71.0	- 4.3	+ 2.3	- 2.6	+ 5.5	71.9		
Khanh Hoa/Cam Ranh	88.3	89.2	- 1.5	- 3.8	+ .4	- 1.6	82.7		
Ninh Thuan	68.4	68.5	- 7.0	+ 7.5	+ 4.6	- .3	73.3		
Tuyen Duc/Dalat	49.0	46.5	-11.2	+ 4.5	- 9.6	+ 4.3	34.5		
Quang Duc	16.0	31.3	- 5.0	+22.9	- 1.1	+18.1	66.2		
Lam Dong	98.4	82.4	- 6.2	+ 4.0	- 2.1	+15.9	94.0		
Binh Thuan	49.0	58.3	- 8.5	+ 2.7	+ 4.1	+11.1	67.7	Up 3 mos.	+ 49,400
II MR	64.0	64.8	- 5.1	+ 1.3	+ 2.0	+ 5.1	68.1		
Binh Tuy	52.4	54.2	-10.4	+ 4.4	- 5.2	-21.5	21.5	Down 2 mos.	- 18,800
Long Khanh	39.7	53.7	-13.5	+16.6	- .9	+ 2.6	88.5		
Phuoc Long	27.0	76.1	-10.3	+ 6.9	+ 9.6	+ 4.0	86.3	Up 3 mos.	+ 10,100
Binh Long	43.9	56.6	-11.0	+ 2.7	+ 1.4	+23.5	75.2	Up 3 mos.	+ 22,900
Binh Duong	65.5	80.2	+ 3.6	- 3.5	+ 5.1	+ 2.5	87.9	Up 2 mos.	+ 18,900
Tay Ninh	83.9	94.1	-14.9	+15.2	- 1.7	+ 2.6	95.3		
Hau Nghia	15.8	21.1	- .1	+ 3.1	+ 4.2	+18.6	46.9	Up 3 mos.	+ 55,800
Bien Hoa	69.7	86.5	+ .5	-12.8	+ 8.0	+ 2.6	84.8	Up 2 mos.	+ 52,600
Phuoc Tuy/Vung Tau	72.6	78.8	- 4.4	- 1.7	+ 6.6	+ 3.8	83.1	Up 2 mos.	+ 26,900
Long An	65.7	76.4	- 2.5	+ 5.5	+ 2.5	+ 1.0	82.9	Up 3 mos.	+ 36,300
Gia Dinh/Saigon	93.8	96.0	+ .1	+ .1	- .8	+ 1.5	96.9		
III MR	81.7	87.6	- 1.7	+ 1.5	+ .8	+ 2.5	90.7		
Go Cong	84.8	91.7	- 9.1	+ 7.1	+ 2.5	+ .6	92.8	Up 3 mos.	+ 20,600
Kien Tuong	62.7	52.7	+ 9.2	+ 5.2	+19.3	+10.6	97.0	Up 4 mos.	+ 24,000
Kien Phong	60.5	77.9	- 4.2	+10.5	+ 2.1	+ 3.4	91.7	Up 3 mos.	+ 81,300
Dinh Tuong	45.2	54.7	- 3.5	+ 5.5	+10.0	+ .3	65.9	Up 3 mos.	+ 84,100
Kien Hoa	37.2	45.3	- 7.0	+ 6.5	+10.9	+ 1.6	57.2	Up 3 mos.	+116,200
Vinh Binh	13.4	54.9	-21.2	+ 9.6	- 3.0	+11.7	49.0		
Vinh Long	47.9	50.5	+ .4	+ 2.5	+ 5.5	+ 8.7	67.9	Up 4 mos.	+ 96,300
An Giang	97.7	100.0	0	0	0	0	100.0		
Kien Giang	52.7	54.0	+ 1.5	- 3.3	+ 4.1	- 5.9	53.4		
Chuong Thien	32.5	54.3	- 1.3	+ 1.3	- 9.7	- 6.6	38.0	Down 2 mos.	- 36,100
Phong Dinh	69.5	69.1	- 1.3	+ .4	- .2	+ 1.2	69.2		
Ba Xuyen	71.4	77.2	+ 2.0	- 3.6	+ 1.9	+ 2.0	79.3	Up 2 mos.	+ 20,800
An Xuyen	45.0	54.0	- 5.3	+ 1.3	- 2.0	+ 6.8	54.8		
Bac Lieu	46.1	23.7	- 1.8	+ 1.4	+ 6.2	+ 4.2	33.7	Up 3 mos.	+ 34,100
Chau Doc b/	68.4	70.0	- 1.3	+ 5.2	+ 2.5	- 1.7	74.7		
Sa Dec	69.5	72.8	+ 1.9	+ 3.6	- .3	- .2	78.0	Down 2 mos.	- 2,100
IV MR	56.5	63.6	- 3.1	+ 3.2	+ 3.1	+ 1.8	68.6		
RVN	68.1	73.5	- 2.5	+ 1.5	+ 2.4	+ 2.9	77.8		

a/ Due to April reporting error, May data assumed to hold for April 1970 also.
b/ May data corrected for keypunch error.

CONFIDENTIAL

Effects of Cambodian Operations. The effects on pacification of allied operations in Cambodia can be felt in two ways: (a) security can improve as a result of disruption to enemy activities in and near the Cambodian base areas, and (b) movement of friendly forces to Cambodia can reduce support to pacification in the provinces furnishing the forces. This analysis concentrates on measuring (a); we do not yet have complete data on friendly forces in order to completely examine (b). Therefore, the following analysis should be considered as a preliminary and not yet complete.

The primary effect of the Cambodian operations on pacification in the 11 provinces bordering Cambodia was to reduce the amount of VC/NVA forces in or near populated areas. Table 4 shows that from April 30 to July 31 the percentage of population in villages free from any VC/NVA main or local forces nearby increased 24% (from 23% to 47%) in border provinces, but only 5% (from 39% to 44%) in non-border provinces.

The presence of VC/NVA forces is rated every month by US district advisors, and is one of the most important questions in the HES/70 for determining security trends. As a result, Table 5 shows that HES/70 A-B security ratings improved faster in provinces bordering Cambodia (up 15%) than in non-border provinces (up 6%).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 4

SIZE OF MAIN/LOCAL VC/NVA FORCES
NEAR POPULATED AREAS
 (% of Population Affected by Each Size Enemy Force)

	April 1970			July 1970			Change		
	None	Squad Platoon	Co/ Bn	None	Squad Platoon	Co/ Bn	None	Squad Platoon	Co/ Bn
I MR:									
Non-Border	42.0	40.7	16.8	47.1	45.3	7.5	+ 5.1	+ 4.6	- 9.3
II MR:									
Border	3.7	67.5	28.0	20.9	63.5	15.4	+17.2	- 4.0	-12.6
Non-Border	13.3	44.4	42.1	22.4	55.8	21.7	+ 9.1	+11.4	-20.4
Total	11.5	48.8	39.4	22.1	57.3	20.5	+10.6	+ 8.5	-18.9
III MR:									
Border	16.1	69.4	14.4	40.9	52.9	6.2	+24.8	-16.5	- 8.2
Non-Border	62.7	29.7	4.1	64.9	30.6	1.2	+ 2.2	+ .9	- 2.9
Total	57.2	34.4	5.3	61.9	33.3	1.8	+ 4.7	- 1.1	- 3.5
IV MR:									
Border	40.7	42.1	17.2	68.0	20.2	11.8	+27.3	-21.9	- 5.4
Non-Border	26.3	50.4	23.2	31.5	50.3	18.2	+ 5.2	- .1	- 5.0
Total	28.5	49.1	22.3	37.2	45.6	17.2	+ 8.7	- 3.5	- 5.1
RVN:									
Border	23.1	57.3	19.3	47.0	41.9	11.0	+23.9	-15.4	- 8.3
Non-Border	38.8	41.0	19.0	43.6	44.0	11.3	+ 4.8	+ 3.0	- 7.7
Total	36.9	43.0	19.0	44.0	43.7	11.3	+ 7.1	+ .7	- 7.7

TABLE 5

SECURITY IN BORDER VS. NON-BORDER PROVINCES
 % of Population Rated A-B (Security)

	1969	1970					Change
	Dec	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Apr-July
RVN:							
Border	56.9	67.4	62.5	69.3	72.1	77.4	+14.9
Non-Border	69.6	74.4	72.2	73.0	75.3	77.9	+ 5.7
Total	68.1	73.5	71.0	72.5	74.9	77.8	+ 6.8

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

HES DATA FOR AUGUST 1970

This analysis is based on complete data through August 1970 from the revised Hamlet Evaluation System (HES/70) received this week from Saigon.

Countrywide and Corps Results

-- Security improvements produced increased pacification ratings in August for both A-B (up .5%) and A-B-C (up .4%) population.

- The increase in A-B-C population was at about the same rate (.5-.7% per month) experienced for the first half of 1970. As of August, 92.8% of the population was rated A-B-C.

- The GVN's 1970 Special Pacification and Development Plan (July 1-October 31) does not yet seem to be accelerating the rate of increase in A-B and A-B-C population, as did the 1969 Accelerated Pacification Campaign (see chart). The GVN is emphasizing consolidating rather than expanding the area of security.

-- Security improved .7-2.6% (A-B) in II, III, and IV MR (Corps), but dropped slightly (1.0%) in I MR. MACV says the decline in I MR was due to enemy battalion-sized attacks in the Quang Tri lowlands, substantial increase in enemy activity in Quang Ngai province, and a relocation of some population in Quang Nam province from B-C hamlets into unrated hamlets.

-- Political and socio-economic ratings remained about the same (plus or minus 1% in all MRs). Quarterly updates for these ratings are due in September.

Province Security Trends

-- Upward trends occurred in 22 of RVN's 44 provinces for the second month in a row in August. The upward trends were noted throughout II, III, and IV MRs.

-- Downward trends were noted in only 2 provinces:

- Quang Tri province (I MR), where DIA reports elements of the 9th NVA Regiment entered the lowland areas near Hai Lang in early August. Friendly forces intercepted the enemy units en route, however, and inflicted heavy losses.

- Kien Giang province (IV MR), where US advisors reported higher levels of enemy presence and activity.


CONFIDENTIAL

OASD/SA
September 25, 1970

% of RVN
Population

CHART 1

HES AND HES 7C PACIFICATION RATE JS



K-E 3 YEARS BY MONTHS 46 3290
MADE IN U.S.A.
KEUPPEL & ZIEGLER CO.

CONFIDENTIAL

HES/70 PACIFICATION RATINGS a/

	1969 (HES/70 Test Period)			1970					
	<u>July</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Aug</u>
A-B Ratings (%)	62.1	63.9	69.3	73.5	72.2	72.6	77.1	78.0	78.0
A-B-C Ratings (%)	81.1	82.8	87.5	89.7	89.1	89.9	91.1	92.4	92.4

a/ Percent of South Vietnam population (17.9 million in July). Saigon, Danang Dec. data used for July-Nov. also. Pleiku May data used for April also. May data for Chau Doc corrected for keypunch errors.


PACIFICATION SUB-MODEL SCORES a/ (% of Population Rated A-B)

	Security						Political			Socio-Economic		
	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Aug</u>
I MR	76.3	75.9	74.4	78.9	82.3	81.3	75.9	82.8	81.4	31.9	42.8	43.1
II MR	64.8	59.7	61.0	63.0	68.1	70.7	67.5	71.5	69.9	42.3	51.8	51.7
III MR	87.6	85.9	87.4	88.2	90.7	91.4	91.8	94.3	94.0	77.1	83.7	83.8
IV MR	63.6	60.5	63.7	66.8	68.6	70.7	70.7	76.3	74.1	49.9	57.8	58.0
RVN	73.5	71.0	72.5	74.9	77.8	79.0	77.6	82.2	80.8	54.0	62.3	62.4

a/ Pleiku data for May assumed to apply for April 1970 also. May data for Chau Doc province corrected for keypunch errors.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



*5,000 or more population involved in trends (gained or lost from A-B)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

HES DATA FOR SEPTEMBER 1970

This is a preliminary analysis based on countrywide and corps data through September 1970 from the revised Hamlet Evaluation System (HES/70) received yesterday from Saigon. More detailed analysis of province-by-province data will be available when computer tapes arrive next week.

Pacification registered its greatest one-month gain of 1970 in September as a result of continuing relatively low enemy activity, and as the HES/70 quarterly questions registered the initial security, political, and socio-economic results of the July-October GVN Special Pacification and Development Plan. The improvement was reflected in increases for both A-B (up 4.8%) and A-B-C (up 1.1%) population. The table below shows that 93.7% of South Vietnam's population was rated A-B-C in September, compared with 92.6% in August; 82.7% was rated A-B in September, up from 77.9% in August. (All earlier figures have been retrospectively adjusted for a new census estimate for Saigon of 1.7 million, compared with 2.2 million used previously. The change represents weeding out of previously padded figures.)

HES/70 PACIFICATION RATINGS a/

	1969 (HES/70 Test Period)			1970					
	<u>July</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>
A-B Ratings (%)	61.1	62.1	68.5	72.8	71.5	76.5	77.4	77.9	82.7
A-B-C Ratings (%)	80.4	82.2	87.2	89.4	88.6	90.9	92.2	92.6	93.7

a/ Percent of South Vietnam population (17,616,100 in September): Saigon, Danang December 1969 data used for July-November also. September 1970 population estimate for Saigon (1.7 million) used throughout. Pleiku data used for April also. May data for Chau Doc corrected for keypunch errors.

Security improved 2.9% in A-B population, continuing the upward trend of over 2% per month during the period of reduced enemy activity since the April-May enemy high points. The table below shows that gains of 1.6-5.3% were registered in I, III, and IV Military Regions (MRs), while II MR declined slightly (.3%), apparently due to enemy activity in 5-6 provinces throughout the Region. The table also shows that political and socio-economic ratings improved in all MRs during the quarter, possibly as a result of GVN efforts to consolidate pacification gains in B and C hamlets during the July-October campaign.

PACIFICATION SUB-MODEL SCORES a/

	Security						Political			Socio-Economic		
	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sept</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Sept</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Sept</u>
I MR	75.9	74.4	78.9	82.3	81.3	84.4	75.9	82.8	86.9	31.9	42.8	59.6
II MR	59.7	61.0	63.0	68.1	70.7	70.4	67.5	71.5	74.9	42.3	51.8	60.9
III MR	84.6	86.3	87.1	89.9	90.6	92.2	91.1	93.8	95.9	76.3	83.5	87.2
IV MR	60.5	63.7	66.8	68.6	70.7	76.0	70.7	76.3	81.7	49.9	57.8	66.1
RVN	70.2	71.8	74.2	77.2	75.5	81.3	77.0	81.7	85.6	53.1	61.7	70.2

a/ September 1970 population estimate for Saigon (1.7 million) used throughout. Pleiku data used for April also. May data for Chau Doc corrected for keypunch error.

CONFIDENTIAL

OASD/SA
22 October 1970


204

of RVN
pul

CHART 1

CONFIDENTIAL

HES AND HES/70 PACIFICATION RATINGS



NEUFEL & SAKES CO.

Sept/Oct 70

CONFIDENTIAL

PACIFICATION PROGRESS: SEPTEMBER 1970

Summary. Pacification registered its greatest one-month gain of 1970 in September because enemy activity remained low and the HES/70 quarterly questions registered the initial results of the July-October GVN Special Pacification and Development (P&D) campaign. The improvement was reflected in increases for both A-B (up 4.8% to 82.7%) and A-B-C (up 1.1% to 93.7%) population.

Most (32) provinces showed security improvements in September, and 18 improved for at least the second month in a row, including 6 populous key provinces of the upper delta (Long An, Go Cong, Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa, Vinh Binh, and Vinh Long). Twelve provinces declined; 3 of the 12 declined for the second month in a row, but only 1 (Long Khanh) represented a serious problem, according to advisors' reports.

As the war winds down, security problems are being replaced by inflation and the VCI as the primary problem facing the GVN. As of September, the Pacification Attitude Analysis System (PAAS) reported that inflation or financial problems were the most serious problems affecting 61% of rural interviewees, compared to 24% who thought security was their most pressing problem. In September, 55% of the respondents reported that the VCI, plus small-to-medium sized enemy forces, could still enter their hamlets at night.

Background. This analysis is based on complete revised Hamlet Evaluation System (HES/70) data through September 1970, including the responses of US District Advisors to 139 monthly and quarter HES/70 questions about each hamlet and village in South Vietnam. Where possible, the analysis has been supplemented with information from Province Senior Advisor narrative reports, PAAS, and other pacification reports from MACV.

Countrywide and Corps Results. Pacification throughout South Vietnam registered its greatest one-month gain of 1970 in September primarily because enemy activity levels have remained relatively low since May, and because the GVN has made significant improvements in security, political and socio-economic factors, probably as a result of the July-October special P&D campaign. The improvement was reflected in increases for both A-B (up 4.8%) and A-B-C (up 1.1%) population. Table 1 shows that 93.7% of South Vietnam's population was rated A-B-C in September, compared with 92.6% in August; 82.7% was rated A-B in September, up from 77.9% in August. (All percentages prior to September have been retrospectively adjusted to use a new census estimate for Saigon of 1.7 million, compared with 2.2 million used previously. The change represents weeding out of previously padded figures.)

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 1

HES/70 PACIFICATION RATINGS a/

	1969 (HES/70 Test Period)			1970					
	July	Sep	Dec	Mar	Apr	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
A-B Ratings (%)	61.1	62.1	68.5	72.8	71.5	76.5	77.4	77.9	82.7
A-B-C Ratings (%)	80.4	82.2	87.2	89.4	88.6	90.9	92.2	92.6	93.7

a/ Percent of South Vietnam population (17.6 million in September). Saigon, Danang December 1969 data used for July-November also. September 1970 population estimate for Saigon (1.7 million) used throughout. Pleiku data used for April also. May data for Chau Doc corrected for keypunch errors.

Security improvements were correlated in September with low enemy activity levels. September was generally a quiet month, with a one-week surge of small-scale attacks the first week, mainly localized in Military Region II, but also affecting MRs IV and I. As a result, Table 2 shows that A-B population gains (1.6-5.3%) were registered in MRs I, III, and IV, while MR II declined slightly (.3%).

TABLE 2

PACIFICATION SUB-MODEL SCORES a/

	Security						Political			Socio-Economic		
	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sept	Mar	June	Sept	Mar	June	Sept
I MR	75.9	74.4	78.9	82.3	81.3	84.4	75.9	82.8	86.9	31.9	42.8	59.6
II MR	59.7	61.0	63.0	68.1	70.7	70.4	67.5	71.5	74.9	42.3	51.8	60.9
III MR	84.6	86.3	87.1	89.9	90.6	92.2	91.1	93.8	95.9	76.3	83.5	87.2
IV MR	60.5	63.7	66.8	68.6	70.7	76.0	70.7	76.3	81.7	49.9	57.8	66.1
RVT	70.2	71.8	74.2	77.2	77.4	77.3	77.0	81.7	85.6	53.1	61.7	70.2

a/ Percent of South Vietnam population (17.6 million in September). Saigon, Danang December 1969 data used for July-November also. September 1970 population estimate for Saigon (1.7 million) used throughout. Pleiku data used for April also. May data for Chau Doc corrected for keypunch errors.

The July-October Special F&D campaign undoubtedly contributed to the improvement in security for the third quarter of 1970, as well as to improved political and socio-economic ratings. The campaign was aimed at consolidating security and development in "C" hamlets, and probably produced at least part of the 7% A-B security gain since June 30.

CONFIDENTIAL

In development, socio-economic ratings showed particularly large gains from June to September, especially in MR I (up 17% A-B). The gains resulted primarily from new project starts reported in the Village Self Development program, but little information is available on whether work has actually started on the projects or on the depth of community support for the projects. Overall, the special P&D campaign has not accelerated the steady quarter-to-quarter increases in political (4-5% per quarter) and socio-economic (8-9% per quarter) ratings achieved throughout 1970, but it may help to consolidate prior gains by the time it concludes (October 31). (Graph 1 indicates the progress made under the 1968, 1969, and 1970 pacification campaigns, showing both old HES and HES/70 A-B and A-B-C population percentages for the past 2 1/2 years.)

Province Security Trends. Most (32 out of 44) provinces showed improvements in September, and 18 improved for at least the second month in a row (see map, and Table 3). Some of the brightest spots are 6 populous key provinces of the upper delta--Long An in MR III, and Go Cong, Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa, Vinh Binh, and Vinh Long in MR IV--which together account for 20% of the non-Saigon population of South Vietnam, and which have long been considered important by the VC. All six have been showing steady increases in security since April. Three of the six are in the area protected by the ARVN 7th Division, which has scored major successes under its new commander in the past year.

Twelve provinces declined in security in September, mostly in MRs II and IV where the enemy concentrated his one-week surge in activity. Only three provinces declined for the second month in a row--Kontum and Quang Duc in MR II, and Long Khanh in MR III. In each case, examination of the detailed HES/70 questions indicates that security declined because friendly forces made light contact with enemy forces near populated areas. In only one case (Long Khanh) did the enemy achieve any marked improvement in his overall presence and activity, according to Province Senior Advisor reports. All twelve provinces which declined in September will be monitored closely in coming months.


Enemy Strategy. More than one year has passed since COSVN promulgated its Resolution 9 ordering a return to "protracted warfare" tactics throughout South Vietnam. This lower profile, coupled with redeployments of major enemy units to Cambodia after the fall of the Lon Nol government and subsequent cross-border operations by US and ARVN forces, has undoubtedly contributed to the apparent growth in security as measured by HES/70. The following report from MACV/CORDS indicates how COSVN 9 is being carried out:

"In general the enemy seems to be trying to replace local force and infrastructure losses. His tactics are protracted war tactics--terror, recruitment, and agitation...Reports from provinces as different and as far away from one another as Vinh Binh and Thua Thien indicate that VC units are continuing to break down into platoons and squads, or as in Thua Thien and MR II, into special action teams (5-10 men) to be used for terror and for collection of intelligence and supplies. Several provinces

CHART 1

CONFIDENTIAL


HES AND HES/70 PACIFICATION RATINGS



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

"CONFIRMED" HES/70
SECURITY TRENDS
as of
September 30, 1970
Based on A-B Security Scores



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 3

HES SECURITY SCORES (% of Population Faced A-3)

Province	Dec 69	Mar 70	Changes					Sep	Sep 70	No. Months & Direction Of Trend
			Apr	May	June	July	Aug			
Quang Tri	87.4	71.3	+ .4	- 8.2	+10.2	- 4.8	- 5.0	+ 7.1	91.0	
Thua Thien/Hue	83.5	92.7	+ 3.0	+ .2	+ .6	0	- .6	+ 2.0	98.5	
Quang Nam/Danang	71.6	79.2	- 1.7	- 4.7	- 1.4	+ 5.9	- .4	+ 3.7	83.4	
Quang Tin	70.6	67.8	+ 1.7	- 2.7	- .2	+13.2	- .2	+ 3.9	83.8	
Quang Ngai	46.6	52.9	- 4.2	+ 4.2	-13.2	+ 1.3	- .5	+ 1.2	68.1	
I MR	70.3	76.3	- .4	- 1.5	- .5	+ 3.4	- 1.0	+ 3.0	84.3	
Kontum	54.6	63.1	- 4.1	- .3	+ 3.1	+15.8	- 5.0	- 2.3	70.3	Down 2 mos.
Binh Dinh	64.0	61.4	- 4.9	+ 3.2	+ 2.4	+ 3.6	+ 2.9	- 6.7	61.9	
Pleiku a/	22.4	54.2	- 6.1	0	+ 9.3	+ 3.6	+ 4.5	- 3.6	61.9	
Phu Bon	85.8	73.6	- 5.5	- .3	+ 9.1	+12.6	+ 2.8	- 6.4	85.9	
Phu Yen	65.8	50.3	- 3.6	- 1.7	+ 5.1	+10.0	- .4	+ 8.1	64.9	
Darlac	65.6	71.0	- 4.3	+ 2.3	- 2.6	+ 5.5	+ .9	+10.2	83.0	Up 3 mos.
Khanh Hoa/Cam Ranh	88.3	89.2	- 1.5	- 3.8	+ .4	- 1.6	+ 9.8	- 7.5	85.0	
Ninh Thuan	68.4	68.5	- 7.0	+ 7.5	+ 4.6	- .3	0	+23.7	97.0	
Tuyen Duc/Dalat	49.0	46.5	-11.2	+ 4.5	- 9.0	+ 4.3	+ .9	+ 7.1	42.5	Up 3 mos.
Quang Duc	16.0	31.3	- 5.0	+22.9	- 1.1	+18.1	- 8.4	-27.4	30.4	Down 2 mos.
Lam Dong	98.4	82.4	- 6.2	+ 4.0	- 2.1	+15.9	- 9.0	+ 3.1	88.1	
Binh Thuan	49.0	58.3	- 8.5	+ 2.7	+ 4.1	+11.1	+ 1.3	+ 1.8	70.8	Up 5 mos.
II MR	64.0	64.8	- 5.1	+ 1.3	- 2.0	+ 5.1	+ 2.6	- .3	70.4	
Binh Tuy	52.4	54.2	-10.4	+ 4.4	- 5.2	-21.5	+23.1	+13.5	58.1	Up 2 mos.
Long Khanh	39.7	53.7	-13.5	+46.6	- .9	+ 2.6	- 3.7	-33.9	50.9	Down 2 mos.
Phuoc Long	27.0	76.1	-10.3	+ 6.3	+ 9.6	+ 4.0	+ 4.0	- 4.3	94.6	
Binh Long	43.9	56.6	-11.0	+ 2.7	- 1.4	+25.5	+11.7	+ 8.0	94.8	Up 5 mos.
Binh Duong	65.5	80.2	+ 3.6	- 3.5	+ 5.1	+ 2.5	+ 2.8	+ 3.0	93.7	Up 4 mos.
Tay Ninh	83.9	94.1	-14.9	+15.2	- 1.7	+ 2.6	+ .2	- 4.6	90.9	
Hau Nghia	15.8	21.1	- .1	+ 3.1	+ 1.2	+16.6	- .5	+ 3.1	49.5	
Bien Hoa	69.7	86.5	+ .5	-12.2	- 2.0	+ 2.6	+ 3.0	+ 1.0	88.8	Up 4 mos.
Phuoc Tuy/Vung Tau	72.6	78.8	- 4.4	- 1.7	+ 6.6	+ 3.8	+ 1.0	+ 8.7	92.8	Up 4 mos.
Long An	65.7	76.4	- 2.5	- 5.5	- 2.5	+ 1.0	+ 1.6	+ 6.1	90.6	Up 5 mos.
Gia Dinh/Saigon c/	93.1	95.5	0	+ 2.1	- .9	+ 1.8	- .2	+ 2.4	98.7	
III MR	80.0	86.5	- 1.9	+ 1.7	+ .8	+ 2.8	+ .7	+ 1.6	92.2	
Go Cong	84.8	91.7	- 9.1	- 7.1	- 2.5	+ .6	+ 2.4	+ 2.4	97.6	Up 5 mos.
Kien Tuong	62.7	52.7	+ 9.2	+ 5.2	-29.3	+10.6	- .1	+ 2.4	99.3	
Kien Phong	60.5	77.9	- 4.2	-10.5	+ 4.1	+ 3.4	- .8	+ .8	91.7	
Dinh Tuong	45.2	54.7	- 3.5	+ 4.7	-10.0	+ .3	+ 1.1	+ 6.4	73.4	Up 5 mos.
Kien Hoa	37.2	45.3	- 7.0	- 6.4	-10.9	+ 1.6	+ 4.8	+ 9.5	71.5	Up 5 mos.
Vinh Binh	13.4	54.9	-24.2	+ 9.6	- 3.0	+11.7	+ 3.6	+ 1.0	53.6	Up 3 mos.
Vinh Long	47.9	50.5	+ .4	+ 2.5	- 5.5	+ 8.7	+ 2.4	+ 2.9	73.2	Up 6 mos.
An Giang	97.7	100.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	100.0	
Kien Giang	52.7	54.0	+ 4.5	- 3.3	- 1.1	- 5.9	- 3.3	+11.9	62.0	
Chuong Thien	32.5	54.3	- 1.3	+ 1.3	- 9.7	- 6.6	+ 6.0	+ 9.6	53.6	Up 2 mos.
Phong Dinh	69.5	69.1	- 1.3	- .1	- .2	+ 1.2	+ .9	- 1.0	69.1	
Ba Xuyen	71.4	77.2	+ 2.0	- 3.8	- 1.9	+ 2.0	+ 3.6	- 2.6	80.3	
An Xuyen	45.0	54.0	- 5.3	+ 1.3	- 2.0	+ 6.8	+ 5.7	+ 3.0	63.5	Up 3 mos.
Bac Lieu	46.1	23.7	- 1.8	+ 1.7	- 6.2	+ 4.2	+ 1.4	+36.2	71.3	Up 5 mos.
Chau Doc b/	68.4	70.0	- 1.3	+ 5.2	- 2.5	- 1.7	+ 2.2	+ 9.8	86.7	Up 2 mos.
Sa Pec	69.5	72.8	+ 1.9	- 3.2	- .3	- .2	+ 6.9	- 5.1	79.8	
IV MR	56.5	63.6	- 3.1	+ 3.2	- 5.1	+ 1.8	+ 2.1	+ 5.3	76.0	
RVN	67.2	72.8	- 2.6	+ 1.6	+ 2.4	+ 3.0	+ 1.2	+ 2.9	81.3	

- a/ Due to April reporting error, May data assumed to hold for April 1970
 b/ May data corrected for keypunch error.
 c/ September Saigon population estimate (1.7 million) used in all months.

CONFIDENTIAL

in MR IV report that VC units have been ordered to become self-sustaining because of supply shortages. These orders indicate an effort on Hanoi's part to encourage self-sufficiency again (as during the early 1960's) now that it is more difficult to supply units in the South, especially those units in MRs III and IV.

"In certain provinces such as Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, and to some extent Kien Giang, the pacification program is under pressure. VC terrorism has been especially bad in Binh Dinh and Phu Yen. The only provinces where a major military threat exists, however, are Quang Tri and Thua Thien, and this threat is up in the hills, not in the populated lowlands." (Emphasis added)

Major GVN Problem Areas. As the war winds down, the GVN is faced with solving two major problems which had previously been of somewhat lower priority: inflation, and the Phoenix program. As of September, the PAAS indicated that 61% of the respondents, primarily in rural areas, thought prices or financial problems were the most severe problems facing them at the time, followed by 24% who thought security was their worst problem. At the same time, the VCI were still strong: 55% of respondents in September reported that VCI and small-to-medium sized enemy forces can enter hamlets at night.

The following is a MACV/CORDS report on the inflation problem; the Phoenix program is discussed elsewhere in this issue of the Analysis Report.

"In many areas of the country, including almost all the delta, the security problem has receded in importance for the ordinary citizen and has been replaced by concern about inflation. In such areas, the war has almost faded away and peacetime problems are now paramount. Such attitudes have been measured by the PAAS, and reflect the change in public concern from the security issue to the pocket-book issue. We are giving increasing credence to the PAAS since it accurately called the first five winning senate lists, in order."

CONFIDENTIAL

(**CONFIDENTIAL**)

HES DATA FOR OCTOBER 1970

This is a preliminary analysis based on countrywide and corps data through October 1970 from the revised Hamlet Evaluation System (HES/70) received today from Saigon. More detailed province-by-province data will be available next week.

Pacification registered moderate gains in October, the final month of the July-October GVN Special Pacification and Development (P&D) campaign, with the largest increases in political and socio-economic ratings. The improvement was reflected in increases of .6% for both A-B and A-B-C population. The table below shows that 94.3% of South Vietnam's population was rated A-B-C in October, compared with 93.7% in September; 83.3% was rated A-B in October, up from 82.7% in September.

HES/70 PACIFICATION RATINGS a/

	<u>1969 (HES/70 Test Period)</u>			<u>1970</u>					
	<u>July</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>
A-B Ratings (%)	61.3	62.3	68.6	72.9	71.5	76.6	77.9	82.7	83.3
A-B-C Ratings (%)	80.6	82.4	87.3	89.4	88.8	90.8	92.6	93.7	94.3

Percent of South Vietnam population (17.7 million in October). Saigon, Danang December 1969 data used for July-November 1969 also. September 1970 population estimate for Saigon (1.7 million) used throughout. Pleiku data (April) and Chau Doc (May) adjusted for errors.

Security remained relatively constant in October with A-B population increasing only .3% countrywide, possibly reflecting a leveling-off at the end of the GVN Special P&D campaign after large increases in September (2.9%). Enemy activity levels remained low in October, as they have since the April-May high points. The table below shows that security gains of .2-.6% were registered in all four Military Regions (MRs).

PACIFICATION SUB-MODELS--A-B POPULATION (%)

	<u>Security</u>					<u>Political</u>			<u>Socio-Economic</u>		
	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Sept</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Sept</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Sept</u>	<u>Oct</u>
MR I	75.9	74.4	78.9	84.4	84.8	82.8	86.9	89.0	42.8	59.6	59.9
MR II	59.7	61.0	63.0	70.4	70.8	71.5	74.9	76.5	51.8	60.9	63.1
MR III	84.6	86.3	87.1	92.2	92.8	93.8	95.9	96.0	83.7	87.2	87.3
MR IV	60.5	63.7	66.8	76.0	76.2	76.3	81.7	81.7	57.8	66.1	65.9
RVN	70.3	71.8	74.3	81.3	81.6	81.8	85.6	86.3	61.7	70.2	70.7

Political and socio-economic ratings showed unusually large increases for a month in the middle of a quarter, primarily in MRs I and II. Political ratings increased 2.1% in MR I, and both political and socio-economic ratings increased significantly (1.6-2.2%) in MR II. We cannot fully assess the reasons for these improvements until computer tapes arrive from Saigon in the next week or so.


CONFIDENTIAL

QASD/SA
23 November 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

HES AND HES/70 PACIFICATION RATIOS

% of RVN
Population



KOE 3 YEARS BY MONTHS 46 3290
MADE IN U.S.A.
KEUFFEL & ESSER CO.

CONFIDENTIAL

HES DATA FOR NOVEMBER 1970

This is a preliminary analysis based on countrywide and corps data through November 1970 from the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) received yesterday from Saigon. More detailed data will be available next week.

Pacification continued to gain in November at the same rates achieved throughout 1970 (except for April-May); enemy activity levels remained low, and friendly forces continued to consolidate previous gains. The improvement was reflected in increases of .7% for A-B-C and 1.1% for A-B population. The table below shows that 95.0% of South Vietnam's population was rated A-B-C in November, compared with 94.3% in October; 84.4% was rated A-B in November, up from 83.3% in October.

HES/70 PACIFICATION RATINGS a/

	1969 (HES/70 Test Period)			1970					
	July	Sep	Dec	Apr	June	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov
A-B Ratings (%)	61.3	62.3	68.6	71.5	76.6	77.9	82.7	83.3	84.4
A-B-C Ratings (%)	80.6	82.4	87.3	88.8	90.8	92.6	93.7	94.3	95.0

a/ Percent of South Vietnam population (17.8 million in November). Saigon, Danang December 1969 data used for July-November 1969 also. September 1970 population estimate for Saigon (1.7 million) used throughout. Pleiku data (April) and Chau Doc (May) adjusted for errors.

Security improved 2.2% countrywide (A-B population) in November, resuming the 1970 upward trend of 1-2% per month which had slowed in October to only .3%. Enemy activity remained relatively low during most of November, with the exception of rocket attacks on Saigon and Hue, moderate activity levels in Military Region (MR) IV, and light activity in MRs I and II where heavy monsoon flooding hampered enemy activity until the last week of the month. The table below shows that security gains ranged from 2.3-3.8 in MRs I and II, to 1.4-1.8% in MR III and IV.

PACIFICATION SUB-MODELS--A-B POPULATION (%)

	Security					Political			Socio-Economic		
	Apr	June	Sept	Oct	Nov	Sept	Oct	Nov	Sept	Oct	Nov
MR I	75.9	78.9	84.4	84.8	87.1	86.9	89.0	89.7	59.6	59.9	59.4
MR II	59.7	63.0	70.4	70.8	74.6	74.9	76.5	77.4	60.9	63.1	63.0
MR III	84.6	87.1	92.2	92.8	94.2	95.9	96.0	96.0	87.2	87.3	87.3
MR IV	60.5	66.8	76.0	76.2	78.0	81.7	81.7	82.3	66.1	65.9	65.9
RVN	70.3	74.3	81.3	81.6	83.8	85.6	86.3	86.8	70.2	70.7	70.5


Political and socio-economic ratings remained relatively constant in the four MRs, since most of the HES questions in the ratings will not be answered until the end of the quarter (December).

CHART 1

CONFIDENTIAL

% of RVN
Population

HES AND HES/70 PACIFICATION RATINGS



CONFIDENTIAL
63

Jan Feb 71

CONFIDENTIAL

HES DATA FOR DECEMBER 1970

Summary. Pacification ratings leveled off in the last quarter of 1970 as territorial forces began running out of D, E, and VC hamlets to occupy, and as the enemy emphasized sporadic guerrilla attacks and terrorism in areas of otherwise very low activity. In December the first security decline since spring 1970 resulted in virtually no gains in A-B (up .2%) and A-B-C (up .1%) pacification ratings.

Security declined in 26 of the 44 provinces in December, but trend analysis and US province advisors' reports show significant problems in only 6 of the 26. In Phuoc Tuy (MR III) and Kien Giang (MR IV), RF/PF had trouble coping with increased enemy activities. In Binh Dinh (MR II), Binh Long and Tay Ninh (MR III-Cambodia border), and An Xuyen (MR IV), enemy main forces increased their activity and pose a long-term threat.

The indicators of GVN control in rural areas developed by the Vietnam Special Studies Group (VSSG) give additional insight into the fourth quarter slowdown. GVN control leveled off one month earlier than HES ratings, and remained virtually constant at 66-67% during October-December 1970. The percentage of GVN control (67%) is lower than A-B security ratings (77% rural, 84% total), indicating the GVN has a long way to go to strengthen its presence and reduce enemy effectiveness in the countryside.

Background. This analysis is based on complete Hamlet Evaluation System (HES/70) data through December 1970, US Province Senior Advisor reports, and other narrative reports of the situation in the Vietnamese countryside.

Starting with January 1971 data, MACV will use a new scoring system (called HES/71) which will give greater weight to political factors (VC infrastructure, terrorism, etc.) in describing security. HES/71 will reportedly reduce A-B and A-B-C ratings about 10% countrywide, so in future articles we will continue to show HES/70 scores (as well as HES/71) in order to maintain a consistent time series.

Countrywide and Military Region Results. Pacification leveled off in the last quarter of 1970 because of a general slowdown in security progress, including a decline in December. Territorial forces (RF/PF) began running out of D, E, and VC hamlets to occupy, and the enemy emphasized guerrilla attacks and terrorism in many provinces after several months of low activity.

In December the security decline resulted in virtually no gains in A-B (up .2%) and A-B-C (up .1%) pacification ratings. Table 1 shows that 95.1% of South Vietnam's population was rated A-B-C in December, compared with 95.0% in November; 84.6% was rated A-B in December, up from 84.4% in November. (Chart 1 shows how pacification ratings began leveling off in October-December 1970.)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 1

HES PACIFICATION AND CONTROL RATINGS (Percent of RVN Population)

	1969 Jul	Dec	1970 Apr	June	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Total Population								
A-B Pacification a/	61.3	68.6	71.5	76.6	82.7	83.3	84.4	84.6
A-B-C Pacification a/	80.6	87.3	88.8	90.8	93.7	94.3	95.0	95.1
Rural Population								
GVN Control b/	39.4	47.8	50.6	56.4	64.5	66.0	66.1	66.9

a/ MACV HES/70 rating system. Percentages based on RVN total population (17.9 million in December).

b/ VSSG rating system. Percentages based on rural population only (11.1 million in November).

At the end of December 1970, only 103 VC hamlets and 945 D and E hamlets remained in all of South Vietnam (only 5% of the population), compared to 607 and 1661 respectively at the end of 1969.

Table 1 also shows the VSSG GVN control indicator for rural population. It uses 10 carefully selected HES/70 questions to provide a much sharper, direct picture of the essence of GVN control in the countryside. It shows that GVN control in the rural areas began to level off one month earlier than the overall HES ratings. At the end of December, 66.9% of the rural population was rated under GVN control, about the same as the October level (66.0%).

The VSSG control indicator is explained more fully in a later section, and in the Annex to this article.

Security scores slowed their general long-term upward trend, and actually declined .2% (A-B) in December, the first decline since the April-May enemy high points. Table 2 shows that the slight countryside decline was caused by a sharp drop in MR I (down 3.5%) and a smaller reduction in MR III (down .8%). Security improved modestly in MRs II and IV (up .4-1.9%), but would have declined in MR II if security in Dalat city had not been re-evaluated in December. So the MR II improvement was purely an administrative change.

TABLE 2

PACIFICATION SUB-MODELS--A-B POPULATION (%)

	Security					Political			Socio-Economic		
	June	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	June	Sep	Dec	June	Sep	Dec
MR I	78.9	84.4	84.8	87.1	83.6	77.8	86.9	89.3	42.8	59.6	58.4
MR II	63.0	70.4	70.8	74.6	75.0	71.5	74.9	80.4	51.8	60.9	64.5
MR III	87.1	92.2	92.8	94.2	93.4	93.8	95.9	96.2	83.7	87.2	87.3
MR IV	66.8	76.0	76.2	78.0	79.9	76.3	81.7	83.5	57.8	66.1	67.1
RVN	74.3	81.3	81.6	83.8	83.6	81.8	85.6	87.7	61.7	70.2	71.1


CONFIDENTIAL

CHART 1

CONFIDENTIAL

% of RVN
Population

HES AND HES/70 PACIFICATION RATINGS



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

The security declines were correlated with the sense of insecurity caused by small December increases in enemy attacks after a steady 3-4 months of declining attacks. Table 3 shows that, in MRs I, II, and III, enemy attacks fell to successively lower levels during August-November, but increased in December to about October levels; this corresponded to the security score pattern--increases in August-November but slight declines in December.

In MR IV, enemy attacks did not have a strong effect on changes in security, since the number of attacks during October-December was relatively constant at 84-87 per month, about 10% below third quarter levels. Security scores showed modest gains throughout the third and fourth quarters in MR IV, suggesting that security was more correlated with the push of GVN forces into VC base areas than with enemy attacks, which remained relatively constant.

TABLE 3

ENEMY ATTACKS - 1970

	Monthly Averages			Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec
	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr					
MR I	53	123	71	99	53	34	13	31
MR II	71	150	70	64	87	58	38	56
MR III	56	59	34	39	28	19	15	22
MR IV	65	112	96	127	67	87	84	85
RVN	245	444	271	329	235	198	150	194

Source: DIA. Includes assaults, ambushes, and attacks by fire (20 rounds or more).

Political and socio-economic ratings progressed steadily in the fourth quarter (see Table 2), although socio-economic ratings declined slightly in MR I. These ratings do not affect pacification ratings significantly, and in HES/71 their effect will be reduced further.

Province Security Trends. Security (A-B population) declined in 26 of South Vietnam's 44 provinces in December, the worst decline since April 1970 when 32 provinces declined. Analysis of trends over several months, and narrative reports from US province advisors indicate that only a few of the declines were serious:

- Only 3 provinces declined for the second month in a row, and US advisors feel one of these (Kien Phong) did not have significant security problems. Phuoc Tuy (MR III) and Kien Giang (MR IV) do represent some cause for concern, however, because of RF/PF inability to cope with local enemy activities.


- In Phuoc Tuy the problem seemed to be lack of offensive operations due to requirements to protect the rice crop.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SIX PROVINCES WITH SIGNIFICANT
SECURITY DECLINES*
December 1970

Figures shown are December declines
in % A-B population (26 provinces).
* Based on HES trend analysis and
US advisor reports.
**A-B population declined in
November also.



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-- In Kien Giang, territorial forces seemed to be spread too thin, 11 RF companies and most 9th ARVN Division elements in the province were committed to assist the ARVN campaign in the U Minh forest and related operations, allowing enemy local forces to double their incident rates in the rest of the province.

- In 4 provinces showing one-month declines, enemy main forces seemed to be the primary cause for concern.

-- In Binh Dinh, the most populous province of MR II, security declined apparently because of activities by NVA line units to remind the population of their presence; in addition, the enemy continued his attempts to build up VCI and supporting forces to increase control of the population in two northern districts.

-- In Binh Long and Tay Ninh provinces in MR III, the main problem was an increase in military activity in and around War Zone C where the 7th NVA Division was reportedly returning from Cambodia.

-- In An Xuyen, traditional VC base area of MR IV, the 95A regiment and the U Minh 2 battalion stepped up incidents against the RF/PF during December. The elimination of these enemy units continues to be the province's main security goal.

- The remaining 19 provinces showing one-month declines did not seem to pose significant problems for security forces currently present.

VSSG Control Indicator Data. The indicators of GVN control in rural areas developed by the Vietnam Special Studies Group (VSSG) give additional insight into the fourth quarter security slowdown. The Annex to this article explains the indicators in detail.

The VSSG indicators use 10 carefully selected HES/70 questions to tell which hamlets have a combination of strong GVN presence (hamlet chief sleeping in hamlet, at least marginal day/night local security forces, village elections), coupled with absence of strong VCI and armed VC local forces during the month.

GVN control in rural hamlets leveled off one month earlier than HES security ratings, and remained virtually constant at 66-67% during October-December. The primary reason for the leveling off was a slower expansion of GVN presence into areas influenced by both sides. Data in Table 4 and Chart 2 show that:

- GVN presence (measured by 5 HES quarterly questions) increased only 2.1% in fourth quarter 1970, compared to 3-8% in the preceding 5 quarters, probably reflecting the lack of new areas for RF/PF to occupy. Future increases will require hamlet security forces to consolidate security enough for hamlet chiefs to be able to sleep in their hamlets, and for village council members to be elected. Table 4 (and Chart 2) shows that GVN presence was extended to 82.6% in December, compared to 80.5% in September, and 60-71% in 1969.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- VC infrastructure (2 HES quarterly questions) vetoed GVN control for 7.2% of the population in the fourth quarter, about the same as in previous quarters (7-9%). GVN internal security forces will have to eliminate "regular covert, sporadic overt" VCI activities, and limit night access for VC agents, tax collectors, recruiters, etc. to expand GVN control to these vetoed areas.

- Activity of VC forces in or near hamlets (3 HES monthly questions) vetoed another 8.5% of GVN control in December, about the same as September, but considerably below previous quarters (9-14%). The GVN must reduce armed enemy forces present in hamlets and clear main and local force companies and battalions from around inhabited areas to extend GVN control to these areas.

TABLE 4

VSSG CONTROL INDICATORS (Percent of Rural Population--End of Quarter Months)

	<u>1969</u> <u>Jul</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>1970</u> <u>Mar</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>De.</u>
GVN Presence	60.3	68.0	71.3	74.9	77.4	80.5	82.6
Less: VCI Veto	7.9	9.0	9.2	9.2	8.7	7.2	7.2
VC Forces Veto	13.0	11.9	14.3	13.6	12.3	8.8	8.5
Total Veto	<u>20.9</u>	<u>20.9</u>	<u>23.5</u>	<u>22.8</u>	<u>21.0</u>	<u>16.0</u>	<u>15.7</u>
Net GVN Control	39.4	47.1	47.8	52.1	56.4	64.5	66.9

HES-Rural A-B Security	48.2	47.2	54.8	61.4	63.9	73.6	76.6

GVN control under the VSSG indicator (67%) is lower than A-B security ratings (77% rural, 84% total) by about 10%, indicating the GVN has a long way to go to strengthen its presence and reduce enemy effectiveness in the countryside. Under the strict conditions of the VSSG indicators, even the most secure provinces in Vietnam do not exceed about 90% GVN control (Thua Thien--88.7%, An Giang--91.1%, Gia Dinh--80.9%), so the GVN may never achieve full 100% rural control.


Chart 3 shows that the VSSG indicators are highly correlated with HES security ratings on a countrywide basis. However, the VSSG indicators are somewhat more sensitive to local security conditions, and because of the simplicity of the VSSG scoring system compared to the HES security score, the VSSG data often provide clearer insights into the reasons for changes.

CONFIDENTIAL

Percent of
Rural Population

CHART 2
VSSG CONTROL INDICATOR
(Percent of RVN Rural Population)

CONFIDENTIAL




CONFIDENTIAL

Percent of
Rural Population

CHART 3
VSSG INDICATORS VS HES SECURITY
(Percent of RVN Rural Population)

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL
40

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX

THE VSSG CONTROL INDICATORS

Background. In October 1969 the Vietnam Special Studies Group (VSSG) began examining the statistical data bases being used to measure activities and results in Vietnam. Among the problems the VSSG considered was the fact that the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) security indicator in common use was an amalgam of many security-related factors, but did not directly measure the essence of GVN control in the countryside. Hamlets could receive high security ratings, but still have enough VC presence in the hamlet to preclude effective GVN control.

Using the raw data provided in both the old HES and the revised HES (HES/70), the VSSG devised new indicators of GVN and VC control. The following sections describe the concepts and mechanics of the VSSG indicators developed for HES/70; similar methods were used for the old HES, but because of the nature of the raw data, the old HES VSSG results did not correlate as well with field reports of GVN control, and are described only briefly in this paper.

VSSG Control Concepts

The VSSG began with the assumption that a primary objective of both sides in the Vietnam conflict is to achieve control of the people and resources of the countryside. VSSG control indicators assign the population of a hamlet to GVN or VC control if the military and political strength of the GVN or VC control organization in that hamlet is sufficient to administer the hamlet effectively while preventing the other side from doing so. To make the indicators as strict and objective as possible, we assumed the following:

- The GVN requires both military strength (local security forces) and political and administrative organization (hamlet chief, village council, administrative personnel) to achieve control over hamlet resources. However, a single indicator of significant VC presence (armed enemy forces, regular covert VCI activity, significant nighttime access) can veto GVN control.

- The VC, on the other hand, can achieve control with a strong political organization alone (the VC infrastructure). The GVN can veto VC control with a strong military or political/administrative presence.

- The GVN can achieve control only when there is full local security provided: when a hamlet must rely primarily on external forces for defense, a key element of lasting control--local participation--is lost. External forces, therefore, cannot serve as a proxy for GVN military strength in the hamlet.

Table 1 shows how the above concepts were applied to construct the VSSG indicators from both the old HES and HES/71.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 1

VSSG INDICATOR CONCEPTS

Old HES (1967-1969)

Requires both GVN military and political/administrative strength to achieve GVN control.

Allows either of 2 VC/VCI presence indicators to veto GVN control:

- VC guerrilla strength and activity
- VC infrastructure intact and active

Allows friendly external forces as well as local security forces to provide the GVN military strength.

Requires both VC guerrilla and infrastructure strength to achieve VC control.

Allows single indicator of GVN presence to veto VC control.

HES/70 (July 1969-1970)

Requires both GVN military and political/administrative strength to achieve GVN control.

Allows any one of 5 VC/VCI presence indicators to veto GVN control:

- VC physical control of hamlet
- VC infrastructure intact and active
- Armed enemy force presence
- Enemy nighttime access to people
- Main/local force presence

Requires local security forces to provide the GVN military strength.

Requires only significant VC infrastructure strength to achieve VC control.

Allows single indicator of GVN presence to veto VC control.

The final step in constructing the indicators was to select a set of HES/70 questions which measured the VSSG control concepts in Table 1 as completely as possible. The set of questions was kept small (only 10 were finally selected) in order to make the indicator as simple and straightforward as possible. Table 2 shows which HES/70 questions were selected and how they are logically combined to measure the VSSG control concepts.

The VSSG indicator is normally applied only to rural population, since the control war is primarily rural in nature. Urban areas are usually assumed to be under GVN control.

Evaluation of the VSSG Indicators. Since the 10 HES/70 questions in the VSSG indicator are also used in the HES security score, it is not surprising that the VSSG indicators are highly correlated with HES security. The VSSG indicators are somewhat easier to interpret because of their concept and simplicity of design, however, and often provide insights into changes of control which the HES security score cannot provide directly.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 2
HES/70 VSSG CONTROL INDICATORS

GVN Control

Group A - GVN Presence (All Required)

1. Local security forces conduct at least "marginal" security operations in daytime (e.g. patrols, ambushes, listening posts, checkpoints, etc.), or operations not needed (no enemy threat). HQC2 = 1,2,3

2. As above for night operations. HQC3 = 1,2,3

3. GVN hamlet chief regularly present day and night in hamlet. HQE2 = 3

4. GVN administrative personnel can move about with relative freedom during daylight hours in areas containing 91-100% of hamlet households. HQC5 = 0, 1

5. Some or all of Village Council members are elected. VQE2 = 2,3,4,5

Group B - Quarterly VC Veto Conditions (One or More Can Veto GVN Control)

1. Regular covert, sporadic overt activity by hamlet VCI; or hamlet VCI are primary authority in hamlet, at least at night. HQB1 = 2,3,4

2. Enemy agents, recruiters, tax collectors, etc. have access at night to 41-100% of hamlet households. HQC4 = 3,4

Group C - Hamlet Monthly VC Veto Conditions (One or More Can Veto GVN Control)

1. VC physically control the hamlet. HMB1 = 1,2

2. Armed enemy forces present more than once in hamlet this month. HMB4 = 2,3

Group D - Village Monthly VC Veto Condition

1. Company or more of enemy main/local forces present in or near inhabited areas of village this month. VMB1 = 3,4

VC Control

Group V - VC Presence (One or More Required; GVN Presence Prohibited)

1. VC physically control the hamlet. HMB1 = 1,2

2. Hamlet VCI are primary authority in hamlet, at least at night. HQB1 = 3,4

3. Regular covert, sporadic overt activity by hamlet VCI (HQB1 = 2), and either of the following conditions hold:

a. Friendly local security activities are not conducted at all at night. HQC3 = 0

b. Friendly local security forces conduct only marginal security operations at night, and GVN daytime access is denied to 10% or more of hamlet households. HQC3 = 1 and HQC5 = 2,3,4

Group Z - GVN Veto Conditions (One or More Can Veto VC Control)

1. Local security forces conduct "adequate" security operations in daytime. HQC2 = 2,3

2. As above for night operations. HQC3 = 2,3

3. GVN hamlet chief regularly present day and night in hamlet. HQE2 = 3

4. GVN administrative personnel can move about with relative freedom during daylight hours in areas containing 91-100% of hamlet households. HQC5 = 0,1

Group N - Could Not Be Rated

One or more of the HES questions used in Groups A,B,C,D,V or Z were rated "not applicable" or "unknown/unable to judge" for three or more months.

Note that if a question is unanswered for only one or two months, the most recent response (two or three months old) is used.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

The VSSG indicators have been checked at least initially against other recognized measures of GVN control in over a dozen provinces in South Vietnam. They seem to give a reasonable evaluation of both the extent of GVN control, and trends in control over time. Province-by-province and hamlet-by-hamlet data is available in hardcopy and magnetic tape formats to any analysts interested in using the VSSG data. Only additional study will be able to provide a complete evaluation of the merits of the indicators.

CONFIDENTIAL

Jan Feb 71

CONFIDENTIAL

HES RATINGS FOR JANUARY 1971

Summary. Preliminary Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) results for January recently arrived from Saigon. We cannot yet analyze changes from December, because MACV has implemented a new scoring system, called "HES/71." The new ratings give more weight to enemy terrorism and VC infrastructure, and caused A-B ratings to fall about 10%.

Pacification apparently continued to show no major improvement in January. The table below shows that 73.9% of South Vietnam's population was rated A-B in January, compared to 74.0% in the test month of November; 94.4% was rated A-B-C in January, but no comparable figure is available from November.

TABLE 1

HES PACIFICATION RATINGS
(% of RVN Population)

	<u>1969</u>		<u>1970</u>					<u>1971</u>
	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Jan</u>
<u>HES/70 Data</u>								
A-B Pacification	61.3	68.6	71.5	76.6	83.3	84.4	84.6	NA
A-B-C Pacification	80.6	87.3	88.8	90.8	94.3	95.0	95.1	NA
<u>HES/71 Data</u>								
A-B "HES Rating"						74.0		73.9
A-B-C "HES Rating"						NA		94.4

The current slowdown in pacification ratings seems to be related to several factors:

- GVN forces have nearly run out of new D, E, and VC hamlets to occupy. Future improvements must come from consolidating security in A-B-C areas.

- The enemy is now emphasizing low-level protracted war tactics, including terrorism and small-scale guerrilla attacks. While overall enemy attacks are low, local surges of activity continue to prevent security improvements in many areas, notably southern MR I, MR II, and other scattered provinces.

- Some GVN forces are currently spread thin in some provinces because of operations in VC base areas in MR IV, Cambodia, and Laos.

In January, MACV ran a special question in the Pacification Attitude Analysis System (PAAS) asking rural interviewees to select the best description of security in their hamlet. The PAAS interviewer then coded the response as "A," "B," "C," or "D," and the results were compared with the HES rating of the hamlet. The following table shows that 44% of the hamlet residents described their hamlets as less secure than the HES ratings indicated; HES and PAAS ratings agreed for 54% of the respondents, and only 2% described

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

better security than the HES ratings indicated. The largest discrepancies were in the "A" and "B" hamlets, where residents generally felt less secure than HES ratings showed.

TABLE 2

HES RATINGS VS PAAS RATINGS

<u>HES Rating</u>	<u>PAAS Rating</u>			<u>No. People Surveyed</u>
	<u>Percent Higher</u>	<u>Percent Same</u>	<u>Percent Lower</u>	
A	3	46	51	286
B	2	47	51	2063
C	1	67	32	435
D	1	87	12	351
All Interviewees	2	54	44	3135

The discrepancies indicate that the factual information collected in HES may not be the best description of "security" as the hamlet resident himself views it. We are conducting further analysis of this data to see whether there are any special factors behind the different perceptions of security.

CONFIDENTIAL

(**CONFIDENTIAL**)

HES DATA FOR JANUARY 1971

Summary

Note: This paper uses the raw HES data for January 1971, but employs the HES 70 scoring system instead of the HES 71 system (which reduces the A-B ratings about 10% below those shown here). For the moment, the HES 70 scoring systems must be used to update our ongoing trend analyses. Thus, the figures here will not agree with the official MACV or published HES 71 scores. We will switch to the HES 71 scoring for trend analysis as soon as we have developed a time series back through 1970 for comparison.

Pacification ratings showed mixed results in January 1971, as security declines in MR IV dropped some marginal B hamlets to C ratings. The percentage of population rated A-B dropped 0.4% (to 84.2%) while A-B-C stayed about the same (up .1% to 95.2%).

Events in January did not halt the slow progress of GVN control in the rural areas: the VSSG control indicator increased 0.5% (to 67.4%). The primary constraint preventing higher ratings is that about 1750 rural hamlet chiefs still do not sleep in their hamlets, presumably because of security problems.

Security declined in 25 of the 44 provinces in January, but trend analysis and US province advisors' reports show significant problems in only 8 of the 25. In Hau Nghia (MR III), the enemy increased its harassment of nighttime traffic supporting ARVN units in neighboring Cambodia. In MR IV, the enemy stepped up harassment of RF/PF positions, causing security declines in Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa, and Kien Phong. Also, enemy contacts increased in MR IV provinces where ARVN units were operating in long-time VC base areas (Kine Giang, Chau Doc, Phong Dinh, and Cnuong Thine).

Background. This analysis is based on complete Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) data through January 1971, US Province Senior Advisor reports, and other narrative reports of the situation in the Vietnamese countryside.

Beginning with January, MACV is using a new scoring system, HES/71. It gives more weight to VC infrastructure and enemy terrorism, and therefore reduces A-B population about 10% below HES/70. Our trend analyses will continue to use the HES/70 scoring techniques until a new HES/71 time series is established.

Countrywide and Military Region Results. Pacification ratings showed mixed results in January because of a security decline in Military Region (MR) IV. While some marginal A-B population (.4%) fell to C pacification ratings, the overall A-B-C population increased slightly (up .1%). Table 1 shows that 95.2% of South Vietnam's population was rated A-B-C in January, compared with 95.1% in December; 84.2% was rated A-B in January, down from 84.6% in December. (Chart 1 shows the trend of pacification and VSSG ratings in 1969-1971.)

OASD/SA
March 22, 1971

232

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 1

HES PACIFICATION RATINGS
(% of RVN Population)

	<u>1969</u>		<u>1970</u>					<u>1971</u>
	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Jan</u>
<u>HES/70 Data</u>								
A-B Pacification	61.3	68.6	71.5	76.6	83.3	84.4	84.6	84.2
A-B-C Pacification	80.6	87.3	88.8	90.8	94.3	95.0	95.1	95.2
<u>HES/71 Data</u>								
A-B "HES Rating"								73.9
A-B-C "HES Rating"								94.4
<u>VSSG Rating (Rural)</u>								
GVN Control	39.4	47.8	50.6	56.4	66.0	66.1	66.9	67.4

Events in January did not halt the slow progress of GVN control in the rural areas: the VSSG control indicator increased slightly in January (up .5%). Table 1 shows that 67.4% of the rural population was GVN controlled in January, compared to 66.9% in December, and 66.0% in October. The main reason that VSSG control ratings are progressing so slowly (only 1.4% in three months) is that about 1750 rural hamlet chiefs still do not sleep in their hamlets,^{1/} presumably because of security. Another reason is that over 100 villages have not yet elected any members of their village councils.

Security scores declined countrywide for the second month in a row, dropping .7% (A-B) in January. In December, slight increases in enemy activity dropped security in MRs I, II, and III. In January, most of the decline was in MR IV, due to enemy reactions to ARVN operations in the U Minh Forest and other enemy base areas. Table 2 shows that security rose in January in MR II (up .9%), fell in MR IV (down 2.6%), and remained virtually the same in MRs I and III (down .2% and up .1%).

TABLE 2

PACIFICATION SUB-MODELS--A-B POPULATION (%)

	<u>Security</u>					<u>Political</u>			<u>Socio-Economic</u>		
	<u>Sept</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Sept</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Sept</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Jan</u>
MR I	84.4	84.8	87.1	83.6	83.4	86.9	89.3	88.8	59.6	58.4	58.6
MR II	70.4	70.8	74.6	75.0	75.9	74.9	80.4	79.1	60.9	64.5	64.5
MR III	92.2	92.8	94.2	93.4	93.5	95.9	96.2	96.2	87.2	87.3	87.1
MR IV	76.0	76.2	78.0	79.9	77.3	81.7	83.5	83.0	60.1	67.1	66.7
RVN	81.3	81.6	83.8	83.6	82.9	85.6	87.7	87.2	70.2	71.1	70.9

^{1/} based on US advisors' responses to the HES question, "Is the GVN hamlet chief regularly present in this hamlet?"


CONFIDENTIAL

% of
population

CHART 1.

CONFIDENTIAL

HES/70 AND VSSG RATINGS



Except in MR IV, security scores were correlated with enemy attacks. Table 3 shows that compared to fourth quarter 1970, enemy attacks declined in MR II and remained the same in MRs I and III, corresponding to the security score pattern. In MR IV, security was more related to ARVN operations and enemy reactions to them than to the overall attack level.

TABLE 3

VC/RV. TACKS
(Monthly Averages)

	1969		1970		1970		1971 Jan
	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	2nd Half	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	
MR I	80	39	88	49	71	26	25
MR II	80	67	111	61	70	51	37
MR III	138	81	58	26	34	19	17
MR IV	70	70	89	91	96	85	81
RVN	368	257	346	227	271	181	160

Source: DIA

Political and socio-economic ratings (see Table 2) remained almost constant in January, since they depend primarily on quarterly questions which will not be re-rated until March.

Province Security Trends. Security (A-B population) declined in 25 of South Vietnam's 44 provinces in January; nearly equalling the December 1970 total (26), the worst decline since April 1970 (32 provinces declined). Analysis of trends over several months, and narrative reports from US province advisors indicate that only 8 of the 25 declines were significant (see map):

- In Hau Nghia (MR III), where security dropped 18% (A-B) in December-January, the enemy increased its harassment of nighttime traffic supporting ARVN units in neighboring Cambodia. RF/PF night patrols are expected to be able to meet the threat, especially under the leadership of the new province chief, installed on January 19.

- In lower MR IV, enemy reactions to ARVN operations in the U Minh Forest and other enemy base areas caused declines in Kien Giang, Chau Doc, Phong Dinh, and Chuong Thien. (Kien Giang has dropped 21.5% in A-B population in the last three months;) GVN commanders, US advisors, and intelligence reports all indicate that the ARVN operations are succeeding in disrupting and displacing enemy units, particularly because the VC underestimated the duration of the operation. The enemy's reactions (mainly outpost harassments, minings, and mortarings) are taking advantage of the fact that ARVN and RF/PF are spread thin temporarily to support operations in enemy base areas.

- In upper MR IV, a similar situation exists for three provinces in the proximity of ARVN operations against VC base areas 470 and 490--Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa, and Kien Phong. The enemy increased his low-level attacks and harassments, particularly against RF/PF outposts, causing significant security

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

declines. These activities are being carried out by small units of enemy local forces and guerrillas, and do not pose a serious threat to the overall security of the area.

- In the other 17 provinces showing declines in January, either the declines were very small (under 5,000 A-B population lost), or US advisors felt there was no serious security problem.

CONFIDENTIAL


CONFIDENTIAL

8 Provinces with Significant
Security Declines*
January 1971

Figures shown are January declines
in % A-B population (25 provinces).

* Based on HES trend analysis and
US advisor reports

** A-B population declined in
December also.



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

HES/71 DATA FOR JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1971

Time series data from the new HES/71 scoring system is now available for 1970, and the preliminary HES 71 results for February 1971 have arrived from Saigon.

The HES/71 ratings are about equivalent to the HES/70 Security Score, except that they give more weight to political activities, such as the VC infrastructure, and to terrorism. This drops the HES/71 A-B ratings to about 10% below the HES/70 A-B ratings. Overall "Pacification" ratings are no longer computed, and socio-economic factors receive very little weight in the "HES/71 Rating."

Detailed province data and advisors' reports will be available in the next one or two weeks. Meanwhile, some general trends are apparent.

Countrywide Results

January and February are traditionally slack months for pacification, due to the wrapup of the yearly pacification campaigns and the approach of the Tet holidays. The results this year are mixed:

- HES 71 Ratings (A-B population) have dropped for two months in a row--down .9% in January and 1.1% in February. The February decline is the worst since the enemy highpoints in April 1970, when security dropped 2.5%.

- But the VSSG rural control indicators show that GVN control in rural areas was continuing to expand slowly.

HES PACIFICATION RATINGS
(% of RVN Population)

	<u>1970</u>						<u>1971</u>	
	<u>Mar</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Sept</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>
<u>HES/71 Data</u>								
A-B "HES Rating"	60.9	65.1	72.5	73.0	74.1	74.8	73.9	72.8
A-B-C "HES Rating"	88.2	89.3	93.1	93.6	94.3	94.5	94.4	93.9
<u>VSSG Rating (Rural)</u>								
GVN Control		56.4		66.0	66.1	66.9	67.4	NA

Detailed Results

The declines are associated with upsurges of enemy activity in all four Military Regions (MRs).

- MR I dropped the most (down 5.0% in February). Enemy attacks doubled in February (from 25-26 per month in October-January, up to 62 in February), including shelling of Danang, Hue, Dong Ha, and other population centers.

OASD/SA
29 March 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- MRs II and III declined slightly (down 2.2% and .6%). Attacks were up 40-80% in both MRs.

- MR IV improved slightly (up .9% in February), reflecting improved ratings in Kien Giang which had declined for the preceding three months. Some US advisors reported problems in December and January because ARVN and RF/PF forces were spread thin to support operations in the enemy's MR IV base areas.

HES RATINGS BY MR--A-B POPULATION (%)

	<u>1970</u> <u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>1971</u> <u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>
MR I	77.7	76.5	76.6	71.6
MR II	61.3	63.1	63.9	61.7
MR III	89.1	89.0	88.3	87.7
MR IV	66.1	68.0	65.5	66.4
RVN	74.1	74.8	73.9	72.8

The February declines are not necessarily cause for alarm, but US advisors' reports and province security trends will be analyzed carefully as soon as they arrive.

VC/NVA ATTACKS
(Monthly Averages)

	<u>1969</u>		<u>1970</u>		<u>1970</u>		<u>1971</u>	
	<u>1st Half</u>	<u>2nd Half</u>	<u>1st Half</u>	<u>2nd Half</u>	<u>3rd Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>
MR I	80	39	88	49	71	26	25	62
MR II	80	67	111	61	70	51	37	86
MR III	138	81	58	26	34	19	17	26
MR IV	70	70	89	91	96	85	81	109
RVN	368	257	346	227	271	181	160	283

Source: DIA

CONFIDENTIAL

2100/0/0 71
CONFIDENTIAL

HES DATA FOR MARCH 1971

Summary

Enemy activities in the first quarter of 1971 set pacification ratings back about three months for RVN as a whole, and about 4-7 months in MR I, northern MR II, and southern MR IV. Countrywide HES ratings recovered in March to the same levels achieved in December 1970 (74.8% A-B population), after declines of about 1% each in January and February.

This year's decline was about the same in both magnitude (2% A-B decline) and duration (2-3 months) as the April-May decline last year. However, April and May HES results may show additional declines, due to current enemy activities in MR I and II, so we will not know until June what the net impact this year will be.

The declines were associated with high enemy activity rates in MRs I, II, and IV. First quarter attacks in those three regions were higher this year than last year, and terrorism has reportedly been stepped up in many provinces at the same time. As a result, HES ratings were set back about 7 months in MR I, about 6 months in northern MR II, and about 3-4 months in southern MR IV, and were still falling at the end of March.

In MR III and the more pacified areas of MRs II and IV, enemy attacks have stayed at the low levels to which they fell in late 1970, and HES ratings have continued to progress upward.

Province senior advisor reports for March tend to confirm significant security problems in 13 provinces -- 9 in MRs I and II, and 4 in MRs III and IV. Lam Son 719 seems to have produced some of the declines in MR I, due to allied deployments away from the populated lowlands, and attempts by the enemy to seize the initiative in the vacated areas.

In MR II, similar problems arose when ARVN forces moved to counter the enemy's annual spring campaign in the tri-border area of Kontum.

Weaknesses in RE/PP, including recruiting problems and overrunning of outposts, contributed to declines in Phuoc Long, Hau Nghia, Chuong Thien, and Bao Lieu in MRs III and IV.

CONFIDENTIAL

240

CONFIDENTIAL

Details

Background. This analysis is based on Hamlet Evaluation System (HES/71) data through the end of March 1971, and on US Province Senior Advisor Reports and other narrative information from the field. All HES ratings shown are from MACV's new HES/71 scoring system, which gives equal weight to military and political ratings. In addition, to give a clearer picture of the situation in rural areas, we used GVN control indicators developed by the Vietnam Special Studies Group (VSSG).

Countrywide Results. Enemy dry season activities in the first quarter of 1971 set pacification ratings back about three months for RVN as a whole, and about 4-7 months in MR I, northern MR II, and southern MR IV. Countrywide HES A-B ratings recovered in March to the same levels achieved in December 1970 (74.8% of the population rated A-B), after declines of about 1% each in January and February. A-B-C ratings declined .7% since December, but seem to have stabilized at about 94%.

VSSG indicators of GVN control in rural areas followed a similar pattern -- a decline in February back to the levels achieved about 4-5 months earlier. Detailed analysis shows that increased size of enemy forces near populated areas and armed incursions into hamlets produced the decline; friendly force presence continued to expand (up 1%) in the first quarter, but at a slower rate than the previous 7 quarters (2%-8%).

TABLE 1

	<u>HES PACIFICATION RATINGS</u> (% of RVN Population)							
	<u>1970</u> <u>Mar</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>1971</u> <u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>
<u>HES/71 Data</u>								
A-B "HES Rating"	60.9	65.1	73.0	74.1	74.8	73.9	72.8	74.8
A-B-C "HES Rating"	88.2	89.3	93.6	94.3	94.5	94.4	93.9	93.8
<u>VSSG Rating (Rural)</u>								
GVN Control	52.1	56.4	66.0	66.1	66.9	67.4	65.5	65.8


Graph 1 shows that this year's decline in HES and VSSG ratings is about the same in both magnitude (2%) and duration (2-3 months) as the April-May declines last year. Pacification usually achieves its greatest gains during the summer and fall when enemy activities are lower and the GVN's yearly pacification campaign achieves momentum.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

GRAPH 1

HES/71 AND VSSG RATINGS
(Percent of RVN Population)



While it is too early to project HES ratings this year, several factors suggest that progress may not be as great as last year. These include continued enemy activity in MRs I and II, the continued problem of low-level activities and outpost harassments in MR IV, and the lack of many more populated areas for GVN forces to occupy. We will be watching the April-May HES data to see what effect the remaining dry season activities will have on security.

Military Region Data. The HES rating declines were associated with high enemy activity rates in MRs I, II and IV. Table 2 shows that first quarter enemy attacks in those regions were higher than last year, especially in MR IV where ARVN operations are continuing in the enemy's long time base areas. Enemy activity has dropped off in MR III to the lowest levels since 1966 (20-30 attacks per month).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 2

VC/NVA ATTACKS
(Monthly Averages)

	<u>1970</u> <u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2nd Qtr</u>	<u>3rd Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u>	<u>1971</u> <u>1st Qtr</u>
MR I	53	123	71	26	60
MR II	71	150	70	51	73
MR III	56	59	34	19	23
MR IV	65	112	96	85	92
RVN	<u>245</u>	<u>444</u>	<u>271</u>	<u>181</u>	<u>248</u>

Source: DIA

As a result, HES ratings were set back about 7 months in MR I, about 6 months in northern MR II, and about 3-4 months in southern MR IV. They were still falling at the end of March. Table 3 shows that the largest decline was in MR I, which fell 5% in February and 1% in March to 70.7% (A-B), about the same level achieved 7 months earlier (August 1970).

In MR III and the more pacified areas of MRs II and IV, HES ratings have continued to progress upward.

TABLE 3

HES RATINGS BY MR -- AB POPULATION (%)

	<u>1970</u> <u>Sep</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>1971</u> <u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>
MR I	76.1	76.5	76.6	71.6	70.7
MR II-North (22nd DTA)	52.4	56.4	56.1	52.7	52.1
MR II-South (23rd DTA)	64.7	70.2	72.0	71.1	74.3
MR III	87.5	89.0	88.3	87.7	90.1
MR IV-North (7-9 DTAs)	70.6	70.8	69.5	70.0	75.6
MR IV-South (21 DTA)	55.5	62.6	57.7	59.4	59.2
RVN	<u>72.5</u>	<u>74.8</u>	<u>73.9</u>	<u>72.8</u>	<u>74.8</u>

242

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Province Analyses. HES A-B ratings declined in 17 provinces in March, 12 for the second month in a row. We compared HES trends with the February and March reports from the 44 US Province Senior Advisors, and identified 13 provinces where both sources indicated significant security declines in February and March (see map).

In MR I, Lam Son 719 seems to have produced some of the declines due to allied deployments away from the populated lowlands, leaving RF/PF to face enemy counterattacks in several provinces.

-- In Quang Tri (down 8% in February) and Thua Thien (down 1% in March), the enemy took advantage of Lam Son 719 to establish base areas in some low-land districts. In some cases the friendly response to enemy activities was less than desired, although many RF/PF performed well in their first real test without substantial ARVN/US assistance.

-- In Quang Nam (down 2% in March), a brief attack on the Duc-Duc district headquarters and surrounding villages, and stepped up terrorism inflicted serious damage to the province, but the main enemy threat appears to be contained. RF/PF continue to lack aggressiveness, primarily because finding good leaders is a slow process of trial and error.

-- In Quang Tin (down 5% in March), an attack on US Landing Zone Mary Ann triggered a 3-day enemy offensive, in which VC forces re-entered areas they had left over a year ago. RF/PF reportedly responded well.

In northern MR II, similar problems arose when ARVN forces moved to counter the enemy's annual spring campaign in the tri-border area of Kontum.

-- In Kontum (down 9% in March), elements of 3 NVA regiments kicked off the annual enemy campaign in the highlands. Two ARVN battalions were badly mauled in the ensuing battle, and RF/PF lacked aggressiveness, even when they outnumbered the enemy.

-- In Binh Dinh (down 5% in February), Pleiku (down 1%), Phu Bon (down 10%) and Phu Yen (down 5%), the enemy initiated many attacks apparently timed to coincide with his attacks in Kontum, including overrunning the strongest RF company compound in Hoai Nhon district, Binh Dinh province, overrunning Phu Nhon district headquarters in Pleiku, and stepping up terrorism. All four provinces reported RF/PF problems, and ARVN sluggishness in reacting to NVA attacks.

RF/PF problems also played a part in security declines registered in four provinces of MRs III and IV.

-- In Phuoc Long (down 13% in March), VC infrastructure rating reassessments in one district dropped the overall HES ratings. In addition, ARVN and RF/PF are in the process of adjusting their areas of operation to fill in for a departing US brigade. RF/PF reportedly require increased motivation.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-- In Hau Nghia (down 9% in March), enemy strength and activity levels rose, but RF/PF have recently been repositioned to provide better coverage in the less secure areas.

-- In Chuong Thien (down 9%) and Bac Lieu (down 30%), four RF/PF operating bases were overrun in March, and the enemy mortared the Chuong Thien province capital five times. RF/PF recruiting is a problem in both provinces, but recent recruiting drives are reporting some success.


CONFIDENTIAL

13 Provinces with Significant
Security Declines*
March 1971

Figures shown are March declines
in % A-B population (18 provinces)

* Based on HES trend analysis
and US advisor reports

** A-B population declined in
February also.



CONFIDENTIAL

10

149 71

CONFIDENTIAL

HES DATA FOR APRIL 1971

Hamlet Evaluation System (HES/71) ratings resumed slow but steady upward progress in April. The population rated A-B increased .5% to 75.3% countrywide, and A-B-C population increased .2% to 94.0%.

The HES rating improvements were associated with lower enemy activity rates in MRs I, III, and IV. April attacks in those three regions were about 30% below the January-March levels. As a result, HES ratings improved .4-1.3% in the three regions.

April attacks increased by almost 50% in MR II over January-March levels, reflecting the yearly increase of enemy activity in the central highlands. HES ratings dropped .6% as a result.

Most provinces (27 out of 44) either improved their HES ratings or remained the same in April. Of the 17 which declined, four showed significant downward trends. Quang Nam (MR I) has not yet recovered from the high enemy activity and weak local security force performance noted for the last four months. Binh Dinh (MR II) declined for the third time in five months, and Hau Nghia (MR III) regressed for the fifth month in a row, reflecting the deeply entrenched enemy position in those provinces. Kontum (MR II) was the scene of continued heavy fighting in the tri-border area.

CONFIDENTIAL

246

CONFIDENTIAL

HES PACIFICATION RATINGS (% of RVN Population)

	<u>1970</u> <u>Mar</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>1971</u> <u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>
<u>HES/71 Data</u>							
A-B "HES Rating"	60.9	65.4	74.8	73.9	72.8	74.8	75.3
A-B-C "HES Rating"	88.2	89.9	94.5	94.4	93.9	93.8	94.0
<u>VSSG Rating (Rural)</u>							
GVN Control	52.1	56.4	66.9	67.4	65.5	65.8	NA

HES RATINGS BY MR -- AB POPULATION (%)

	<u>1971</u> <u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>
MR I	76.6	71.6	70.7	72.0
MR II	63.9	61.7	63.0	62.4
MR III	88.3	87.7	90.1	90.5
MR IV	65.5	66.4	70.0	70.7
RVN	73.9	72.8	74.8	75.3

VC/NVA ATTACKS (Monthly Averages)

	<u>1970</u> <u>1st</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>2nd</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>3rd</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>4th</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>1971</u> <u>1st</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>Apr</u>
MR I	53	123	71	26	60	42
MR II	71	150	70	51	73	108
MR III	56	59	34	19	23	20
MR IV	65	112	36	85	92	59
RVN	245	444	271	181	248	229


Source: DIA

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

4 PROVINCES WITH SIGNIFICANT*
SECURITY DECLINES
April 1971

Figures shown are April declines in
% A-B population (17 provinces)
* Based on HES trend analysis
** A-B population declines in March
also.



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PACIFICATION

Pacification continued to improve countrywide in 1971, but at a slower rate than previous years due to setbacks in southern MR I - northern MR II, and a slower expansion of GVN territorial forces into remaining contested areas. The Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) showed that 77.3% of South Vietnam's population was secure (A-B) in July 1971, an increase of 10% since July 1970 and 24% since Vietnamization began in July 1969.

HES Ratings (%)	Tet 68	July 68	July 69	July 70	July 71
A-B	35.0	37.6	53.2	67.2	77.3
C	25.1	27.3	25.3	24.1	17.9
D-E-VC	39.9	35.1	21.5	8.7	4.8

VSSG Ratings (%)	Tet 68	July 68	July 69	July 70	July 71
GVN Control (Rural)	14.2	16.8	39.4	59.1	69.0
GVN Presence (Rural)	N/A	N/A	60.3	77.5	83.3

MR I-II Setbacks. Pacification has been set back to mid-1970 levels in the coastal lowlands of southern MR I and northern MR II (VC-MR 5). The regression stems from a well entrenched VC presence, recent US withdrawals, and poor RVNAF performance in this particular area. The transfer of main force responsibility from US to ARVN units has produced some disruptions, particularly in Quang Nam (MR I). Formation of a new ARVN division in MR I may help these problems, but the delay may be giving the enemy further time to rebuild.

RF/PF. The GVN probably has enough territorial forces, existing or planned (RF, PF and PSDF), to consolidate and expand security. However, recent VSSG data show that the GVN presence in the countryside is not expanding as fast as it did in 1969-1970. The rural population having strong GVN presence increased about 6% in FY 71, compared to 17% in FY 70. With GVN presence at 83.3%, the rate of expansion is likely to slow down even more. Further expansion must reach into less densely populated areas and will require proportionally more GVN resources per population. Moreover, establishing local government and services in a brand new area is a slower process than the initial establishment of basic security.

Protracted War. A long-term danger to pacification is the possibility that as the main force war dies down, the reduced enemy activity levels may lull GVN forces into letting up the pressure on enemy local forces, guerrillas, and VCI. The problem is illustrated by outposts being overrun in the Delta. The GVN will face this problem more and more as RF/PF pick up an increasing burden of the war: RF/PF now account for 54% of RVNAF KIA (75% in the Delta), and the trend is up.

The VCI continues to number about 60,000 and at current neutralization rates, will still pose a serious threat in 1972-73. It is showing considerable staying power, and has previously shown its capability to resurge strongly. This could lead to an intensified, protracted struggle which the GVN might well lose; only the introduction of US forces saved the GVN in the last such struggle. Success this time will depend on the good leadership and staying power by the GVN.

OASD/SA
17 September 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

HES DATA FOR AUGUST 1971

Localized increases in enemy activity, together with a reported GVN pre-election slowdown, produced a 1% countrywide decline in Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) A-B population in August 1971. Population rated A-E declined from 77.3% in July to 76.3% in August, and A-B-C population declined from 95.2% to 94.9%.

The decline was not as widespread as first indicated by Military Region (MR) data. Although this was the first time since the 1968 Tet offensive that MACV HES statistics showed declines in all four MRs, fewer provinces were affected than during other recent declines. Only 21 provinces showed A-B population declines in August, compared to 32 during the enemy's spring campaign in April 1970, and 26-30 provinces during the January-February 1971 pre-Tet slowdown.

The countrywide pacification decline in the face of generally low levels of enemy activity tends to confirm MACV's appraisal of a pre-election GVN slowdown. Enemy attack rates in August 1971 were 35% below last year's rates (second half 1970 average), despite a moderate upsurge in MR I. US advisor reports cite many provinces where GVN officials seemed to be neglecting pacification duties and paying more attention to upcoming elections.

The GVN's main pacification problems still center in southern MR I - northern MR II. Six provinces there have shown net declines during the last 12 months (see map). Binh Dinh province declined another 8% in August to 35.4% A-B population, 8-10% below any other province in South Vietnam.

OASD/SA
September 28, 1971


250

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

EIGHT PROVINCES
SHOWING 12-MONTH
A-B POPULATION DECLINES

August 1970--August 1971



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

HES PACIFICATION RATINGS
(% of RVN Population)

	<u>1970</u> <u>June</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>1971</u> <u>Mar</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>Aug</u>
<u>HES/71 Data</u>						
A-B "HES Rating"	65.4	74.8	74.7	76.8	77.3	76.3
A-B-C "HES Rating"	89.9	94.5	93.7	94.7	95.2	94.9
<u>VJSG Pating (Rural)</u>						
GVN Control	56.4	66.9	65.8	67.5	69.0	NA

HES RATINGS BY MR -- AB POPULATION (%)

	<u>1971</u> <u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>Aug</u>
MR I	72.3	72.2	73.3	72.8
MR II	63.1	64.5	62.7	60.0
MR III	90.7	90.2	91.3	90.6
MR IV	70.5	74.3	75.1	74.6
RVN	75.4	76.8	77.3	76.3

VC/NVA ATTACKS
(Monthly Averages)

	<u>1970</u> <u>1st</u> <u>Half</u>	<u>2nd</u> <u>Half</u>	<u>1971</u> <u>1st</u> <u>Half</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>Aug</u>
MR I	88	49	59	18	61
MR II	111	61	78	35	38
MR III	58	26	26	19	25
MR IV	88	90	76	43	23
RVN	345	226	239	115	147

Source: DIA

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY SITUATION IN SOUTHERN MR I

Summary. The withdrawal of US units together with continuing enemy pressure and problems with RF/PF have produced a decline in security to mid-1970 levels in the three southern provinces of MR I (Quang Nam, Quang Tin and Quang Ngai). The enemy's activities are actually below last year's levels, but lack of confidence in territorial forces has produced a general climate of pessimism, particularly in Quang Nam where the enemy continues to emphasize terrorism and shelling of population centers.

The situation may be analogous to the former area of US operations in the Delta. Security lost momentum there for about six months while ARVN units adjusted to the absence of the US 3rd Division. It would appear that the security arrangements in Quang Nam province should be strengthened in order to compensate for the aggressive leadership and resources formerly provided by US Marine units.

Forces. During the past six months US forces declined in southern MR I while RVNAF and enemy units remained relatively constant. Table 1 shows that US battalions declined from 18 in December 1970 to 11 in May 1971. The last US Marine battalions left Quang Nam province in March-April, and US Army battalions shifted from Quang Tin and Quang Ngai to help fill the gap. The withdrawals are placing an added burden on the ARVN 2nd Division and 51st Regiment, and are forcing the GVN territorial forces to operate on their own (without US MAT and CAP advisors) for the first time.

TABLE 1

ENEMY AND FRIENDLY UNITS

	Quang Nam		Quang Tin		Quang Ngai		Total	
	Dec 70	May 71	Dec 70	May 71	Dec 70	May 71	Dec 70	May 71
<u>Enemy</u>								
Combat Bns	15	14	7	5	9	11	31	30
Separate Cos	8	9	8	9	20	20	36	38
Separate Plts	0	0	2	2	1	1	3	3
<u>Friendly</u>								
US Bns	6	5	6	2	6	4	18	11
FW Bns	4	4	0	0	0	0	4	4
ARVN/VNMC Bns	8	8	5	5	8	8	21	21
Total	18	17	11	7	14	12	43	36
RF Cos	62	64	38	40	54	54	154	158
PF Plts	223	223	222	226	285	283	730	732

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

The decline in friendly forces was felt in Quang Nam more than the other two provinces. While the number of friendly units in Quang Nam remained constant, there are indications that the changeover from US Marines to US Army/ARVN/RF/PF responsibility may have disrupted force effectiveness there. The table below shows that friendly operations with contact declined from 1970 to 1971 in Quang Nam, but generally increased in the other two provinces.

TABLE 2

US/FW/ARVN ACTIVITY a/
(Monthly Averages)

	<u>Quang Nam</u>		<u>Quang Tin</u>		<u>Quang Ngai</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	1st Half 1970	1st Half 1971	1st Half 1970	1st Half 1971	1st Half 1970	1st Half 1971	1st Half 1970	1st Half 1971
<u>Large Unit Ops</u>								
US/FW	3	2	6	3	10	4	19	9
ARVN	14	7	6	16	9	11	29	34
Total	17	9	12	19	19	15	48	43
<u>Small Unit Ops with</u>								
<u>Contact</u>								
US/FW	453	17	0	0	1	0	454	17
ARVN	19	13	24	27	26	30	69	70
Total	473	30	24	27	27	30	523	87

a/ 1971 data through May.

Territorial force performance also appears to be suffering, particularly for PF in Quang Nam province. Table 3 shows that RF/PF effectiveness in terms of contacts per LCO operations dropped off sharply in Quang Nam (from 7.3 in first half 1970 to 4.1 in 1971), but remained constant in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai (6.5). Furthermore 100% of PF platoons reporting in June 1971 in Quang Nam were operating primarily in secure areas, rather than in the consolidation zones where the enemy threat is greater and there is opportunity for contact and results. A recent report by a field grade ARVN officer also suggests a general pessimism and defensive attitude on the part of territorial forces, particularly in Quang Nam province;

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 3

RF/PF ACTIVITY
(Monthly Averages)

	Quang Nam		Quang Tin/ Quang Ngai		Total RVN	
	1st Half	1st Half	1st Half	1st Half	1st Half	1st Half
	1970	1971	1970	1971	1970	1971
Small Unit Opns with Contact						
RF	296	195	223	536	2395	3797
PF	477	265	597	763	2989	3623
Total	773	460	820	1299	5384	7420
Contacts per 100 Operations						
RF	9.1	5.5	10.1	8.5	2.1	2.1
PF	6.4	3.4	5.8	5.6	1.3	1.2
Total	7.3	4.1	6.5	6.5	1.6	1.5
Percent of Units Operating Primarily in Secure Areas a/						
RF		28		42		26
PF		100		71		61

a/ Units reporting "not applicable" or "unknown" are excluded from consideration.
Based on June 1971 data of unknown reliability.

Enemy Activity. The enemy's first half activities were generally lower in 1971 than 1970 in southern MR I, but terrorism continued unabated, particularly in Quang Nam. Enemy attacks in the three provinces declined about one-third from 1970 (48 per month) to 1971 (33 per month), and other types of incidents declined 40-60%. Terrorist incidents continued to produce about as many victims (assassinations, abductions, and woundings) in Quang Nam in the first half of 1971 (289) as in 1970 (298).

CONFIDENTIAL

255

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 4

ENEMY INCIDENTS AND CHIEU HOI RESULTS (Monthly Averages)

	Quang Nam		Quang Tin		Quang Ngai		Total	
	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st
	Half	Half	Half	Half	Half	Half	Half	Half
	1970	1971	1970	1971	1970	1971	1970	1971
Enemy Incidents a/								
Attacks	18	14	18	4	12	15	48	38
Harassment by fire	160	92	72	21	67	41	299	104
Other Har/Ter/Sab	160	103	42	31	115	73	331	207
Total	338	159	132	56	194	129	678	344
Terror Casualties	298	289	74	56	150	127	522	472
Chieu Hoi Ralliers b/	91	38	121	70	160	66	372	174

a/ Prioritized to include data from OPREP and TIRS reporting systems.

b/ 1971 data through May 1971 only.

The patterns of enemy activity indicate a general decline in overall capability, but an increased emphasis on building guerrillas and VCI for protracted warfare. One result of the continued enemy presence in rural areas is a recent decline in the rate of Chieu Hoi ralliers in all three provinces. First half 1971 ralliers totaled 174, compared to 372 in 1970. VCI neutralizations are also lagging in many areas.

Security Results. The overall result of US withdrawals, lagging PF/PF, and continued enemy presence has been to set security back to mid-1970 levels in all three provinces. Data from the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES/71) below shows that 61.9% of the population was rated A-B in June 1971, compared to 62.6% in June 1970.

TABLE 5

HES POPULATION DATA (% of Population Rated A-B)

	Jan 70	Jun 70	Dec 70	Mar 71	Jun 71
Quang Nam/Danang	45.6	72.2	76.9	70.7	71.1
Quang Tin	60.3	59.3	75.0	64.9	69.8
Quang Ngai	36.3	51.1	51.3	42.7	44.7
Total Southern MR I	52.0	62.6	68.1	62.5	61.9
VSSG Rural GVN Control	45.8	54.0	66.3	54.6	N/A

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

The VSSG rural control indicator shows a similar loss in GVN control. Detailed data shows that the loss of control is due to increased enemy companies and battalions in the populated areas, indicating lagging RF/PF effectiveness in patrolling the approaches to hamlets.

Prospects for Recovery. The situation in southern MR I is analagous in many ways to the tough situation the ARVN 7th Division faced in the Delta in mid-1969. Both areas were traditional VC strongholds, and both had been dominated for several years by a vigorous US presence (US 9th Division in the Delta, and US Marines in Southern MR I). When the US units left the Delta, it took a full six months before ARVN was able to achieve full effectiveness, and population security lagged in the interim. It wasn't until a forceful, energetic ARVN division commander took over that security resumed strong upward momentum.

In southern MR I, the burden for population security rests squarely on the RF/PF and PSDF. These forces were largely dormant under the massive US presence, and may take some time to develop their full potential. It also appears that some additional measures may be needed to strengthen security arrangements in Quang Nam to restore confidence and aggressiveness formerly provided by US units and the CAP/MAT teams which worked with the RF/PF.

CONFIDENTIAL

257

CONFIDENTIAL

*Aug-Oct
1971*

PACIFICATION STATUS -- SEPTEMBER 1971

Summary

The lowest third quarter enemy activity levels since 1966, together with the GVN's annual fall pacification expansion, produced a 3.8% increase in Hamlet Evaluation System (HES/71) A-B population in September 1971, the largest gain in 12 months. Population rated A-B increased from 76.3% in August to 80.1% in September, and A-B-C population increased from 94.9% to 95.8%.

The September increase indicates that 1971 may be similar to the patterns of the last three years, in which large gains in the second half of the year make up for slow progress (or even slight losses) in the first half.

The September gains were widespread (34 of the 44 provinces showed increases). Even the 10 least secure provinces in South Vietnam showed third quarter security improvements, despite substantial US force withdrawals in the past 6 months from 3 of the 10 provinces, and little or no US forces in the other 7 provinces for over a year.

A closer examination of the challenge to the GVN posed by the 10 least secure provinces reveals that:

- As a whole, these provinces are at least a year behind the average level of security in the middle group of South Vietnam provinces, and two years behind the 10 most secure provinces, even if the GVN can match the historical trend of 1-1.7% A-B population gains per month in other provinces.

- ARVN operations seem to have the initiative against the enemy in 4 of the 10 provinces, all located in MR IV..

- Less progress is evident in the other provinces, 5 of which are located in the crucial southern MR I - northern MR II area. Improvements in GVN leadership, ARVN strength and aggressiveness, and RF/PP performance will be critical to prevent further erosion, especially in the three key densely populated provinces of Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, and Binh Dinh.

258

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Details

This analysis is based on data from the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES/71) through September 1971, and various field reports from US advisors and Vietnamese observers.

Countryside and Corps Results. The lowest third quarter enemy activity since 1966, together with the GVN's annual fall pacification expansion, produced the largest HES A-B population gain in 12 months. Population rated A-B increased 3.8% from 76.3% in August to 80.1% in September, the largest one-month gain since September 1970 (5.2%). A-B-C population increased .9% from 94.9% to 95.8%.

TABLE 1

HES PACIFICATION RATINGS
(% of RVN Population)

	<u>1970</u> <u>June</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>1971</u> <u>Mar</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>
<u>HES/71 Data</u>							
A-B "HES Rating"	65.4	74.8	74.7	76.8	77.3	76.3	80.1
A-B-C "HES Rating"	89.9	94.5	93.7	94.7	95.2	94.9	95.8
<u>VSSG Rating (Rural)</u>							
GVN Control	56.4	66.9	65.8	67.5	69.0	69.4	NA

Data from the stricter VSSG rating system has not yet been computed for September. However, it will probably show over 70% GVN control in rural areas for the first time, a further indication of the strength of the GVN in the countryside.

All four Military Regions (MRs) showed gains in September, ranging from 4.7-6.2% increases in MRs I and IV, to 1.5-2.4% increases in MRs II and III. The gains represent new high levels for MRs I, III, and IV; MR II has not yet recovered fully from losses earlier in the year, due primarily to pacification setbacks and rating re-evaluations in northern MR II.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 2

HES RATINGS BY MR -- AB POPULATION (%)

	<u>1971</u> <u>June</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>
MR I	72.2	73.3	72.8	79.0
MR II	64.5	62.7	60.0	62.4
MR III	70.2	91.3	90.6	92.2
MR IV	71.3	75.1	74.6	79.3
RVN	76.6	77.3	76.3	80.1

The HES rating gains were associated with the lowest third quarter enemy activity rates since 1966, and the lowest January-September rates since 1967. Table 3 shows that there were 425 enemy attacks (ground assaults and attacks by fire of 20 rounds or more) during the third quarter of 1971, compared to 660-870 during the years 1967-1970, and 241 in 1966. Attacks for 1971 as a whole (January-September) averaged 213 per month, compared to 328-378 during 1968-1970, and 185 in 1967. Other types of enemy military incidents (harassment, sabotage, indirect fire) show similar patterns.

TABLE 3

	<u>ATTACKS IN SVN a/</u>				<u>Year</u> <u>Total</u>	<u>Monthly Average</u> <u>Jan-Sept</u>
	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2nd Qtr</u>	<u>3rd Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u>		
1971	768	726	425			213
1970	777	1308	870	584	3539	328
1969	985	1229	759	848	3821	330
1968	1537	1267	594	523	3921	378
1967	478	523	661	814	2476	185
1966	191	198	241	308	938	70
1965	231	170	131	153	685	59

a/ Source: OSD(C) Table 2, SEA Statistical Summary. Includes ground attacks and attacks by fire.

Historical Patterns. The September increase indicates that 1971 may be similar to the patterns of the last three years, in which large gains in the second half of the year make up for slow progress (or even slight losses) in the first half. Table 4 shows that ever since the GVN took the pacification initiative with the 1968 Accelerated Pacification Campaign, the largest security improvements occur in the third or fourth quarters of each year. These periods coincide with the enemy's rainy season lulls, and provide a good opportunity

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

for the GVN pacification forces to redeploy into less secure hamlets and establish expanded population security.

TABLE 4

TRENDS IN A-B POPULATION

% A-B Population - Gain (+) or Loss (-)

	Old HES			HES/71	
	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
1st Qtr	+1.0	-6.1	+ 2.7	+6.3	- .1
2nd Qtr	+2.2	+1.2	+ 2.4	+4.5	+2.1
3rd Qtr	+2.5	+1.9	+13.7	+7.1	+3.3
4th Qtr	- .7	+7.8	+ 5.7	+2.3	

Province Results. The September gains were widespread (34 of 44 provinces showed increases), and even the 10 least secure provinces in South Vietnam showed security improvements. The extent of the gains was about the same as the best months in 1970 (33 provinces improved in September 1970 and 34 in July 1970), but somewhat less than during the peak expansion months in 1968 and 1969 (36-40 provinces improved).

The 10 least secure provinces all showed A-B population gains in September, with the exception of Binh Dinh, where security remained generally the same but rating evaluations were revised downward, and Fleiku, which showed no change from August. (See map on next page.) The improvements occurred despite the fact that major US forces withdrew from 3 of the 10 provinces during the past six months (Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, and Binh Dinh), and that there have been practically no US forces in the other 7 for over a year (1 battalion each in Fleiku, Phu Yen, and Hau Nghia since July 1970; none in the other provinces).

The Ten Worst Provinces. We examined the 10 least secure provinces (based on HES province rankings throughout 1971) to determine the nature of the challenge the GVN faces in the last remaining insecure provinces.

The map showed that the ten provinces form three main groups: those in VC Military Region (VCMR) 5 in southern GVN MR I; northern MR II; those bordering VC Base Areas 487-490 in MR IV; and those near the VC U Minh Forest base area in MR IV.

The average security in the 10 provinces is about 59% A-B. If the GVN can achieve the rates of pacification expansion it achieved elsewhere (gains of 1% to 1.7% per month, on the average, during late 1968 to mid-1971), it will take at least one year for the 10 worst provinces to match the 82% A-B level of the middle group of provinces, and at least two years to match the 98% level of the top 10 provinces.

CONFIDENTIAL


CONFIDENTIAL

TEN LEAST SECURE PROVINCES
IN SOUTH VIETNAM

As of September 1971

Figures indicate September 1971
Gain (+) or Loss (-) of HES % A-B
Population

(Province Rank in Parentheses)



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

The GVN's most pressing pacification problems will undoubtedly focus on three provinces: Quang Nam, Quang Ngai (both in MR I), and Binh Dinh (MR II). HES data and reports from the field suggest that the problems in the other provinces are much less pressing.

- The three provinces named are among the most populous in South Vietnam, and play key roles politically as well as militarily. Quang Nam, with the contiguous autonomous city of Danang, accounts for 1.0 million people and has been the scene of some of the heaviest main force clashes of the war. Quang Ngai, as the home province of many of North and South Vietnam's key leaders, has always been politically active. Binh Dinh, with .9 million people, is by far the most important population center between Danang and Saigon.

- The GVN seems to have the initiative in most of the other 7 provinces. For instance, Table 5 shows that GVN pressure on the enemy is producing many times the rate of Chieu Hoi ralliers in the MR III and IV provinces (from 6 to 24 ralliers each month per 1,000 enemy strength) as in Quang Nam/Quang Ngai/Binh Dinh (only 0.4 to 0.6 per 1,000). ARVN operations against the U Minh Forest and in the ARVN 7th Division area are good examples of the kind of pressure which produces large numbers of ralliers.

TABLE 5

TEN LEAST SECURE PROVINCES IN SVN (Based on HES Data Through Sep 71)

	Population (Millions)	HES A+B Ratings			Province Rank		Military Chieu Hoi per 1000 Enemy Str 1971	
		Dec 70	Sep 71	Change	HES	VSSG	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr
Quang Nam/Danang ^{a/}	1.0	76.9	77.2	+ .3	37	41	2	0.4
Quang Ngai	.7	51.3	62.1	+10.8	36	38	7	0.6
Binh Dinh/Qui Nhon	.9	51.0	33.6	-17.4	44	44	1	0.4
Phu Yen	.3	60.1	55.8	- 4.3	41	40	2	1
Pleiku	.2	56.8	51.3	- 5.5	42	43	2	2
Hau Nghia	.2	54.4	58.7	+ 4.3	40	28	5	6
Kien Hoa	.6	47.6	59.8	+12.2	39	36	19	8
Vinh Binh	.4	42.0	60.0	+18.0	38	27	9	8
Chuung Thien	.3	51.8	47.6	- 4.2	43	42	53	24
An Xuyen	.3	53.7	63.0	+ 9.3	35	39	46	23

a/ A-B population excluding Danang was 61.7% in December 70 and 61.2% in September 71.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- Despite massive amounts of US force assistance to the three provinces, including some of the best examples of the use of US forces in a pacification role (the US Marines in Quang Nam, and the 173rd Brigade in Binh Dinh), the enemy is still deeply entrenched. Table 6 shows that from 1965 through 1971, the three provinces have taken turns leading South Vietnam's 44 provinces in the number of enemy ground attacks each year.

TABLE 6

ENEMY GROUND ATTACKS

	<u>Countrywide</u>	<u>Quang Nam</u>	<u>Quang Ngai</u>	<u>Binh Dinh</u>
Jan-Sep 1971	1225	55 (Rank 6th)	65 (Rank 4th)	167 (Rank 1st)
1970	1766	74 (9)	85 (3)	221 (1)
1969	1613	85 (5)	87 (4)	120 (1)
1968	1500	114 (1)	56 (7)	108 (2)
1967	1538	106 (2)	116 (1)	66 (5)
1966	896	43 (4)	71 (1)	26 (13)
1965	659	48 (2)	52 (1)	44 (3)
1964	633	19 (14)	13 (26)	21 (9)
1963	816	16 (20)	47 (5)	48 (4)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NSA-Gen 72

PACIFICATION TRENDS IN 1971

Summary

Hamlet Evaluation System (HES/71) results for December 1971 show:

- A-B rated population rose 3.2 points in December to 84.3%. This represents a net gain of 9.5 percentage points for all of 1971.

- A-B-C rated population was 96.8%, an 0.8 point rise in December, and a net gain of 2.3 points for the year.

Detailed analysis of HES data shows:

- All four military regions gained in 1971. MR 4 led with a 13.8 point increase in A-B population. (Gains in the other three regions ranged from 5.7 - 8.6 points).

- GVN control of the rural population (measured by the VSSG indicator) rose 9.1 points in 1971 to 76%.

-- It remained unchanged in MR's 1 and 2 despite the overall HES increase.

-- MR 3 had the largest control gain - 14.3 points.

-- Control in MR 4 matched the HES gains up 13.3 points.

-- GVN control in the critical northern coastal provinces (from the DMZ south to Phu Yen) showed a 1.7 point loss for the year.

- Thirty-seven provinces showed improvement in the A-B rated population in 1971. Seven lost ground. Binh Dinh (MR 2) ranked last in the country (42.7%), followed by Chuong Thien (MR 4) at 45.4%.

- 1971 Pacification gains were helped by the low levels of enemy activity during the last half of the year.

- Although the net gain over the year was substantial, it came about in modest steady increases instead of a large spurt in any given quarter (as in past years).

- By the end of this month (February 19, 1972) 136 of the 254 districts will be using Vietnamese reporters for HES. Thus far, the data show no incongruities or abrupt changes as a result of the Vietnamization.

265

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PACIFICATION TRENDS IN 1971

Details

This analysis is based on data from the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES/71) thru December 1971, and various field reports from U.S. advisors and Vietnamese observers.

Overview. A steep decline in enemy activity which began in July, continued through the 4th quarter. This helped HES A-B population rise 9.5 percentage points during 1971; from 74.8% in December 1970 to 84.3% in December 1971. A-B-C rated population increased 2.3 percentage points during the same period and ended the year at 96.8%.

The VSSG control indicator reflected the countrywide HES gain, rising 9.1 percentage points. This more stringent measure of GVN control in rural areas broke thru the 70% level for the first time in September, and finished the year at 76.0%.

TABLE 1

HES PACIFICATION RATINGS (% of RVN Population)

	<u>1970</u> <u>June</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>1971</u> <u>Mar</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>
<u>HES/71 Data</u>								
A-B "HES Rating"	65.4	74.8	74.7	76.8	80.1	80.7	81.1	84.3
A-B-C "HES Rating"	89.9	94.5	93.7	94.7	95.7	96.0	96.0	96.8
<u>VSSG Rating (Rural)</u>								
GVN Control	56.4	66.9	65.8	67.5	71.4	71.9	72.5	76.0

The Military Regions. All four regions ended 1971 with moderate gains. MR 4 had the largest gain (13.8 points) moving to 81.8% A-B population in December compared to 68.0% a year ago. Each of the other three regions had gains of less than 10 points over the year (Table 2).

TABLE 2

HES RATINGS BY MR - AB POPULATION (%)

	<u>1970</u> <u>Dec</u>	<u>1971</u> <u>June</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>1971</u> <u>Dec</u>	<u>1971 Change</u>
MR 1	76.5	72.2	79.0	79.1	79.4	84.4	+ 7.9
MR 2	63.1	61.5	62.4	65.5	66.5	71.7	+ 8.6
MR 3	89.0	90.2	92.2	92.6	93.2	94.7	+ 5.7
MR 4	68.0	74.3	79.3	79.2	79.2	81.8	+13.8
RVN	74.8	76.8	80.1	80.7	81.1	84.3	+ 9.5

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Perhaps the most significant year-end result was produced by the VSSG control indicator (Table 3):

- Despite respectable gains in HES A-B rated population in MRs 1 and 2, GVN control of the rural population remained virtually unchanged.
- GVN control gains far exceeded HES A-B gains in MR 3 (14.5 points for VSSG vs 5.7 points for HES A-B population).
- GVN control gains matched the 13 point rise in HES A-B population in MR 4.

TABLE 3

VSSG CONTROL BY MR (% Rural Population)

	<u>1970</u> <u>Dec</u>	<u>1971</u> <u>June</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>1971 Change</u>
MR 1	72.5	62.2	62.2	64.6	64.8	73.2	+ 0.7
MR 2	54.6	47.0	54.9	55.2	56.1	56.5	+ 1.9
MR 3	68.8	75.5	78.6	78.7	79.1	83.3	+14.5
MR 4	69.2	75.4	79.3	79.2	79.9	82.5	+13.3
RVN	66.9	67.5	71.4	71.9	72.5	76.0	+ 9.1

A separate analysis of the control situation in the northern coastal provinces (MR 1 plus Binh Dinh and Phu Yeu) showed that:

- The GVN controlled 63.9% of the population in January 1971. GVN control dropped to a low of 51.7% in April (and again in June). It then recovered gradually over the second half of the year, but closed short of where it began (finishing at 62.2%).

- Although VC control did not rise appreciably, (it remained below 3.7% all year) the enemy was apparently able to challenge GVN authority in as much as 20% of the area's rural population during the last half of the year.

Historical Patterns

The 1971 HES A-B population gain generally continued the patterns set in previous years: progress in the second half of the year compensated for the annual first half slowdown.

However, 1971 did depart from the pattern in one respect. There was modest, steady improvement in each of the last three quarters instead of a large gain in any single quarter (Table 4). As a result, the net gain over the year was substantial, although far less spectacular than the progress in 1969 and 1970. The data seems to indicate that the GVN can no longer progress by moving into vacuums left by the enemy.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 4

TRENDS IN A-B POPULATION % A-B Population - Gain (+) or Loss (-)

	Old HES			HES/71	
	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
1st Qtr	+1.0	-6.1	+ 2.7	+6.3	- .1
2nd Qtr	+2.2	+1.2	+ 2.4	+4.5	+2.1
3rd Qtr	+2.5	+1.9	+13.7	+7.1	+3.3
4th Qtr	- .7	+7.8	+ 5.7	+2.3	+4.2
Year	+5.0	+4.8	+24.5	+20.2	+9.5

Much of the 1971 pacification gains must be attributed to lack of enemy activity. Table 5 shows that enemy attacks during 1971 as a whole averaged 187 per month, lower than any year since 1966. They were at particularly low levels during the second half of the year. Other types of incidents show similar patterns.

TABLE 5

ATTACKS IN SVN a/

	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	Year Total	Monthly Average
1971	768	726	425	325	2244	187
1970	777	1300	870	584	3539	295
1969	985	1229	759	848	3821	318
1968	1537	1267	594	523	3921	327
1967	478	523	661	814	2476	206
1966	191	198	241	308	938	78
1965	231	170	131	153	685	57

a/ Source: OSD(C) Table 2, SEA Statistical Summary. Includes ground attacks and attacks by fire.

Province Results. Thirty-seven provinces showed increases in A-B population in 1971; seven had declines. Only two of December's ten worst provinces showed net losses over the year.

- Binh Dinh (in MR 2), presently ranked last at 42.7% A-B population in the rural areas, lost 9.6 percentage points in 1971.

- Quang Thien (MR 4), presently ranked 43rd with 45.4% A-B population, lost 5.0 percentage points last year.

The map on the following page shows the ten least secure provinces (based on HES rankings as of December 1971).

CONFIDENTIAL


CONFIDENTIAL

**TEN LEAST SECURE PROVINCES
IN SOUTH VIETNAM**

As of December 1971

Figures indicate 1971 gains (+)
or loss (-) of HES % AB Population

(Province rank and % AB Population as
of December 1971 in Parenthesis)



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- These provinces contain about 25% of RVN's population; however, seven of the ten contain fewer than 500,000 people each.

- The ten provinces averaged 65% A-B population in December.

- Slightly more than half of the rural population (55%) is considered under GVN control in these provinces.

It would take from 2-4 years to bring 70% of the rural population of the five worst provinces (Quang Nam, Binh Dinh, Pleiku, Phu Yen, Chuong Thien) under GVN control at the 1971 rate of progress (0.7 points per month). If the five worst provinces could progress at the 1969 countrywide average rate (2.64 points per month), they could reach 70% control in six months to a year.

Vietnamized HES Reports

Since July, HES results in 128 districts (out of 254) have been reported by Vietnamese. Six more districts are scheduled to begin Vietnamese reporting of HES data this month. We have examined the data from these districts and have found no incongruities or abrupt changes in trends. From this standpoint the transfer of reporting responsibility to the Vietnamese seems to be going well.

((CONFIDENTIAL ((

JUNE HES/71 RESULTS

June Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) results continue to portray some improvement over April's low. Countrywide, AB-rated population moved to 73.0%, up from 72.2% in May and 2.4 points higher than in April.

- Most of the gain was in MR 1
- Enemy controlled (V-rated) hamlets dropped by 155 to 1009, (containing about 557,000 people or 2.9% of the total population). The decline was due primarily to the GVN counter offensive in MR 1.

The Military Regions

AB-rated population in MR 1 improved for the second consecutive month as territorial forces continued to play a major role in restoring security throughout the region. MRs 2 and 3 remained about the same, while in MR 4, the AB-rated population regressed. AB-rated population in:

- MR 1 rose 7.2 points to 56.5%.
- MR 2 rose 1.8 points to 62.5%
- MR 3 increased 0.7 points to 90.0%
- MR 4 fell 2.6 points to 72.1%

The Provinces

AB-rated population increased in 19 provinces, fell in 20, and remained unchanged in 5. The greatest improvement came in provinces where RVNAF operations and declining enemy activity combined to push security upward.

- Thua Thien (MR 1) rose 33.7 points due to the return of refugees and local GVN officials to the populated coastal regions, while enemy political and military activity declined.
- Quang Duc (MR 2) rose 23.1 points because of a decline in enemy military activity.
- Phuoc Long (MR 3) increased 49.0 points, primarily because of reopened roads and a decline in enemy activity.

But a significant drop occurred in Hien Tuong and there is still no AB-rated population in three of Vietnam's provinces.

Classified by 213
TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF
US ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE, AND MARINE CORPS

OASD/SA/REPRO
SEA Division
July 26, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

((CONFIDENTIAL ((

- Kien Tuong (MR 4) fell 26.7 points, primarily because of the 5th NVA division's attacks. .

- Kontum (MR 2), Binh Long (MR 3), and Quang Tri (MR 1) continue to have no AB population.


Map 1 shows the ten least secure provinces in Vietnam in May.

CONFIDENTIAL

MAP 1

Ten Least Secure Provinces in South Vietnam June 1972

Figures indicate June 1972
gain (+) or loss (-) in HES
% AB population (Province
rank is shown in parenthesis).
Asterisk indicates province
which regressed ten or more
points in June.



CONFIDENTIAL

MID YEAR PACIFICATION ASSESSMENT

Summary

The current NVA offensive adversely affected mid-year pacification results. Hamlet Evaluation System (HES 71) results through June 1972 reveal:

- A-B rated population declined 11.3% during the first six months of 1972.
- A-B-C rated population declined 7.1%.
- VSSG Rural Control Indicator declined 15%.

Detailed analysis of HES data shows:

- MR 1 predictably sustained the greatest GVN control recession (-27.9%).
- MR 4 is the only region to continue the control decline in every month since the offensive with a 9.7% total decrease over the six month period. All other regions showed slight increases in May and/or June.
- Fourteen provinces suffered a decline of A-B population of 20% or greater thus far this year. Two of these provinces, Hau Nghia and Kien Tuong, are on traditional infiltration corridors to Saigon.

Preliminary July HES data appears to fit with the trends observed during the first six months of the year.

Terrorism this year has surpassed the level experienced during the comparable period of the 1968 Tet Offensive. As a result, the likely totals of terrorist incidents and resulting civilian casualties could reach an all-time high in 1972.

Although GVN attention and resources are naturally focused on the main force war and the issue of national survival, unless pacification progress is revitalized, there is a possibility that control may further deteriorate and future recovery made exceedingly difficult.

Renewed pacification efforts will be affected by the potential of further enemy initiatives and the ability of RVNAF to properly balance the conflicting demands of the main force war with territorial security.

Modest pacification progress will most probably continue, but a recovery rate similar to that experienced after Tet 68 is not probable. RVNAF military reoccupation of enemy controlled areas, while a prerequisite, is not a substitute for the lengthy and delicate process of re-establishing effective local government and instituting new community development programs. Country-wide, pre-offensive security levels could be reached by the end of 1973. The GVN may achieve control over 77% of the total population by the end of 1972 (almost midway to recovery), but results will probably not be uniform.

Classified by DASD/REPRO(OASD/SA)
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652. AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 12/31/73
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OASD/SA/REPRO
August 31, 1972

273

CONFIDENTIAL

DECEMBER HES RESULTS

(C) Countrywide Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) results displayed a 7.2% increase in total secure (HES A-B rated population) to 79.6% at the end of December. ^{1/} This was the largest control gain recorded in 1972.

The Military Regions

(C) All MR's reported an increase in HES A-B rated population during the month.

MR 1 increased 28.5% to 72.9%.

MR 2 increased 3.0% to 69.7%.

MR 3 increased 0.7% to 91.4%.

MR 4 increased 4.4% to 77.8%.

(C) The HES in all of MR 1's 48 districts were reported by the Vietnamese in December, as MR 1 became the first region to achieve total Vietnamese reporting. MR 3 reporting was almost completely Vietnamized in December (only 2 of the 65 districts in the region were reported by US). MR 4 is 73% Vietnamized (26 of 98 districts reported by US) while MR 2 has 37 districts reported by Vietnamese out of a total of 61 (or 61% Vietnamized).

(C) The dramatic increase in MR 1 in December was caused by a variety of factors:

- Enemy military activity decreased sharply as he conserved force. Local cadre were also primarily occupied with planning and coordinating military and political activity for the ceasefire and VCI activity was abnormally low.

- Coinciding with this enemy decline, RVNAF, under the forceful leadership of General Truong, commenced highly effective military operations oriented on protection of the densely populated coastal strip in the region. (To emphasize his interest in the central and southern portion of MR 1, General Truong has moved his CP south from Hue to Danang.)

- The winter monsoon in MR 1 also played a role in the enemy recession (this seasonal drop has been observed in prior years).

1/ HES ratings include a range from A (most secure) to E (least secure), N (non-evaluated due to insufficient data) and V (under physical control of the enemy). A-B rated population live under comparatively high military security and law enforcement, are subject to only sporadic VC infrastructure activity, and enjoy good socio-economic conditions.

CONFIDENTIAL - (C) (S) (U) (E) (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J) (K) (L) (M) (N) (O) (P) (Q) (R) (S) (T) (U) (V) (W) (X) (Y) (Z) (AA) (AB) (AC) (AD) (AE) (AF) (AG) (AH) (AI) (AJ) (AK) (AL) (AM) (AN) (AO) (AP) (AQ) (AR) (AS) (AT) (AU) (AV) (AW) (AX) (AY) (AZ) (BA) (BB) (BC) (BD) (BE) (BF) (BG) (BH) (BI) (BJ) (BK) (BL) (BM) (BN) (BO) (BP) (BQ) (BR) (BS) (BT) (BU) (BV) (BW) (BX) (BY) (BZ) (CA) (CB) (CC) (CD) (CE) (CF) (CG) (CH) (CI) (CJ) (CK) (CL) (CM) (CN) (CO) (CP) (CQ) (CR) (CS) (CT) (CU) (CV) (CW) (CX) (CY) (CZ) (DA) (DB) (DC) (DD) (DE) (DF) (DG) (DH) (DI) (DJ) (DK) (DL) (DM) (DN) (DO) (DP) (DQ) (DR) (DS) (DT) (DU) (DV) (DW) (DX) (DY) (DZ) (EA) (EB) (EC) (ED) (EE) (EF) (EG) (EH) (EI) (EJ) (EK) (EL) (EM) (EN) (EO) (EP) (EQ) (ER) (ES) (ET) (EU) (EV) (EW) (EX) (EY) (EZ) (FA) (FB) (FC) (FD) (FE) (FF) (FG) (FH) (FI) (FJ) (FK) (FL) (FM) (FN) (FO) (FP) (FQ) (FR) (FS) (FT) (FU) (FV) (FW) (FX) (FY) (FZ) (GA) (GB) (GC) (GD) (GE) (GF) (GG) (GH) (GI) (GJ) (GK) (GL) (GM) (GN) (GO) (GP) (GQ) (GR) (GS) (GT) (GU) (GV) (GW) (GX) (GY) (GZ) (HA) (HB) (HC) (HD) (HE) (HF) (HG) (HH) (HI) (HJ) (HK) (HL) (HM) (HN) (HO) (HP) (HQ) (HR) (HS) (HT) (HU) (HV) (HW) (HX) (HY) (HZ) (IA) (IB) (IC) (ID) (IE) (IF) (IG) (IH) (II) (IJ) (IK) (IL) (IM) (IN) (IO) (IP) (IQ) (IR) (IS) (IT) (IU) (IV) (IW) (IX) (IY) (IZ) (JA) (JB) (JC) (JD) (JE) (JF) (JG) (JH) (JI) (JJ) (JK) (JL) (JM) (JN) (JO) (JP) (JQ) (JR) (JS) (JT) (JU) (JV) (JW) (JX) (JY) (JZ) (KA) (KB) (KC) (KD) (KE) (KF) (KG) (KH) (KI) (KJ) (KK) (KL) (KM) (KN) (KO) (KP) (KQ) (KR) (KS) (KT) (KU) (KV) (KW) (KX) (KY) (KZ) (LA) (LB) (LC) (LD) (LE) (LF) (LG) (LH) (LI) (LJ) (LK) (LL) (LM) (LN) (LO) (LP) (LQ) (LR) (LS) (LT) (LU) (LV) (LW) (LX) (LY) (LZ) (MA) (MB) (MC) (MD) (ME) (MF) (MG) (MH) (MI) (MJ) (MK) (ML) (MM) (MN) (MO) (MP) (MQ) (MR) (MS) (MT) (MU) (MV) (MW) (MX) (MY) (MZ) (NA) (NB) (NC) (ND) (NE) (NF) (NG) (NH) (NI) (NJ) (NK) (NL) (NM) (NN) (NO) (NP) (NQ) (NR) (NS) (NT) (NU) (NV) (NW) (NX) (NY) (NZ) (OA) (OB) (OC) (OD) (OE) (OF) (OG) (OH) (OI) (OJ) (OK) (OL) (OM) (ON) (OO) (OP) (OQ) (OR) (OS) (OT) (OU) (OV) (OW) (OX) (OY) (OZ) (PA) (PB) (PC) (PD) (PE) (PF) (PG) (PH) (PI) (PJ) (PK) (PL) (PM) (PN) (PO) (PP) (PQ) (PR) (PS) (PT) (PU) (PV) (PW) (PX) (PY) (PZ) (QA) (QB) (QC) (QD) (QE) (QF) (QG) (QH) (QI) (QJ) (QK) (QL) (QM) (QN) (QO) (QP) (QQ) (QR) (QS) (QT) (QU) (QV) (QW) (QX) (QY) (QZ) (RA) (RB) (RC) (RD) (RE) (RF) (RG) (RH) (RI) (RJ) (RK) (RL) (RM) (RN) (RO) (RP) (RQ) (RR) (RS) (RT) (RU) (RV) (RW) (RX) (RY) (RZ) (SA) (SB) (SC) (SD) (SE) (SF) (SG) (SH) (SI) (SJ) (SK) (SL) (SM) (SN) (SO) (SP) (SQ) (SR) (SS) (ST) (SU) (SV) (SW) (SX) (SY) (SZ) (TA) (TB) (TC) (TD) (TE) (TF) (TG) (TH) (TI) (TJ) (TK) (TL) (TM) (TN) (TO) (TP) (TQ) (TR) (TS) (TT) (TU) (TV) (TW) (TX) (TY) (TZ) (UA) (UB) (UC) (UD) (UE) (UF) (UG) (UH) (UI) (UJ) (UK) (UL) (UM) (UN) (UO) (UP) (UQ) (UR) (US) (UT) (UU) (UV) (UW) (UX) (UY) (UZ) (VA) (VB) (VC) (VD) (VE) (VF) (VG) (VH) (VI) (VJ) (VK) (VL) (VM) (VN) (VO) (VP) (VQ) (VR) (VS) (VT) (VU) (VV) (VW) (VX) (VY) (VZ) (WA) (WB) (WC) (WD) (WE) (WF) (WG) (WH) (WI) (WJ) (WK) (WL) (WM) (WN) (WO) (WP) (WQ) (WR) (WS) (WT) (WU) (WV) (WW) (WX) (WY) (WZ) (XA) (XB) (XC) (XD) (XE) (XF) (XG) (XH) (XI) (XJ) (XK) (XL) (XM) (XN) (XO) (XP) (XQ) (XR) (XS) (XT) (XU) (XV) (XW) (XX) (XY) (XZ) (YA) (YB) (YC) (YD) (YE) (YF) (YG) (YH) (YI) (YJ) (YK) (YL) (YM) (YN) (YO) (YP) (YQ) (YR) (YS) (YT) (YU) (YV) (YW) (YX) (YY) (YZ) (ZA) (ZB) (ZC) (ZD) (ZE) (ZF) (ZG) (ZH) (ZI) (ZJ) (ZK) (ZL) (ZM) (ZN) (ZO) (ZP) (ZQ) (ZR) (ZS) (ZT) (ZU) (ZV) (ZW) (ZX) (ZY) (ZZ)

OASD/SA/REFRO
January 26, 1973

- Quarterly updates of the HES were accomplished in December (140 of the 165 routine HES questions are quarterly questions). The previous update was accomplished in September, a time when the southern portion of the region (especially Quang Ngai) was in the throes of a renewed communist offensive targeting the populated areas. December, in contrast, saw the GVN in the best security position in MR 1 since the beginning of the offensive in April.

- Some inflation may have distorted the ratings as the region went to 100% Vietnamized reporting (CORDS analysts, however, feel this effect was probably true in only one province, Quang Tin).

The Provinces

(U) Total HES rated secure population increased in 31 provinces, decreased in 7, and remain unchanged in 6 provinces.

(C) Quang Tri reported no secure population for the ninth consecutive month. Phu Thien (+16.1%), Quang Nam (+31.0%), Quang Tin (+39.9%), and Quang Ngai (+33.1%) reported major increases primarily as a result of RVNAF military initiatives, GVN political activity and a decrease in all forms of enemy activity.

(C) In MR 2, Binh Dinh increased to 42.3% secure population (+7.4%) primarily as a result of enemy military and political inactivity and corresponding GVN activity. Phu Bon (+8.2%) and Quang Duc (+9.3%) also reported control increases for the month.

(C) In MR 3 only Long Khanh (-6.2%) suffered a significant control loss to 62.7% secure population primarily as a result of receding security conditions caused by increased enemy military presence. Binh Long remained at 0% secure population (for the eighth consecutive month). Critical Hau Nghia Province on the Saigon River Corridor gained 8.6% secure population (to 58.7%) due to an improved GVN political position, the impact of GVN sponsored community development programs, and a slightly improved security situation. Sparsely populated Phuoc Long province reported 95.7% A-B rated population, a gain of 12.6%.

(C) In the Delta, Kien Giang recorded 76.1% secure population (+14.7%) due to improved security conditions, enemy political inactivity, and GVN community development progress. Chuong Thien province gained 7.4% in December to 36.0% secure population (the highest level this beleaguered area has attained since the offensive) primarily as a result of decreased enemy political pressure. Kien Phong (+6.2%), Kien Hoa (+5.4%), Ba Xuyen (+9.7%) and Bac Lieu (+9.5%) also reported notable increases in HES A-B rated Population.

(C) Map 1 displays the ten least and the ten most secure provinces in Vietnam as reflected by HES A-B security scores. An Xuyen (MR 4) is the only new addition to the least secure list for December, replacing Quang Nam (MR 1) from the November ratings. Phuoc Long (MR 3) and Kien Phong (MR 4) replaced Khanh Hoa (MR 2) and Kien Tuong (MR 4) on the most secure list for December.

CONFIDENTIAL

3

(U) Chart 1 depicts the monthly fluctuations of HES A-B rated population by MR for 1972.


275

CONFIDENTIAL

CHART 1

HES PACIFICATION RATINGS
JAN-DEC 1972

Secure Population
(HES A-B rated) as
% Of Total
Population



(C) Countrywide Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) results displayed a 3.5% decrease in total secure (HES A-B rated) population to 76.1% at the end of January.^{1/} The loss in secure population was primarily due to the flurry of pre-ceasefire activity during the last ten days of the month. Subsequent field reports indicate that most of these control losses were temporary in nature.

The Military Regions

(C) All Military Regions reported a slight decrease in HES A-B rated population during the month.

MR 1 decreased 3.0% to 69.9%.

MR 2 decreased 3.2% to 66.5%.

MR 3 decreased 4.1% to 87.3%.

MR 4 decreased 3.1% to 74.7%.

The Provinces

(C) Total GVN secure population decreased in 32 provinces, increased in 8, and remained unchanged in 4 provinces.

(C) Quang Tri reported no secure population for the eleventh consecutive month (since March 1972). Quang Ngai endured a 9.1% recession in GVN secured population to 40.7% primarily due to NVA activity in the populated areas of the southern districts, Mo Duc and Duc Pho (the Sa Huynh area).

(C) In MR 2, secure population declined in Khanh Hoa (-10.1%), Binh Thuan (-10.8%), and Darlac (-6.8%) as the enemy forces concentrated attacks on lines of communication and attempted to infiltrate selected population centers. Beleaguered Binh Dinh Province gained 2.0% A-B rated population (recording a gain for the third consecutive month).

(C) In MR 3, concerted enemy initiated activity during the last four days of January caused control declines in Tay Ninh (-30.7%), Hau Nghia (-6.6%), and Long Khanh (-6.0%). The significant loss in Tay Ninh was due to the communist short-lived attempt to infiltrate Tay Ninh City. Binh Long remained at 0% A-B rated population for the tenth successive rating period (since April 1972).

^{1/} HES ratings include a range from A (most secure) to E (least secure), N (non-evaluated due to insufficient data) and V (under physical control of the enemy). A-B rated population live under comparatively high military security and law enforcement, are subject to only sporadic VC infrastructure activity and enjoy good socio-economic conditions.

CONFIDENTIAL

(C) In the Delta, Kien Phong (-10.3%), Chau Doc (-9.3%), and Chuong Thien (-8.7%) reported serious control losses in January. Enemy activity in the area began two days preceding the ceasefire and continued through the end of the month. With the exception of Chuong Thien, the control losses were largely regained by swift FVN counteractions.

(C) Map 1 displays the ten least and the ten most secure provinces in South Vietnam as reflected by HES A-B security scores for January. There were no changes from December rankings.

(U) Chart 1 depicts the fluctuations of HES A-B rated population by MR for the last thirteen months.

CONFIDENTIAL

THE LEAST AND TEN MOST SECURE PROVINCES IN
SOUTH VIETNAM - HES RATINGS AS OF JANUARY 1973


[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

CHART 1

HES PACIFICATION RATINGS
JAN 72 - JAN 73

Secure Population
(HES A-B rated) as
% Of Total
Population



CONFIDENTIAL